Heavy artillery ammunition usage USSR, Germany, USA (pcs.)

Heavy artillery ammunition usage (pcs.)
	1942	1943	1944	Jan-May 1945
USSR
152 mm cannon BR-2			9,900	3,036
203 mm howitzer 1931	107,400	216,470	167,770	167,620
210 mm cannon			50	792
280 mm mortar			3,322	7,363
305 mm howitzer			656	2,764
Germany
15cm K 16 & 18	78,370	57,300	90,900
15cm K 39	43,850	65,250	15,500
15cm K Mrs.Laf.	4,370	5,460	7,900
15cm K. 15/16(t)		180
15,5cm K 416(f)	158,800	266,800	352,200
15,5cm K 418(f) [155 GPF]	54,800	110,500	266,800
17cm K Mrs.Laf.	25,650	115,140	270,000
21cm Mrs 18	339,130	404,640	507,600
21cm Lg.Mrs 16	2,100
21cm K 38 & 39/40	3,720	18,090	15,800
21cm Kz.Mrs(t)	450	520
24cm K 3	1,352	4,310	1,710
24cm H 39	3,070	9,370	6,726
24cm s.K(t)	470	1,047	340
28cm Kusten Haubitze	3,600	401
30,5cm Mrs(t)	7,350	6,371	595
35,5cm Haubitze M1	513	539	100
42cm Gamma Mrs.	449
USA			Jun 1944 - May 1945
155mm Howitzer M1			4,548,526
155mm Field Gun M1A1			1,395,225
8 inch Howitzer			484,523
8 inch Field Gun			41,652
240mm Howitzer			82,494

Sources: VIF2NE (1)
VIF2NE (2)
VIF2NE (3)
VIF2NE (4)

Infantry gun ammunition usage USSR and Germany

Sources: VIF2NE (1)
VIF2NE (2)
VIF2NE (3)
VIF2NE (4)

Field gun ammunition usage (pcs.)
	1942	1943	1944	Jan-May 1945
USSR
76 mm regiment 1927	5,063,100	6,760,830	6,233,100	2,454,800
76 mm regimental 1943			714,300	1,099,300
Germany
7.5cm le.I.G.18	6,200,465	7,796,300	10,817,300
7,62cm IKH 290(r)		118,640	1,261,500
15cm s.I.G.33	1,115,610	1,493,700	2,287,800
7,5cm LG 40			99,800
10,5cm LG 40 & 42	43,350	87,730	183,900

USSR, USA and Germany Field gun ammunition usage.

Sources: VIF2NE
VIF2NE
VIF2NE
VIF2NE

Field gun ammunition usage (pcs.)
	1942	1943	1944	Jan-May 1945
USSR
76 mm 02-30-1936.	10,024,200	20,780,800	24,825,300	14,301,900
76 mm mount. 1938		175,500	166,400	125,500
85 mm			447,000	802,800
122 mm howitzer	4,306,200	5,474,780	7,610,100	4,041,800
100 mm			5,940	126,000
107 mm 10/1930	322,000	142,900	99,800	0
122 mm 1931	599,100	701,300	768,400	622,200
152 mm howitz.	706,300	934,700	996,100	669,300
152 mm mount. 1937 г.	1,508,800	2,364,000	2,537,100	1,364,200
Germany
10cm le.FH 30(t)	31,340	211,960	92,400
10cm le.FH 14/19(t)	137,800	212,380	763,200
10,5cm Geb.H 40	2,390	68,920	433,400
10cm le.FK 18	17,751,086	26,034,350	31,104,600
10cm s.K 18	1,209,800	1,906,800	2,147,700
10,5cm s.K 35(t)	39,400	45,130	213,900
10,5cm K 331(f)	33,400	177,000	808,000
10,5cm K 332(f)	2,400	18,260	42,450
12cm Haubitze 14 & 15/16(t)	230
12,2cm le.FH 388(r) [10/30]	3,200	61,280	42,200
12,2cm le.FH 396(r) [M-30]	6,100	43,820	690,600
12,2cm K 390(r) [A-19]	4,900	19,400	312,500
15cm s.FH 18	4,481,985	6,470,400	6,774,500
15,5cm s.FH 414(f)	175,100	1,208,430	1,334,500
15cm s.FH 25(t)	33,800	74,800	12,000
15cm s.FH 37(t)	81,570	134,700	120,700
15,2cm s.FH 445(r) [09/30]		23,830	20,850
15,2cm s.FH 443(r) [M-10]			15,300
15,2cm K.H. 433(r) [ML-20]	12,330	57,954	292,000
22cm Mrs 531(f)	65,300	232,200	118,270
USA				Jun 1944 - May 1945
37mm M10, M1A2, M3, M6, AA-M9				1,637,895
40mm AA M1 Bofors				1,153,156
57mm AT				631,080
75mm M1 Howitzer, M8 GMC				1,604,617
75mm Gun M3, GMC M10				2,003,952
76,2mm Gun M7, GMC M10, M10A1				1,639,780
90mm Gun M3, GMC M36				424,741
90mm AA Gun M1, M1A1				1,002,141
105mm Howitzer M2A1				16,808,000
105mm Howitzer M3				1,972,349
4.5 inch Howitzer M1				694,234
155mm Howitzer M1				4,548,526
155mm Field Gun M1A1				1,395,225
8 inch Howitzer				484,523
8 inch Field Gun				41,652
240mm Howitzer				82,494

USSR, USA and Germany Mortar ammunition usage.

Sources: VIF2NE (1)
VIF2NE (2)
VIF2NE (3)
VIF2NE (4)

Small arms ammo usage

Mortar ammunition usage (pcs.)
	1942	1943	1944	Jan-May 1945
USSR
50 mm	13,144,200	11,207,300	3,236,500	224,600
82 mm	15,145,300	37,808,100	42,550,700	25,328,900
107 mm	293,800	110,300	386,400	291,300
120 mm	3,008,200	10,886,900	15,454,200	10,080,700
160 mm				203,650
USA
			June 1944 - May 1945
60mm M19			4,881,196
81mm M1			6,324,249
Germany
5cm Gr.W.36	8,646,580	6,828,300	3,903,600
5cm Gr.W. 205(r)		725,050
8cm Gr.W.34	9,605,075	11,781,400	24,182,700
8cm Gr.W.(t)		60,940
8,2cm Gr.W. 274(r)		326,630	218,700
12cm Gr.W.378(r)	2,900	8,800
12cm Gr.W.42		207,510	2,983,500
10cm Nb.W.35	444,950	571,210	416,700
10cm Nb.W.40	106,900	257,810	153,900

Small arms ammo usage

Ammo usage: USSR, Germany and USA

Sources: VIF2NE
VIF2NE
VIF2NE
VIF2NE

Mortar ammo usage.

Small arms ammo usage, pcs.
	1942	1943	1944	Jan-May 1945
USSR
7,62 mm rifle.	2,284,369,800	2,905,355,200	3,013,572,600	1,293,287,000
7,62 mm Nagant	16,876,600	15,350,400	16,289,100	9,411,000
7,62 mm TT	569,321,900	2,446,501,100	2,637,625,700	1,287,382,000
12,7 mm DShK	11,311,200	21,816,900	27,490,700	19,656,000
14,5 mm ATR	9,154,150	25,719,600	17,234,000	6,517,000
Germany
9mm Pistolen & Maschinepistolen	216,415,200	324,016,200	451,732,500
Sturmgewehr			164,572,600
7.92mm Gewehr, Karabiner & Maschinegewehr	2,830,274,650	3,259,634,800	4,168,975,300
Pz.Buchsen	768,600	442,900
USA
			June 44 - May 45
.30 M1 Carbine			130,022,000
.30 M1 Rifle			241,885,000
.30 M1903 Rifle			56,164,000
.30 M1918 Automatic Rifle			11,310,000
.30 M1917/M1919 Machine Gun			392,088,000
.45 Pistol M1911, M1928 SMG, M3 SMG			97,369,000
.50 M2 Machine Gun (ground)			10,561,900

Mortar ammo usage.

24th Army Losses 15-26 September 1942

Information about the losses within the Rifle Divisions of the 24th Army.

For period from 15.09 to 26.09.1942

Division name	Staff				Horses
	KIA	WIA, Shell-shocked, Sick	MIA or Captured	Total
396 Rifle Division	387	1762	34	2177	38
49 Rifle Division	494	2029	185	2708	169
231 Rifle Division	249	1304	29	1582	93
233 Rifle Division	1587	5097	289	6968	194
	2701	10192	532	13435	494

Division name	Equipment
	Guns 152mm	Guns 122mm	Guns 76mm	AT guns	Mortars	Mounted MG	Light MG	PPSh	AT rifles
396 Rifle Division	-	-	-	4	-	5	-	86	2
49 Rifle Division	-	-	2	3	21	30	60	-	19
231 Rifle Division	-	1	1	4	27	10	4	1	1
233 Rifle Division	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	2	4	11	48	45	64	87	22

24th Army, captain Nikitchenko,
2 rank intendant-technician Sholomin

Original scan

ЦАМО, Фонд: 206, Опись: 262, Дело: 107

Meeting of command staff of the 1st guards Army

Meeting

Of division and separate units commanders, commissars,
Artillery leaders and heads of command staff of the 1st guards Army.

29.9.1942
(2km South East from Sovkhoz Kotluban) ravine.

Report of the head of staff of army colonel Ivanov.

Results of combat operations of the 1st guards army from 18.09 to 30.09.1942

1. The objective, set for the 1st guards army to break through the enemy’s defense line and connecting with the Stalingrad defenders was failed. The Soviet reports have specific style of minimizing or ignoring positive things and highlighting bad things, because those need to be addressed.
   This causes the so-called "archive depression" for an unprepared reader when things seem much worse than they actually were.
2. We had enough forces to fulfill the objective. The force balance was on our side, especially in manpower, vehicles and weapons. The enemy had supremacy mostly (1000 planes) in the air. The enemy had 76th infantry division, parts of 60th and 3rd motorised division.
3. the concentration of forces was not properly concealed because:
   • constant enemy air scouting and
   • possible information leak caused by defectors from 173 rifle division on 17.09 (this data requires checking).
4. The main strike was performed by the left flank of the 1st guards army (in the strip of 316 rifle division and 7th tank corps).
5. The execution of the operation.
   The fighting has begun:
   • 18.09. The defense of the enemy was broken in the strip of the 316 rifle division. Hill 154.2 was taken by one regiment of the 316th rd and the advancing units rushed towards farm Borodkin. 4th Tank Corps did not enter the breakthrough in time. Due to absolutely unsatisfactory leadership of the 316rd, they did not gain a foothold on the hill 154.2 and no weapons {like cannons} were brought in, no recon was organized. The enemy could attack (supported by 50 tanks) this hill in the second part of the day and retake it. Commander and commissaar of the 1073 regiment deserted from the battlefield and were sent to court-martial. The commander and commissar of the 316rd have let the command out of their hands. The hill 154.2 has a high importance within the strip of offense of the 1st guards army because it is dominant on the front of offensive operations of our army and possessing it will put our forces in a better position. Further on a fight was ongoing for a few days for possessing that hill. The 260th rifle division and 4th tank corps (7th tank corps went dry) were sent to battle. At this time the Germans were concentrating their forces and intensified the bombing.
   • Due to lack of results of this offensive, future operations were transferred to the right flank . The main strike was performed in the strip of the 273rd, 258th rifle divisions and 16th tank corps. According to the new order of the commander of the army the 273rd rifle division, acting quite energetically has taken hill 130,4. The 16th tank corps entered the battle and did provide help, but the infantry did not gain a foothold (by this time some artillery regiments and mortar regiments were taken away from the army).
6. By this time the situation in the army is as follows. The attacks will be continued in order to tie up enemy forces from the siege of Stalingrad, thus supporting the Stalingrad defenders. For this, units of the rear should be cleared and part of the forces should be sent to the front units to reinforce them.
7. the result of the offensive actions of the army was:
   • partially the forces enemy were taken away from Stalingrad,
   • same for the German aviation
8. Operations of our divisions.
   • 173rd did not accomplish its task. It reported its initial location on hill 108.4 wrongly. This hill was in the hands of the Germans. It moved only for a small distance throughout the entire offensive period.
   • 273rd was taking part in the 2nd period of the offensive in the direction of the main attack and did fulfill its objective. The division has organized a breakthrough in the region of hill 130.4 but did not gain a foothold.
   • 258rd within the first period of the fighting did not take hill 118.1 despite having a lot of supporting weapons.
     Unsatisfactory leadership of the division played a role in that.
   • 292rd for ten days of fighting did not move a bit, but lost a lot of men and only by 29.09 approached the frontal edge of the enemy defense.
   • 260rd is totally disorganized. Absolutely unsatisfactory leadership from the commander and commissar of the division. The staff is not put-together and is poor at controlling the combat. Units of the division took a long time to cross the balkas and were only brought in the proper direction by the staff commanders of the staff of the Army. Did not meet its objective.
   • 221rd has low manpower. Accomplished the objective on a satisfactory level.
   • The artillery was miserable during the offensive. The fire was unaimed (they cannot even concentrate fire). The artillery did not make way for the infantry with its fire, because of this very few enemy fire-positions were suppressed and did not follow up the infantry while in offence. This altogether does not help the overall progress of the attack.
   • Tank actions. Tanks move very slowly during the offensive. Tankers do not trust the artillery men because the latter do not support tank attacks. There were cases of attacks in the wrong directions.
   • Staff work. Account of the losses is very poor. Urgent messages are delivered to staff with huge delays. Leadership is not precise. Frequently the control is lost. Unit work checking is not organized which results in many mistakes and frequent lying.
   • The main drawback in staff and unit work is poor organization of cooperation between infantry, artillery and tanks. More precisely, there is no cooperation at all. That is why units operate without proper cooperation and naturally don’t have success in their offensive.
   • One of big drawbacks in actions is lack of cooperation between the neighboring units. They do not support each other which also does not help the offensive.

Objectives on 30.09

• Eliminate the German bulge in the region of hill 123.6 because it interferes with the future offensive.
• Use existing forces to attack and use rear units to increase the numbers of frontal units.

Instructions of the Army Commander.

• many commanders show signs of lack of belief in victory. (Commanders, 316rd, 260rd), which undoubtedly has a negative effect on the fighting. We must fight these moods. Those who think in such a way should free up their posts and not interfere with fighting.
  We have all the necessary forces and equipment to crush the German fascists.
• By this time, the situation is such that the enemy wants to take Stalingrad despite any losses. Our mission is to help the Stalingrad garrison to repel all the attacks and prevent the enemy from reaching Volga.
• despite us breaking the German defenses twice (316rd, 273rd) we were unable to exploit the success. One of the reasons for this is poor division leadership and also unsatisfactory organization of cooperation.
• 16th tank corps during the offensive lost the attack direction twice and did not fulfill its objective.
• A drawback of our attacks is that the infantry uses little machine guns, submachine guns and rifle fire. Evidence to that is the fact that for ten days of fighting there were no ammo requests from the divisions.
• We observe German submachine gunners operating near our Command posts and Observing posts. We must urgently clear those areas.
• Please keep in mind that German submachine gunners and snipers are hunting primarily lower ranked officers.

Conclusion:

1. immediately address the errors pointed out by me and the head of the staff and by all means resolve them.
2. clarify the international situation {to the subordinates} and address the moods that do not facilitate the fulfillment of our common goals.

Member of the Military Council division commissar Abramov points out:

1. The military Council during the offensive was sending its representatives to 35 battalions and they have presented the material proving the unsatisfactory work performed to organize the offensive. Most of the issues were pointed out buy the army commander and the chief of staff.
   Additionally to that:
2. • not everywhere the commanders are leading the offensive spirit of the soldiers.
   • We see a lot of cases of unskilled use of weapons. During the 10 days of fighting we have spent 10 railroad cars of ammo with absolutely unsatisfactory results.
   • There are many cases of poor responsibility shown by the leadership regarding the implementation of orders.
   • The condition of party and political work is not satisfactory because it does not address the most basic questions regarding the combat support.
   • Active bayoneta saying means a front line soldier with a weapon term is understood incorrectly in the divisions, for instance: a regiment has just over a 1000 of men, but only several active bayonets are accounted for. This is wrong. We must account for all the specialists that have individual and collective weapons as well.
   • Brigade commissar Layok adds about the unsatisfactory work of evacuation services. Treatment of wounded is poorly organized especially if they get to other sanitary battalions which belong to other divisions.

ЦАМО, Фонд: 292, Опись: 6911, Дело: 41