Description of battle between the 53rd grds tank brigade and “Tiger B” type tanks.

19.08.1944

To head of staff of the 3rd Tank Army.

With order Nr. … From 11th August 1944 the Commander of the 16 tank division has set up a task to take the small Schidlow with two columns to slice our combat order, with the right column through Otamuw and the left column through Rakuw.

The corps intel has timely discovered a tank gathering place near small Schidlow, with either Tiger or Panther type tanks assembling and moving to the East. The left enemy formation managed to push back units of the 112 rifle division and take Rakuw. Fierce battles were raging in the direction to Stashuw where separate enemy tanks managed to rip through the defenses to the Eastern border of Stashuw.

53rd tank brigade with separate tanks from 71st grds heavy tank regiment after organizing several tank ambushes in the region: Zelebitza, hill 247.9, Ponik, along the reverse sides of hills, has engaged in battles to the North West and West of the Eastern border of Stashuw.

52nd tank brigade was sent to strike the enemy from the rear and to capture the hill 272.1 and to advance in the direction towards Oseletz, Kshiv[unclear], kol. Zhendruw, Pechenogi Gatzki, Mokre, has reached the region of Mokre and organized tank ambushes at Mokre and on the Northern edge of the grove which is East of the Mokre.

This way enemies' routes to the South and retreat to the West were cut off. When moving further enemy tanks have exposed their sides to the fire of tanks of the 53rd grds tank brigade and 71st grds heavy tank regiment which were in the ambush. The distance of fire was 200-250m.

As a result 3 tanks burned down and 3 were knocked out (caterpillars were broken). Trying to help these tanks the enemy has attempted several attacks from Schidluw, but tanks of 52nd and 53rd grds tank brigades have repelled all of them, firing from the ambushes, destroying 9 enemy tanks as well as the enemy's towing vehicle.

Without the possibility to evacuate the knocked out tanks, their crews abandoned them and ran away. Groups of sub machine gunners who supported the tanks were hit by RS [Katyushas] several times which resulted in most of them being killed, while the rest fled to the North and North West directions.

Enemy attempt to break through to Yaseny direction was not successful and was stopped by the fire of the 1893 self-propelled artillery regiment [unclear] which was dropped near hill 284.2 and destroyed 5 enemy tanks.

As a result of three day battles the 501st separate heavy tank battalion which was armed with “Tiger B” tanks, lost 20 tanks and was forced to retreat and go defensive near Eastern part of small Schidluw.

The first evacuated tank was sent to the commander of the forces of the 1st Ukrainian front Marshal of the Soviet Union, comrade Konev. This tank didn’t make a single shot.

Chief of staff of the 6th grds tank corps. Guards Colonel Lebedev.

ЦАМО, Фонд: 315, Опись: 4440, Дело: 172
ЦАМО, Фонд: 315, Опись: 4440, Дело: 172

Report from the Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov and Marshal Rokossovsky to the Supreme Commander about the Warsaw operation plan for the 1st Belorussian front.

Active Army.

8 August 1944

To the Supreme Commander Marshal of the Soviet Union comrade Stalin.

Reporting our views about the following combat activities of the forces of the 1st Belorussian front and about the estimate of the Warsaw operation plan.

1. The front can begin the Warsaw operation after the right wing armies reach the region of river Narev and capture the bridgehead on its Western bank near Pultusk and Serotsk.
   The combat formations of these armies are around 120km away from river Narev and it will take around 10 days to cover that distance. This way the right wing of the front should perform an offensive operation with reaching Narev from 10th to 20.08.1944.
2. Within this time on the left flank of the front the 69th army, 8th grds Army, 7th grds Cavalry Corps and 11th Tank Corps must perform a local operation with objective to enlarge the bridgehead on Vistula river Western bank and to reach the region of Varka, Strometz, Radom, Vezhbitsa.
   To carry out this operation Katukov's 1st Tank Army must be transferred from 1st Ukrainian Front to 1st Belorussian Front and send it from Opatuw through Ostrovetz, Senno with the objective to strike in the Northern direction and reach the front: Zwoleny, Radom; by this supporting the 69th, 8th grds Army, 6th Cav.Corps and 11th Tank Corps in crushing the enemy in front of them.
   Together with this the current delimiting line between the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts must be lifted up to the North until the line: Krasnostav, river Ilzhanka, Opochno, Piotrkuw. This wil tighten the combat formations of the left flank of the 1st Belorussian front and increase the striking force of our forces in the Radom direction.
3. After carrying out these operations and reaching the Narev river by the front's right flank and left flank reaching Varka, Strometz, Radom, Veshbitza, the forces will need at least 5 days to relocate the aviation and for the rear and artillery to catch up as well as to resupply fuel and oils.
4. Taking into account the preparation time needed, then the Warsaw operation may be started on 25.08.1944 using the entire front strength and aiming to reach Cehanuw, Plonysk, Vyshogrud, Sohachew, Skernewitze, Tomashuw and taking Warsaw.
   In this operation to advance to the North of Vistula three armies shall be used, 1st tank corps, 1st cav. crops, as for advancing to the North of Vistula 69th army, 8th grds army, 1st tank army and 2nd tank army, two cav. corps one tank corps and one army from the right wing shall be used.
   1st Polish Army will advance along the Western bank of Vistula river with the objective to take Warsaw in collaboration with the forces of right flank of the Front.
5. Reporting the above, we ask to accept our considerations and time estimates about carrying out the furhter offensive operations with the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Zharov
Rumyantsev

ЦАМО РФ. Ф.233 Оп. 2356. Д. 26. Л. 181-183.

Stavka of the Supreme Commander directive Nr 11072 to the commanders of 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts about the necessity for humane treatment towards the German population and prisoners of war.

20 April 1945 20:40

Stavka of the Supreme Command orders:

1. To require the forces to change their treatment of Germans both towards prisoners of war and civilians and treat them better.
   Cruel treatment makes them fear and provokes more stubborn resistance without surrendering.
   The civilians, fearing revenge, gather into gangs. This situation is not good for us. More humane treatment of the Germans will make our fighting easier on their territory and without doubt will reduce their stubbornness in the defence.
2. In German regions to the West of the line between river Oder mouth, river Oder until Furstenberg and further until river Neise (western), create German administrations and put Germans as burgomasters.
   Do not touch ordinary members of the national-socialist party, if they are loyal towards the Red Army, only leaders may be taken into custody if they weren’t able to flee yet.
3. Better treatment of the Germansmust not lower your vigilance and cause familiarities with them.

Stavka of the Supreme command
J.Stalin, A.Antonov

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 212. Л. 13.

Directive Nr 11060 of Stavka of the Supreme Commander to the Commander of 1st Ukrainian Front about the elimination of the enemy group in the region of Kotbus and to the South of Berlin.

3 April 1945 21:00

The Stavka of the Supreme Commander orders:

1. To prepare and implement an offensive operation with the objective to eliminate the enemy group in the region of Kotbus to the South of Berlin. No later than on 10-12 day of operation take Beelitz, Wittenberg and further along Elbe to Dresden. Later, after Berlin is taken, prepare to advance towards Leipzig.
2. The main strike with forces of five combined arms armies and two tank armies should be made from the Triebel region in the direction towards Shpremberg, Beltzig.
   In the region of breakthrough gather six breakthrough artillery divisions to create artillery density of no less than 250 barrels per kilometer of 76mm and higher.
3. To support the main group from the South perform a supportive strike with forces of the 2nd Polish Army and parts of 52nd Army from the region of Kolfurt to the overall direction of Bautzen, Dresden.
4. The tank armies and combined arms armies of the second echelon must be sent in after the breakthrough is achieved to supplement the success in the direction of the main strike.
5. The left flank of the front must stay in a rigid defence with special caution to the Breslau direction.
   The 5th guards Army must be swapped and used in the offensive in the main direction.
6. Establish the following delimiting line from 15.04.1945 with the 1st Belorussian front: Up to Unrushtadt -as before, then lake Einsdorfer-Ze, Gros-Gastroze, Lubben (all points except Lubben for the Belorussian front inclusive). Responsibility for maintaining the joint as before.
7. The beginning of the operation is according to instructions you have received personally.

Stavka of the Supreme Command
J.Stalin, A.Antonov

Source: ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 139. Л. 231, 232.