Report about the delay of Vistula river crossing.

REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OFFICER OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY TO THE DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ON THE REASONS FOR THE DELAY IN THE CROSSING OF VISLA RIVER BY THE TROOPS OF 8TH GUARDS ARMY

August 3, 1944

to Comrade ZHAROV

Troops of the 8th gds Army during August 2, 1944, the armies fought an unsuccessful battle on the western bank of Vistula river and continued to transport infantry, artillery, ammunition and horses.

I consider the reason for the unsuccessful offensive for the expansion of the bridgehead on the western bank of Vistula river to be:

• Indecisive actions of the infantry without appropriate amounts of reinforcing, namely: absence of tanks and an insufficient amount of artillery on the western bank of Vistula river and especially in the morning.
• The increase of the resistance of the enemy, since the latter had planned, according to the testimony of the prisoners, to throw off our units from the occupied bridgehead with the help of aviation. During August 2, 1944, enemy aircraft had disabled a large number of crossing facilities, which slowed down the crossing of troops and equipment.

The absence of a built pontoon bridge and an insufficient number of floating crossing facilities makes it impossible to transfer divisional mechanically tracted artillery, tanks and other equipment to the western coast in a timely manner.

By 20.00 2.8.1944, in two days, the following were transported in total:

• of the 29th gds rifle corps fully: infantry of the 27th and 74th guards rifle division, 82-mm mortar units and 45-mm guns, 2, 76{mm} regiment artillery - 7, 76{mm} divisional artillery - 2.
• of the 28th rifle corps fully: infantry of the 79th, 39th gds rifle division, 76-mm guns of regiment artillery - 20; 76 mm divisional artillery - 33; 45 mm - 26; 82-mm mortars - 83; 120-mm mortars - 12; self-propelled regiment 1061 - 7 guns.
• In the 4th Guards. sk in full: 57th, 35th gds rifle division, all 45-mm and 76-mm horse-drawn regiment artillery, 82-mm mortar units and 28 76-mm divisional artillery guns, self-propelled guns. regiment 1087 - 20 guns.

In addition to infantry and equipment, horses were transported to the western bank of the Vistula - 2 horses for each gun and the necessary amount of ammunition.

An attempt to transport tanks to the western bank of the Vistula river under water did not give any result: the first 2 KV tanks to attempt that remained under water. After this underwater crossing attempts were stopped. For the crossing of heavy equipment (tanks, wheeled artillery), it is necessary to speed up the construction of a heavy pontoon bridge.

General Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Drabkin

Source: Печ. по: ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 178503. Д. 2. Л. 98–99. Подлинник.

Report from the Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov and Marshal Rokossovsky to the Supreme Commander about the Warsaw operation plan for the 1st Belorussian front.

Active Army.

8 August 1944

To the Supreme Commander Marshal of the Soviet Union comrade Stalin.

Reporting our views about the following combat activities of the forces of the 1st Belorussian front and about the estimate of the Warsaw operation plan.

1. The front can begin the Warsaw operation after the right wing armies reach the region of river Narev and capture the bridgehead on its Western bank near Pultusk and Serotsk.
   The combat formations of these armies are around 120km away from river Narev and it will take around 10 days to cover that distance. This way the right wing of the front should perform an offensive operation with reaching Narev from 10th to 20.08.1944.
2. Within this time on the left flank of the front the 69th army, 8th grds Army, 7th grds Cavalry Corps and 11th Tank Corps must perform a local operation with objective to enlarge the bridgehead on Vistula river Western bank and to reach the region of Varka, Strometz, Radom, Vezhbitsa.
   To carry out this operation Katukov's 1st Tank Army must be transferred from 1st Ukrainian Front to 1st Belorussian Front and send it from Opatuw through Ostrovetz, Senno with the objective to strike in the Northern direction and reach the front: Zwoleny, Radom; by this supporting the 69th, 8th grds Army, 6th Cav.Corps and 11th Tank Corps in crushing the enemy in front of them.
   Together with this the current delimiting line between the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts must be lifted up to the North until the line: Krasnostav, river Ilzhanka, Opochno, Piotrkuw. This wil tighten the combat formations of the left flank of the 1st Belorussian front and increase the striking force of our forces in the Radom direction.
3. After carrying out these operations and reaching the Narev river by the front's right flank and left flank reaching Varka, Strometz, Radom, Veshbitza, the forces will need at least 5 days to relocate the aviation and for the rear and artillery to catch up as well as to resupply fuel and oils.
4. Taking into account the preparation time needed, then the Warsaw operation may be started on 25.08.1944 using the entire front strength and aiming to reach Cehanuw, Plonysk, Vyshogrud, Sohachew, Skernewitze, Tomashuw and taking Warsaw.
   In this operation to advance to the North of Vistula three armies shall be used, 1st tank corps, 1st cav. crops, as for advancing to the North of Vistula 69th army, 8th grds army, 1st tank army and 2nd tank army, two cav. corps one tank corps and one army from the right wing shall be used.
   1st Polish Army will advance along the Western bank of Vistula river with the objective to take Warsaw in collaboration with the forces of right flank of the Front.
5. Reporting the above, we ask to accept our considerations and time estimates about carrying out the furhter offensive operations with the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Zharov
Rumyantsev

ЦАМО РФ. Ф.233 Оп. 2356. Д. 26. Л. 181-183.