Order 0391 About the facts of sybstitution of educational work with repressions

Order of people's Deffense Commissar of the USSR

"About the facts of sybstitution of educational work with repressions"

4 December 1941 № 0391

Recently, there have been frequent cases of illegal repressions and gross abuse of power by individual commanders and commissars in relation to their subordinates. Lieutenant of the 288th rifle regiment Komissarov, without any reason, killed a Red Army soldier Kubica with a shot from a revolver.
The former head of the 21st UR, Colonel Sushchenko, shot Jr. Sergeant Pershikov for too slowly getting off the car due to an injured hand.
The commander of a platoon of a motorized rifle company of the 1026th rifle regiment, Lieutenant Mikryukov, shot dead his assistant, junior platoon commander Baburin, allegedly for not following orders.
The military commissar of the 28th Panzer Division, Regimental Commissar Bankvitzer, beat a sergeant for lighting a cigarette at night; he also beat Major Zanozny for an unrestrained conversation with him.
The chief of staff of the 529th Infantry Regiment, Captain Sakur without any reason has hit twice senior lt. Lieutenant Sergeyev with a pistol. Such intolerable facts of the perversion of disciplinary practices in the Red Army, the excess of granted rights and power, lynching and assault are explainable with:

• the method of persuasion was incorrectly relegated to the background, and the method of repression against subordinates moved into first place;
• daily educational work in units is in some cases replaced by swearing, repression and assault;
• the method of explanations and conversations of commanders, commissars, political workers with the Red Army soldiers is abandoned and the clarification of questions that are incomprehensible to the Red Army soldiers is often replaced by shouting, abuse and rudeness;
• individual commanders and political workers in difficult conditions of battle get lost, fall into a panic and cover their own confusion with the use of weapons without any reason;
• the simple truth is forgotten that use of repression is an extreme measure, permissible only in cases of direct disobedience and open resistance in a combat situation or in cases of malicious violation of discipline and order by persons deliberately going to disrupt the orders of the command.

Commanders, commissars, and political workers must remember that without a correct combination of method of persuasion with method of coercion, the imposition of Soviet military discipline and the strengthening of the political and moral state of the troops is unthinkable.
Severe punishment in relation to malicious violators of military discipline, accomplices of the enemy and open enemies should be combined with careful analysis of every case of violation of discipline that require a detailed clarification of the circumstances it has occurred in.
Unjustified repressions, illegal executions, arbitrariness, and assault on the part of commanders and commissars are a manifestation of lack of will and handlessness, often lead to the opposite results, contribute to decline in military discipline and political and moral state of troops, and can push unstable fighters to defect to the side of the enemy.

I order:

1. Restore educational work, widely use the persuasion method, do not replace everyday explanatory work with administration and repressions.
2. To all commanders, political workers and chiefs to talk daily with the Red Army soldiers, explaining to them the necessity for strict military discipline, honest fulfillment of their military duty, the military oath and orders of the commander and chief. In conversations, also explain that a serious threat looms over our Motherland, that the greatest self-sacrifice, unshakable steadfastness in battle, contempt for death and a merciless struggle against cowards, deserters, self-mutilators, provocateurs and traitors to the Motherland are needed to defeat the enemy.
3. Explain to the commanding staff that lynching, assault and public swearing are degrading the rank of a soldier of the Red Army, lead not to strengthening, but to undermining the discipline and authority of the commander and political worker.
4. In the most resolute manner, up to bringing the perpetrators to trial by a military tribunal, to combat all manifestations of illegal repression, assault and lynching.

The order is to be announced to the entire commanding staff of the Army in the field, up to and including the commander and commissar of the regiment.

People's Commissar of Defense I. Stalin
Chief of the General Staff B. Shaposhnikov

ЦАМО РФ Ф. 4. Оп. 11. Д. 66. Л. 149–152.

Transcript of talks of the Supreme Commander and the Commander of the Joint Staff to the Commander of the 54th Army.

16.09.1941 ended at 23:30

Volkhovstroy.: Marshal Kulik at the device.

Moscow.: Stalin and Shaposhnikov at the device. Hello. We got acquainted with your last order, where you plan to strike against the Schlisselburg enemy group first and then reach the Mga station.
We think that you must leave cover from the Schlisselburg direction and use your forces to strike at the direction to the station Mga, while covering your left flank from the direction of Shapka, Sologubovka and after that not to delay the preparations for the offence but lead it decisively in order to connect with Zhukov’s forces.
In conversation with you on 15.09 Zhukov has described his situation to you and that is why your operation cannot be delayed. Over.

Kulik.: Hello. My main strike with three divisions and a mountain rifle brigade is in the direction of the station Mga while covering from the right from the direction of Schlisselburg and from the left from the direction of Turyshkino.
The detailed order [with indication] of the limiting lines [between] the divisions will be given to you now. I repeat that the enemy has concentrated 21st infantry division and 12th tank division in the region of Slavyanka, Voronovo. These two divisions are concentrated, holding the road Slavyanka - Voronovo.
I set my main objective: to defeat these two divisions and only after that to capture the station Mga. Tomorrow at 10:00AM I will start my offensive. Today I just finished all the organization of the offensive. The units have taken their initial positions, the cooperation has been worked out in detail. Over.

Shaposhnikov.: Good. In the following days after staffing two additional combat divisions will be sent to you. Over.

K.: I have one more question for you.
This morning I found out from comrade Cvetaev that the enemy has crossed the river Svir in the region of Podporozhye and captured the railway bridge across the river Svir. I have immediately sent my aviation there, considering the seriousness of the situation.
The recon has discovered a big concentration of forces in the region of station Sviry and to the South in the forests. Also the enemy has built a bridge across Vyazhenka near its mouth. In the second half of the day the bombers and attack planes were operating against the concentration of the enemy forces and destroyed the ferry across the river Vazhenka near its mouth. Huge losses were inflicted upon enemy man force and vehicles.
Also, comrade Cvetaev has reported to me that the railway bridge was cleared {from the explosives} according to the order of the brigade kommissar Rumyantsev from Petrozavodsk. Our sappers have cleared it and the enemy has captured it.
I ordered my aviation to destroy it, but the special aviation link sent there between 16:00 and 17:00 didn’t reach it because of the fog.
I will not be able to allocate anything to this region tomorrow because my aviation will be occupied by another operation. While reporting, I consider it necessary to take serious measures and under no conditions not let the enemy to cross the river Sviry. Cvetaev has very limited forces. Over.

Shaposhnikov.: Good, we will tackle this. As for you, without delay you must attack and defeat the enemy tomorrow 17.09 in the direction of station Mga, capture that station and chase the enemy.
You have three artillery regiments of corps level and you can solve this task. Over.

K.: Everything is prepared and we will act. Will report with the results. Wish you well.

Stalin.: Hello again.
We are very happy that you have success. But take into account that if tomorrow you will strike hard towards Mga to break through or get around the Mga defences, then you will get two good personnel divisions and maybe even a tank brigade. But if you delay the strike tomorrow, then I swear that you will not get those new divisions nor the tank brigade.

K.: I’m hearing you comrade Stalin. Everything is aimed there, everyone is waiting for the morning and delay is out of the question. We will do our best to fulfill your instructions and to get your promised forces. I will speak now to comrade Zhukov about the coordination of our efforts.

Stalin.: Do not forget to put RS to action.

K.: Yes they do participate, but we have only three barrages left. I ask to deliver us at least ten barrages, because the enemy doesn’t like them.

Stalin.: ten barrages are sent to you. You will get them tomorrow or at least the day after tomorrow.

K.: Good.

Stalin.: I shake your hand, wish you well.

K.: Over. Good bye.

ЦАМО. Ф. 96а. Оп. 2011. Д. 5. Л. 104-107.

Transcript of talk of the Supreme Commander and the Head of the Joint Staff to the Commander of the forces of Reserve front

04.09.1941 03:50AM - 04:30AM

Zhukov.: at the device

Stalin, Shaposhnikov.: at the device. Hello. It appears that you plan to send forces to Smolensk direction for the elimination of Yelnya {enemy forces} as a result leaving Roslavly in its current unpleasant situation. I think that this operation you are planning must be executed only after the elimination of Roslavly {enemy forces}. And even better would be to wait with Smolensk operation and eliminate Roslavly together with Eremenko and then “sit on the tail” of Guderian by moving some divisions to the South. The most important is to defeat Guderian, but Smolensk will not walk away from us. Over.

Z.: I wish you health comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin, I do not think about the Smolensk operation and am concerned that it is Timoshenko’s work. Strike 109, 149, 104 {seems like numbers on a map} I want to carry out right now to help the fastest elimination of Yelnya adversary group. When that is done, I will free up additional 7-8 divisions to relocate to the region of Pochinki. There, while defending from the Smolensk direction, I could carry out a powerful strike in the direction of Roslavly and to the West of it. That is to strike against Guderain’s rear.

As experience shows, performing a deep strike with 3-4 divisions leads to trouble because the enemy quickly surrounds these groups with its mobile units. That is why I asked your permission for such a maneuver. If you will order to strike towards Roslavly, then I can organize this measure. But there would be more use if I would eliminate Yelnya first. Today at the end of day, the right flank of our Yelnya group has occupied Sofiyevka. The enemy has only a 6 km wide opening so I think that tomorrow we will complete a tactical encirclement. Over.

S.: I’m worried about the terrain in the direction of Pochinki - there are forests and swamps and your tanks can get stuck there.

Z.: Reporting. The strike is planned through the Pogulyaevka, South of river Khmara along a good terrain, with exit towards Storino, Vasykovo, 30 km North West of Roslavly around 10 km South from Pochinki. Also it is a bad idea to strike along the previous route. A German soldier has moved to us and told us that during the night today the defeated 23rd infantry division was replaced by the 267 infantry division as well as he saw SS units in the area. Strike to the South is also better from the perspective that it will hit between the two divisions. Over.

S.: Do not overly trust the enemy POWs interrogate him and then shoot him. We do not object against your proposed manuever 10km South of Pochinki. You can act. Especially concentrate airstrikes against it and use RS also {Katyusha}. When do you plan to start?

Z.: I will finish regrouping until 7th. Preparation is on 7th and on 8th in the morning we strike. I beg you to support me with charges for the RS, 76mm shells and also 152mm shells year 09/30 and mortar mines 120mm. Also, if possible, one regiment of ILs {IL-2} and one regiment of Pe-2 and tanks, around 10 KVs and around 15 T-34s. These are all my requirements.Over.

S.: Unfortunately we currently don’t have any RS reserves. We will give them when we have them. You will get RS. Pity that Yeremenko will have to operate alone against Roslavly. Could you organize a push against Roslavly from the North East?

Z.: No comrade Stalin I have nothing to push with. Only separate units with some artillery support, but this will be a chilling blow while the main strike I will perform on the 8th in the morning. I will do my best. Perhaps I can do it on the morning of 7th. Yeremenko is still far from Roslavly and I think comrade Stalin that strike on 7th or 8th will not be too late. Over.

S.: And for how long will the glorified 211th division sleep?

Z.: Acknowledged. Will organize on the 7th. The 211th division is forming now and will be ready no earlier than 10th. I will pull it as a reserve, won’t allow it to fall asleep. I ask you to grant permission to arrest and to put under trial those alarmists and traitors I reported about. Over.

S.:Seventh is better than eighth. We agree and authorize to trial them as strictly as necessary. Over. Good bye.

Z.: Wish you health.

ЦАМО. Ф. 96а. Оа. 2011. Д. 5. Л. 68-70