Excerpt from Stavka of the Supreme Commander directive to the Commander of the 1st Belorussian front about transition to defense.

Response to this document

Moscow
29th August 1944

1 - Left flank of the front must go defensive after receiving this directive. The right flank must continue offensive with the objective to reach river Narev and its mouth around 4.09 - 5.09 and to capture a bridgehead on the Western bank near Pultusk, Sierotsk and also go defensive after that.[...]

5 - Special attention must be payed at the following directions: Rozhan, Ostruw-Mazovetzky, Chizhaev, Pultusk, Vyshkuw, Vengruw, Warsaw, Minsk-Mazovetsk, Demblin, Lukuw, Radom, Lyublin and to holding the bridgeheads on the Western bank of rivers Vistula and Narev.[...]

Report about the issued instructions and present a detailed defensive plan to the Joint Staff no later than 5th of September.

Stavka of the Supreme Command
Stalin
Antonov

ЦХСД Ф.2\2. 1944г. Л. 18-20.

Response to this document

Report of the Staff of the 1st Belorussian front to the Joint Staff of the Red Army about the losses of the front from 1st to 10th of August 1944.

13th August 1944.

To the Head of the Operational Headquarters of the Red Army Joint Staff.

Reporting the summary of the losses sustained by the 1st Belorussian front from 1st to 10th of August 1944:

• 48th army – personell:
  killed – 737, wounded – 2 352 ;
  horses: killed – 49, wounded – 48 ;
  material: artillery – 3, rifles and machineguns – 137, machineguns – 24, ATR – 1, mortars – 4, cars – 1.
• 65th army. – personell: killed – 842, wounded – 2 487.
• 28th army – personell: killed – 651, wounded – 2 963;
  material: rifles and machineguns – 251.
• 70th army – personell: killed – 158, wounded – 563; material: cars – 2, carriages – 5.
• 47th army – personell: killed – 1045, wounded – 3146;
  horses: killed – 76, wounded – 6.
• 1th Polish army – personell: killed – 290, wounded – 684, missing – 565;
  horses: killed – 55, wounded – 87 ;
  material: rifles and machineguns – 824, machineguns – 87, ATR – 35, mortars – 18, artillery – 76 and 45 mm – 9,
  tanks: burned – 1, knocked out – 6, radios – 1, cars – 2.
• 8th grds. army – personell: killed – 1769, wounded – 7415, missing – 482.
• 69th army – personell: killed – 1418, wounded – 3958;
  material: artillery – 8, mortars – 8, rifles and machineguns – 294, machineguns – 4, ATR – 2, cars – 3, tractors – 1, radios – 3.
• 2th tank army – personell: killed – 409, wounded – 1271, missing – 589;
  material: burned and knocked out tanks – 101, self propelled artillery – 13.
  destroyed: artillery – 28, mortars – 9, machineguns – 84, APC – 2.
• 16th air army – lost to enemy AA artillery and in air fights as well as crashed – 22 aircraft.
• 6th air army – lost to enemy AA artillery and in air fights – 13 and did not return from combat mission – 27 aircraft.

Head of the operative headquarters of the staff of the 1st Belorussian front
General-Major Boikov

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 2307. Д. 12. Л. 307–308.

Report from the Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov and Marshal Rokossovsky to the Supreme Commander about the Warsaw operation plan for the 1st Belorussian front.

Active Army.

8 August 1944

To the Supreme Commander Marshal of the Soviet Union comrade Stalin.

Reporting our views about the following combat activities of the forces of the 1st Belorussian front and about the estimate of the Warsaw operation plan.

1. The front can begin the Warsaw operation after the right wing armies reach the region of river Narev and capture the bridgehead on its Western bank near Pultusk and Serotsk.
   The combat formations of these armies are around 120km away from river Narev and it will take around 10 days to cover that distance. This way the right wing of the front should perform an offensive operation with reaching Narev from 10th to 20.08.1944.
2. Within this time on the left flank of the front the 69th army, 8th grds Army, 7th grds Cavalry Corps and 11th Tank Corps must perform a local operation with objective to enlarge the bridgehead on Vistula river Western bank and to reach the region of Varka, Strometz, Radom, Vezhbitsa.
   To carry out this operation Katukov's 1st Tank Army must be transferred from 1st Ukrainian Front to 1st Belorussian Front and send it from Opatuw through Ostrovetz, Senno with the objective to strike in the Northern direction and reach the front: Zwoleny, Radom; by this supporting the 69th, 8th grds Army, 6th Cav.Corps and 11th Tank Corps in crushing the enemy in front of them.
   Together with this the current delimiting line between the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts must be lifted up to the North until the line: Krasnostav, river Ilzhanka, Opochno, Piotrkuw. This wil tighten the combat formations of the left flank of the 1st Belorussian front and increase the striking force of our forces in the Radom direction.
3. After carrying out these operations and reaching the Narev river by the front's right flank and left flank reaching Varka, Strometz, Radom, Veshbitza, the forces will need at least 5 days to relocate the aviation and for the rear and artillery to catch up as well as to resupply fuel and oils.
4. Taking into account the preparation time needed, then the Warsaw operation may be started on 25.08.1944 using the entire front strength and aiming to reach Cehanuw, Plonysk, Vyshogrud, Sohachew, Skernewitze, Tomashuw and taking Warsaw.
   In this operation to advance to the North of Vistula three armies shall be used, 1st tank corps, 1st cav. crops, as for advancing to the North of Vistula 69th army, 8th grds army, 1st tank army and 2nd tank army, two cav. corps one tank corps and one army from the right wing shall be used.
   1st Polish Army will advance along the Western bank of Vistula river with the objective to take Warsaw in collaboration with the forces of right flank of the Front.
5. Reporting the above, we ask to accept our considerations and time estimates about carrying out the furhter offensive operations with the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Zharov
Rumyantsev

ЦАМО РФ. Ф.233 Оп. 2356. Д. 26. Л. 181-183.

Combat report of the commander of the 2nd Tank Army to the Commander of 1st Belorussian front about the enemy offensive near Radzimyn.

3 August 1944

At 10:00 the enemy has attacked the 3rd grds tank corps with a force of up to 85 tanks supported by infantry, moving towards Voloshyn. Another attack from Zelenka to Ossuw with a force of up to 40 tanks has forced our units to retreat and at 18:00 of 3.08.1944 is fighting along the line of railway near Voloshyn.

8th grds tank corps is repelling attacks from East and West is fighting on its previous position.

Decided to: after the infantry reaches Okunew region, to use the 8th grds tank corps in the overall direction towards Ossuw, Zielenka, Marki to cut the Warsaw highway near Strugi, Marki.

3rd grds corps shall go counteroffensive towards Radzymin.

Asking to urgently replace the 16th tank corps with infantry and to allow it to fall back towards Okunew in order to concentrate the army forces as it is now scattered and difficult to control.

Radzievsky.

[RESOLUTION]

To the commander of th 2nd tank {army}.

If 3rd tank corps is in danger to be thrown away from the main forces, move it back to the main forces with objective in mind to not let the enemy to South and South-East directions.

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 2307. Д. 29. Л. 99а, 996.

Stavka of the Supreme Commander directive Nr 11072 to the commanders of 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts about the necessity for humane treatment towards the German population and prisoners of war.

20 April 1945 20:40

Stavka of the Supreme Command orders:

1. To require the forces to change their treatment of Germans both towards prisoners of war and civilians and treat them better.
   Cruel treatment makes them fear and provokes more stubborn resistance without surrendering.
   The civilians, fearing revenge, gather into gangs. This situation is not good for us. More humane treatment of the Germans will make our fighting easier on their territory and without doubt will reduce their stubbornness in the defence.
2. In German regions to the West of the line between river Oder mouth, river Oder until Furstenberg and further until river Neise (western), create German administrations and put Germans as burgomasters.
   Do not touch ordinary members of the national-socialist party, if they are loyal towards the Red Army, only leaders may be taken into custody if they weren’t able to flee yet.
3. Better treatment of the Germansmust not lower your vigilance and cause familiarities with them.

Stavka of the Supreme command
J.Stalin, A.Antonov

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 212. Л. 13.

Supreme commander Stavka directive Nr. 11059 to the commander of the 1st Belorussian front for preparation and execution of the operation of capturing Berlin.

2nd April 1945

The Stavka of the Supreme commander orders:

1. To prepare and to implement the offensive operation with the objective to take the capital of Germany the city of Berlin and to reach Elbe no later than on the twelfth-fifteenth day of operation.
2. The main strike must be directed from the bridgehead on Oder river to the West of Kustrin by using the forces of four combined and two tank armies. Bring five to six artillery divisions to the breakthrough region to create a density of no less than 250 barrels per 1km of 76mm guns and higher.
3. To support the main group of the front, perform two supporting strikes from the North and South with forces of two armies each. The first one from Bervalde in the general direction towards Eberswalde, Ferbellin. The second from the bridgeheads on river Oder to the North and South from Frankfurt-on-Oder to the general direction towards Furstenwalde, Potsdam, Brandenburg to surpass Berlin from South.
4. Tank armies must be sent in the direction of main strike after defenses will be breached, to facilitate the success of surpassing Berlin from North and North-East.
5. The army of the second echelon must be used to facilitate the success in the main direction.
6. Delimiting lines:
   With the 2nd Belorussian front according to the Stavka directive Nr.110531 ОП 1.04.1945;
   With the first Ukrainian front from 15.04.1945 until Unrushtadt - as before, then lake Ensdorfer-Ze, Gross-Gastroze, Lubben (all points except Lubben for the 1st Belorussian front inclusive)
7. The responsibility for ensuring joints with the 2nd Belorussian front and 1st Ukrainian fronts are the same.
8. Operation start is in accordance with instructions received personally by you.

Stavka of the Supreme Commander.
J. Stalin, A. Antonov.