Meeting of command staff of the 1st guards Army

Meeting

Of division and separate units commanders, commissars,
Artillery leaders and heads of command staff of the 1st guards Army.

29.9.1942
(2km South East from Sovkhoz Kotluban) ravine.

Report of the head of staff of army colonel Ivanov.

Results of combat operations of the 1st guards army from 18.09 to 30.09.1942

1. The objective, set for the 1st guards army to break through the enemy’s defense line and connecting with the Stalingrad defenders was failed. The Soviet reports have specific style of minimizing or ignoring positive things and highlighting bad things, because those need to be addressed.
   This causes the so-called "archive depression" for an unprepared reader when things seem much worse than they actually were.
2. We had enough forces to fulfill the objective. The force balance was on our side, especially in manpower, vehicles and weapons. The enemy had supremacy mostly (1000 planes) in the air. The enemy had 76th infantry division, parts of 60th and 3rd motorised division.
3. the concentration of forces was not properly concealed because:
   • constant enemy air scouting and
   • possible information leak caused by defectors from 173 rifle division on 17.09 (this data requires checking).
4. The main strike was performed by the left flank of the 1st guards army (in the strip of 316 rifle division and 7th tank corps).
5. The execution of the operation.
   The fighting has begun:
   • 18.09. The defense of the enemy was broken in the strip of the 316 rifle division. Hill 154.2 was taken by one regiment of the 316th rd and the advancing units rushed towards farm Borodkin. 4th Tank Corps did not enter the breakthrough in time. Due to absolutely unsatisfactory leadership of the 316rd, they did not gain a foothold on the hill 154.2 and no weapons {like cannons} were brought in, no recon was organized. The enemy could attack (supported by 50 tanks) this hill in the second part of the day and retake it. Commander and commissaar of the 1073 regiment deserted from the battlefield and were sent to court-martial. The commander and commissar of the 316rd have let the command out of their hands. The hill 154.2 has a high importance within the strip of offense of the 1st guards army because it is dominant on the front of offensive operations of our army and possessing it will put our forces in a better position. Further on a fight was ongoing for a few days for possessing that hill. The 260th rifle division and 4th tank corps (7th tank corps went dry) were sent to battle. At this time the Germans were concentrating their forces and intensified the bombing.
   • Due to lack of results of this offensive, future operations were transferred to the right flank . The main strike was performed in the strip of the 273rd, 258th rifle divisions and 16th tank corps. According to the new order of the commander of the army the 273rd rifle division, acting quite energetically has taken hill 130,4. The 16th tank corps entered the battle and did provide help, but the infantry did not gain a foothold (by this time some artillery regiments and mortar regiments were taken away from the army).
6. By this time the situation in the army is as follows. The attacks will be continued in order to tie up enemy forces from the siege of Stalingrad, thus supporting the Stalingrad defenders. For this, units of the rear should be cleared and part of the forces should be sent to the front units to reinforce them.
7. the result of the offensive actions of the army was:
   • partially the forces enemy were taken away from Stalingrad,
   • same for the German aviation
8. Operations of our divisions.
   • 173rd did not accomplish its task. It reported its initial location on hill 108.4 wrongly. This hill was in the hands of the Germans. It moved only for a small distance throughout the entire offensive period.
   • 273rd was taking part in the 2nd period of the offensive in the direction of the main attack and did fulfill its objective. The division has organized a breakthrough in the region of hill 130.4 but did not gain a foothold.
   • 258rd within the first period of the fighting did not take hill 118.1 despite having a lot of supporting weapons.
     Unsatisfactory leadership of the division played a role in that.
   • 292rd for ten days of fighting did not move a bit, but lost a lot of men and only by 29.09 approached the frontal edge of the enemy defense.
   • 260rd is totally disorganized. Absolutely unsatisfactory leadership from the commander and commissar of the division. The staff is not put-together and is poor at controlling the combat. Units of the division took a long time to cross the balkas and were only brought in the proper direction by the staff commanders of the staff of the Army. Did not meet its objective.
   • 221rd has low manpower. Accomplished the objective on a satisfactory level.
   • The artillery was miserable during the offensive. The fire was unaimed (they cannot even concentrate fire). The artillery did not make way for the infantry with its fire, because of this very few enemy fire-positions were suppressed and did not follow up the infantry while in offence. This altogether does not help the overall progress of the attack.
   • Tank actions. Tanks move very slowly during the offensive. Tankers do not trust the artillery men because the latter do not support tank attacks. There were cases of attacks in the wrong directions.
   • Staff work. Account of the losses is very poor. Urgent messages are delivered to staff with huge delays. Leadership is not precise. Frequently the control is lost. Unit work checking is not organized which results in many mistakes and frequent lying.
   • The main drawback in staff and unit work is poor organization of cooperation between infantry, artillery and tanks. More precisely, there is no cooperation at all. That is why units operate without proper cooperation and naturally don’t have success in their offensive.
   • One of big drawbacks in actions is lack of cooperation between the neighboring units. They do not support each other which also does not help the offensive.

Objectives on 30.09

• Eliminate the German bulge in the region of hill 123.6 because it interferes with the future offensive.
• Use existing forces to attack and use rear units to increase the numbers of frontal units.

Instructions of the Army Commander.

• many commanders show signs of lack of belief in victory. (Commanders, 316rd, 260rd), which undoubtedly has a negative effect on the fighting. We must fight these moods. Those who think in such a way should free up their posts and not interfere with fighting.
  We have all the necessary forces and equipment to crush the German fascists.
• By this time, the situation is such that the enemy wants to take Stalingrad despite any losses. Our mission is to help the Stalingrad garrison to repel all the attacks and prevent the enemy from reaching Volga.
• despite us breaking the German defenses twice (316rd, 273rd) we were unable to exploit the success. One of the reasons for this is poor division leadership and also unsatisfactory organization of cooperation.
• 16th tank corps during the offensive lost the attack direction twice and did not fulfill its objective.
• A drawback of our attacks is that the infantry uses little machine guns, submachine guns and rifle fire. Evidence to that is the fact that for ten days of fighting there were no ammo requests from the divisions.
• We observe German submachine gunners operating near our Command posts and Observing posts. We must urgently clear those areas.
• Please keep in mind that German submachine gunners and snipers are hunting primarily lower ranked officers.

Conclusion:

1. immediately address the errors pointed out by me and the head of the staff and by all means resolve them.
2. clarify the international situation {to the subordinates} and address the moods that do not facilitate the fulfillment of our common goals.

Member of the Military Council division commissar Abramov points out:

1. The military Council during the offensive was sending its representatives to 35 battalions and they have presented the material proving the unsatisfactory work performed to organize the offensive. Most of the issues were pointed out buy the army commander and the chief of staff.
   Additionally to that:
2. • not everywhere the commanders are leading the offensive spirit of the soldiers.
   • We see a lot of cases of unskilled use of weapons. During the 10 days of fighting we have spent 10 railroad cars of ammo with absolutely unsatisfactory results.
   • There are many cases of poor responsibility shown by the leadership regarding the implementation of orders.
   • The condition of party and political work is not satisfactory because it does not address the most basic questions regarding the combat support.
   • Active bayoneta saying means a front line soldier with a weapon term is understood incorrectly in the divisions, for instance: a regiment has just over a 1000 of men, but only several active bayonets are accounted for. This is wrong. We must account for all the specialists that have individual and collective weapons as well.
   • Brigade commissar Layok adds about the unsatisfactory work of evacuation services. Treatment of wounded is poorly organized especially if they get to other sanitary battalions which belong to other divisions.

ЦАМО, Фонд: 292, Опись: 6911, Дело: 41

Transcript of talk of the Supreme Commander to Stavka Representative and commander of the South-West front

27.11.1942

Mikhailov and Fyodorov at the device.

Stalin at the device.

Stalin.: Comrade Mikhailov, report what you have done there in the region of Filippov.

M.: Reporting. All day yesterday together with Voronin and Filippov and the division commanders we were in the operative regions. We made clarifications to the decision and issued all the necessary orders for the division commanders to start their work today, together with specialists and regiment commanders. Some unresolved questions remain with the RS - we have three, but need five M-13. The question about returning the second air army from Fyodorov before the start of operation. Filippov could be ready to begin relocation 1-2 [December] if Moscow will accelerate the delivery of fuel and ammunition. In three days I will be at him to check the preparation progress on the spot and to help. Tomorrow I, together with com. Voronov plan to go to Lelyushenko’s right flank to start full scale preparations there, because factually nothing is done there yet. Both me and Fyodorov have big doubts that Lelyushenko will handle the preparations and commanding the operations on his left and right flanks simultaneously, especially given the events on his left flank.
We decided to ask your permission to handle the operative command to Kuznetsov, who will immediately go there and make all preparations through him. Lelyushenko could be given direct command of the left flank group. We have just spoken to Lelyushenko about this, he not only shares this point of view, but also asks us to do so. In this case Lelyushenko will have 8 I.D. one mechanized corps and reinforcement units, because we think to reinforce him additionally with three I.D. from Romanenko. Lelyushenko’s preparation is lagging overall, because of slow arriving of forces, for instance the rifle corps have unloaded up to 50-70%, while tank corps and tank regiments as well as artillery and AA divisions have not yet arrived. We ask to accelerate this. Beginning on 29th we will start field training with the arriving commanding staff for what as I reported already, I will be leaving together with comrade Voronov to the right flank.

S.: But who will unify the actions of Dontsov and Ivanov? This is a very responsible task.

M.: It would be very hard for me to command them, being on the right flank of Lelyushenko’s forces, from where communication with Dontsov and Ivanov is possible only through Moscow. On the other hand, to accelerate preparations, our presence there is is absolutely necessary for at least three days. I ask for your directions.

S.: It is unreasonable to underdo one thing and rush to another. Enemy forces near Stalingrad are surrounded and they must be eliminated to free up our three armies. But there is no one to lead this task and no one to align the actions of Ivanov and Dontsov. Mikhailov needs a small operation point of around 10-15 people somewhere around or to the West of Lyapichev and lead the elimination of the enemy Stalingrad group from there, gradually squeezing the encirclement more and more. This is a very important task, more important than operation “Saturn”. Mikhailov must concentrate solely on this task. Concerning the operation “Saturn”, let Vatutin and Kuznetsov deal with it. Moscow will help.
I cannot understand from where did Lyashkov get 8 divisions and what kind of phrase is this “left Lelushenko’s flank” and “right Lelyushenko’s flank” when Lelyushenko has to have one army - the First Guards Army. If we follow Your proposals, what will be left on Lelyushenko’s right flank, what forces?

M.: I perfectly understand that the elimination of the enemy group surrounded in Stalingrad is a primary task at this time. I was following your directions when I took the lead of preparing the operation “Saturn”. Starting from tomorrow with great satisfaction I will take over aligning and leading actions of Dontsov and Ivanov, which I stopped doing since 24th because of my departure to Filippov and Lelyushenko’s right flank.
Secondly. Saying “Lelyushenko’s right flank” I meant his strike group positioned on the right flank which consists of two guards corps, one tank corps and other reinforcement units. Saying “Lelyushenko’s left flank” I meant his left flank group which consists of eight rifle divisions, five of which are already there and three are planned to be transferred over to him from Romanenko. All from me regarding these questions.

S.: What other questions do you have? Where do you plan to organize your operative point to lead actions of Dontsov and Ivanov? Will Voronov stay with you or leave for the “Saturn” region? Over.

M.: I need to report the situation for the current moment. The situation is as follows: against Lelyusheno’s left flank from the region of Bokovskaya and to the North the German divisions are attacking for three days now: 62nd infantry and 22nd tank division as well as 1st Romanian motorized division. Today we discovered also the German 294 I.D. Lelyshenko’s units were forced back by this offence, to the region of river Krivaya. On the direction Astakhov - Pronin, the Germans have crossed to the Eastern bank of the river. To the North of this region, on the direction to Yagodniy the attempts of Romanian 7th, 11th and the remnants of 9th infantry divisions were repelled by our forces. To stop the attacks of German divisions and eliminate them the 47th guards rifle division and two tank brigades are on the way from the Pronin area as well as one motorcycle regiment from the region of Lipovskaya which is to the South West of Perelazovskoye. These units are heading North East to strike against the enemy’s flank.
To meet them from the north along the river Krivaya Lelyshenko’s 226th rifle division will strike, supported by tanks. We consider it necessary to move Lelyshenko’s 1st mechanized corps to river Don to the region of Elanskiy, to…

S.: You can move that mechanized corps and use it as situationally needed according to Vatutin’s view. Please continue.

M.: While preparing “Saturn” have it ready, especially because there is a possibility to commit heavy attacks against the flanks and rear of the attacking enemy group and eliminate it. The situation may require a mechinized corps to perform strikes on beneficial directions.
Second. Regarding the question of leading Dontsov and Ivanov. I am ready to go to Lyagichev region right now, but I think that it will be too difficult to organize control of everything from there. Only Kalach forces could be controlled from there to stop the enemy breakthrough from within the Stalingrad circle to the direction of Tormosin. Immediate control of both fronts could be organized from the Dontsov control point region, where there are communications and where I could be as soon as tomorrow. I ask for your final instructions, so I can start fulfilling them immediately. Over.

S.: Speak about Voronov.

M.: Comrade Voronov is here with me now. Comrade Vatutin asks to allow Voronov to go to him for two days and then together to go to Lelyushenko to help him organize “Saturn” quickly.

S.: And where is Dontsov’s control point?

M.: Answering - in the area of the 24th army.

S.: Good. Then go now to Dontsov’s control point, take needed staff and organize coordination of Dontsov and Ivanov’s actions. Let Voronov go with Vatutin to prepare “Saturn”. You can put Lelyushenko with face to the West, so he can repel actions of the Germans with his 8 divisions and other reinforcement units. It is not clear to me who will command the 1st guards considering two rifle corps and a tank corps.

M.: Good, I proceed to execution immediately. Please allow to take with me...

S.: I’m asking who will command the 1st guards army, situated on the right flank of Lelyushenko - Kuznetsov or someone else?

M.,F.: Answering. We ask to allow all the preparations for two guards and tank corps to lay down on Kuznetsov under the direct supervision of Vatutin. Lelyushenko will be very busy fighting off the German attack on his left flank and will not be able to handle both tasks simultaneously. These forces within these conditions must be controlled by Kuznetsov or send Lelyushenko to command that group, but make Kuznetsov command the left flank group consisting of 8 divisions.

S.: And where the 1st guards Staff will be - at Lelyushenko or at Kuznetsov?

M.,F.: The Staff of group of troops is already organized at Krasnoselovsk South West of Kalach (Voronezhsky), control point of the left group - 7km South of Elanskaya is also organized and functional. I ask to take Novikov with me. Falalayev when he arrives to command the aviation of “Saturn”. I ask Bokov immediately, that is tomorrow by plane to send me eight men for operative works with a good signalman {radio operator maybe?} and a logistician. Over.

S.: So who will command the right group Lellyushenko or Kuznetsov? Please answer.

M., F.: If you will not object, then allow us to do like this: we will immediately put Kuznetsov on Lelyushenko’s left flank to command the defence against German attacks and also he will prepare the operation “Saturn” for this group. Staff crew will be given to him from the Staff of the front. We will send Lelyushenko to the right flank no later than tomorrow evening, he will essentially command the 1st guards army, consisting of two guards corps and a tank corps.

S.: Lelyushenko already commands the front against the Germans, perhaps better to leave him in the area of the left group, but to assign Kuznetsov to the right group. In this case Kuznetsov could do preparations for “Saturn”. Do you agree?

M., F.: Good, will do like that.

S.: Now to comrade Mikhailov. Take these instructions:
1) In the current situation Your objective is to align the actions of Dontsov and Ivanov to eliminate the surrounded enemy group. I ask you to do this task only and not to bother with anything else.
2) All the aviation of Don and Stalingrad fronts together with Novikov as well as Pe-2 bomber corps which is arriving now to the Don front, will be at your disposal. The objective of aviation is to smash the surrounded enemy group without giving it a break.
3) It is possible to send one tank corps to Your reserve, which you can use to reinforce Dontsov or Ivanov. If you will need more reserve forces, report tomorrow.
4) You must have a direct connection to Stavka and regularly inform it about all the events happening in the region of Dontsov and Ivanov.
5) Tomorrow report whether it is necessary to incorporate the 62nd army to the Don front, tomorrow report about where to send the tank corps. Do you have any questions, is everything clear?

M.: All is clear and will be fulfilled.
1) Tank corps I ask to route from unloading spot in the region of Ilovlinskaya, Log.
2) I will report to you daily about the progress of my work and the overall situation. About the 62nd I will report immediately after arriving at the new control point. I will depart immediately and will report when arrived.

S.: It seems to me that it would be good for you to have that tank corps somewhere in the junction area of the Stalingrad and Don fronts. I mean the region of Kalach or Krivaya Muzga.

M.: That is correct, but here it will be easier for it to get from Ilovlinskaya, because if it arrived at Stalingrad we will have to ship it across Volga which takes a lot of time.

S.: Good, the tank corps will be sent to Ilovlinskaya, Log region. Please, Fedorov to the device.

Fedorov:Fedorov at the device.

S.: Comrade Fedorov, please accept the following instructions.
1) You have a dual task now, one is to direct the actions of Romanenko and Lelyushenko from the region of Nizne-Chirskaya to Nizne-Krivskaya; second is to make preparations for operation “Saturn”.
2) Leave comrade Voronov at Fedorov to prepare “Saturn” and also to help Lelyushenko.
3) Additionally to the first mixed aviation corps which remains at Fedorov’s disposal, you will get one more mixed aviation corps with a division of fighters and division of attack aircraft. Entire Fedorov’s group will be under control of Falaleyev who will be arriving to you in the following days.
4) If 5th mech. corps is being transferred to Romanenko, is that so?

F.: Reporting, In the current situation it is better to plan it for Romanenko. In case the situation changes and we will need to reinforce Lelyushenko, then it can be done seamlessly a bit later, but now better plan it for Romanenko.

S.: Under whose disposal does the guards mech. corps arrive?

F.: Guards mech. corps remains at Lelyushenko at his left flank, where it must be kept even now. 1 Krivomuzginskaya.

S.: I repeat:
4) Both mech. corps and 5th guards could be used if needed in the region of Lelyushenko’s left group or in Romanenko’s region, depending on the situation. For operation “Saturn” on additional mech. corps and one tank corps will be sent to you. This would be Fedorov’s reserve.
5) Immediately put Kuznetsov to the region of Lelyshenko’s right group, that is into the 1st guards army and make him do preparations for “Saturn”.
6) Filippov’s and Fyodorov’s divisions for “Saturn” operation will be commanded by Moscow. You must regularly inform Moscow about the progress of preparation of “Saturn”. Over. All is clear, are there any questions?

F.: all the instructions are clear and their execution will begin immediately with all the energy. One question - I have not yet received an artillery division RGK and AA division and it is not known whether they are dispatched. I ask for the 9th division.

S.: RGK division and AA division are already loaded and soon will be at you.

F.: Understood, please tell me their numbers. I have only three RS regiments left, M-13 and M-8. All the others were transferred to together with the 21st army. I ask to dispatch 4 regiments immediately.

S.: I inform that guards motorcycle regiment cannot be taken from Western front and be sent to Lelyushenko. Instead the 1st guards army will receive 3 motorcycle battalions. Please send your requests about the RS and other things to Stavka. I can send you two RS M-13 regiments and will dispatch them tomorrow. Over.

F.: All clear about the motorcycle battalions. Good luck.

S.: Thank you, good bye.

ЦАМО. Ф. 96а. Оп. 2011. Д. 26. Л. 195—205.