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Attitude of Armia Ludowa regarding the capitulation.
The leadership of
Armia Ludowa [AL]
and other democratic organizations were not informed by the representatives
of Armia Krajowa [AK]
about the preparations of the capitulation. The leadership of AL were
strictly against it and expressed their protests, requesting to continue the
resistance.
On 27.09 during a converstation with me, general Skakowsky has said that: “I
will act against the capitulation”. Skakowsky has approved the plans of
escaping and uniting with the army of Berling. The unit leaders of the AL
awere also supporting the continuation of the struggle and for contacting
the Red Army.
However the political leadership of AL was hesitating to break up with the
AK considering the difficulty of the situation. AL, which was against
surrendering, was joined by the democratic elements from AK and also a
considerable number of the civilians, who were counting on the Red Army.
Degradation within AK
The leadership and especially middle and lower ranks of the AK organization
were torn apart by big contradictions regarding military and political
questions. The anti Soviet policy of the government in London has suffered a
complete disaster and has discredited itself within the eyes of the
population and ordinary soldiers of AK. London delegates could not hold off
sympathy among the rebels towards the Red Army anymore.
I personally
know several officers who at first were strictly against any union with the
Red Army or Berling, but later claimed that they are ready to join AL.
The terrorist actions of PKB began to cause protests. The leadership of AK
began to hesitate to prosecute the Russian prisoners. If earlier, Russians
who were in AK captivity did not receive any food, then later the AK
leadership was forced to acknowledge their equality. It also allowed major
Volkov (from former POWs) to form a unit consisting of Russian POWs.
There were people in the AK who were against surrendering, such as colonel
Bogumil the commander of one of the districts. The AK has begun searching
for compromise between the policy of government in London and rebel demands
to form a stable contact with the Red Army. Willing to reestablish its
authority, even such reactionists as Vakhnowsky began talking about the will
to find a compromise between Rolya-Zhimersky and London. However at the same
time they were preparing the full capitulation.
In the military respect carelessness prevailed among the leadership of AK.
Only in the last period trenching was activated. The barricades were not
improved. There were drinking and revelry cases among the officers of AK,
especially at Mokotuv district.
Within the AK signs of political degradation were evident. It became known
that general Sosnowsky was replaced by “Bor”. There were rumors about the
forthcoming dismissal of “Bor”. Messages arriving from London testified that
there were contradictions within Mikolaichik and the ministers.
In the evening of 29.09 Mikolaichik deputy (allegedly in the rank of
colonel) invited general Skakovsky. Two questions were discussed there:
-
Skakowsky’s attitude regarding the capitulation. Skakowsky has replied in
a sharply negative manner, demanding struggle till the end.
-
Skakowsky’s attitude regarding his promotion to replace general “Bor”.
Mikolaichik’s deputy has underlined that Skakowsky’s candidacy is
supported by the government in London and Lyublin. Skakowsky allegedly
didn’t respond positively to this matter.
Surrendering
On 29-30.09 the leadership of AK has finished the preparation to surrender.
Money reserve of amount up to 1,5 million zloty was buried and respective
organization have prepared themselves to go underground.
According to the agreement with Germans, on 30.09 the first exit of the
civil population has begun. The time window was established every day from
5:00 till 19:00, military operations continued outside of these hours. AK
soldiers and officers started to panic. They were trying to dress as
civilians and leave among them. AL was still objecting the capitulation.
In the evening of 28.09 I visited General “Monter”. Colonel Vakhnowsky was
present during this meeting as well as chief of staff colonel “Hirurg”.
I said to General “Monter”: “As a Soviet Officer I propose to develop
a plan on how to cross Visla. I will coordinate the actions with the Red
Army to provide artillery covering fire and infantry support from the other
bank. We must concentrate all the rebel forces to perform a strike. We have
enough machine guns, ATRs and amoo for them. I ask you to develop a plan and
inform me”.
General “Monter” answered: “I will think about this.
However it is strange that the Red Army doesn’t come to help us”.
Colonel Vakhnowsky said: “This is a good plan, but we have no ammo”.
When I noted that despite the lack of ammo they still managed to hold
on until now, Vakhnowsky answered that the uprising was not planned for such
a long period etc.
In that way I didn’t receive an answer to my
proposal.
During the talk with colonel Slabvor and Bogumil I also expressed this plan
to them. They cheerfully approved it, but said that they will obey the
leadership of AK and will not go against its orders.
As noted before, the leadership of AL has agreed with my plan.
On
29.09 I requested answer from “Monter” twice in written form and by
telephone, but I received no answer. On this day at “Monter’s” staff they
refused to give me the information about the enemy, motivating it with
absence of new data.
In the evening of 01.10 I was visited by general
“Monter’s” adjutant captain Boguslawsky callsign “Korob” who was very
sympathetic towards me and the Red Army.
Boguslawsky has warned me of the following:
-
The leadership of AK has decided to surrender.
-
I must leave immediately, because assasination attempt is being prepared
against me as a representative of the Red Army.
After assessing the situation, I made a decision to leave about which I
reported on the radio. I went down the manhole, went along the pipes
following previously scouted path to Visla, swam across the river and went
ashore around the bridge of Ponyatowsky. I notified the members of the
Lyublin government in Warsaw about this route.
About the actions of captain Kalugin
After arriving to Warsaw I found out that 3-4 days prior to my arrival
captain Kalugin has went to the Soviet side. He was at “Monter’s” staff and
was considered an official representative of the Soviet command.
The officers of AL said me that Kalugin was exceptionally trusted by
“Monter” and was called “Soviet military attache”. Kalugin has taken part in
all the meetings of AK staff.
Kalugin has issued leaflets addressing
the Russian cossacks, traitors who were on the German side. He called them
to join the Red Army or the rebels. These leaflets were dropped from
airplanes.
Of Kalugin’s personal omens I know only that he lacks 2-3 fingers on his
hand. Kalugin was sent by “Monter” on the Eastern bank and allegedly had
some important plans with him.
Survey performed by: deputy head of intelligence staff of the 1st
Belorussian front colonel Ozeryansky and captain Bezimensky.
Source: ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 2380. Д. 22. Л. 238–244.
Source: warsaw75.mil.ru
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