Order 0391 About the facts of sybstitution of educational work with repressions

Order of people's Deffense Commissar of the USSR

"About the facts of sybstitution of educational work with repressions"

4 December 1941 № 0391

Recently, there have been frequent cases of illegal repressions and gross abuse of power by individual commanders and commissars in relation to their subordinates. Lieutenant of the 288th rifle regiment Komissarov, without any reason, killed a Red Army soldier Kubica with a shot from a revolver.
The former head of the 21st UR, Colonel Sushchenko, shot Jr. Sergeant Pershikov for too slowly getting off the car due to an injured hand.
The commander of a platoon of a motorized rifle company of the 1026th rifle regiment, Lieutenant Mikryukov, shot dead his assistant, junior platoon commander Baburin, allegedly for not following orders.
The military commissar of the 28th Panzer Division, Regimental Commissar Bankvitzer, beat a sergeant for lighting a cigarette at night; he also beat Major Zanozny for an unrestrained conversation with him.
The chief of staff of the 529th Infantry Regiment, Captain Sakur without any reason has hit twice senior lt. Lieutenant Sergeyev with a pistol. Such intolerable facts of the perversion of disciplinary practices in the Red Army, the excess of granted rights and power, lynching and assault are explainable with:

• the method of persuasion was incorrectly relegated to the background, and the method of repression against subordinates moved into first place;
• daily educational work in units is in some cases replaced by swearing, repression and assault;
• the method of explanations and conversations of commanders, commissars, political workers with the Red Army soldiers is abandoned and the clarification of questions that are incomprehensible to the Red Army soldiers is often replaced by shouting, abuse and rudeness;
• individual commanders and political workers in difficult conditions of battle get lost, fall into a panic and cover their own confusion with the use of weapons without any reason;
• the simple truth is forgotten that use of repression is an extreme measure, permissible only in cases of direct disobedience and open resistance in a combat situation or in cases of malicious violation of discipline and order by persons deliberately going to disrupt the orders of the command.

Commanders, commissars, and political workers must remember that without a correct combination of method of persuasion with method of coercion, the imposition of Soviet military discipline and the strengthening of the political and moral state of the troops is unthinkable.
Severe punishment in relation to malicious violators of military discipline, accomplices of the enemy and open enemies should be combined with careful analysis of every case of violation of discipline that require a detailed clarification of the circumstances it has occurred in.
Unjustified repressions, illegal executions, arbitrariness, and assault on the part of commanders and commissars are a manifestation of lack of will and handlessness, often lead to the opposite results, contribute to decline in military discipline and political and moral state of troops, and can push unstable fighters to defect to the side of the enemy.

I order:

1. Restore educational work, widely use the persuasion method, do not replace everyday explanatory work with administration and repressions.
2. To all commanders, political workers and chiefs to talk daily with the Red Army soldiers, explaining to them the necessity for strict military discipline, honest fulfillment of their military duty, the military oath and orders of the commander and chief. In conversations, also explain that a serious threat looms over our Motherland, that the greatest self-sacrifice, unshakable steadfastness in battle, contempt for death and a merciless struggle against cowards, deserters, self-mutilators, provocateurs and traitors to the Motherland are needed to defeat the enemy.
3. Explain to the commanding staff that lynching, assault and public swearing are degrading the rank of a soldier of the Red Army, lead not to strengthening, but to undermining the discipline and authority of the commander and political worker.
4. In the most resolute manner, up to bringing the perpetrators to trial by a military tribunal, to combat all manifestations of illegal repression, assault and lynching.

The order is to be announced to the entire commanding staff of the Army in the field, up to and including the commander and commissar of the regiment.

People's Commissar of Defense I. Stalin
Chief of the General Staff B. Shaposhnikov

ЦАМО РФ Ф. 4. Оп. 11. Д. 66. Л. 149–152.

Order to the commander of 20th tank regiment to organize the protection of historical material in Berlin.

To the commander of 20th tank regiment.
Fulfilling the order of the military council of the army.
The division commander has ordered:

Select 7 people from the saergeant and private staff to perform the protection tasks of the archive and precious museum materials of the German writer Goethe. The term is from 17.7 till 23.7.45.

Instructions regarding the guarding as well as places to guard shall be received from the commander of the guarding company of the staff of the 8th Guards Tank Army (Veimar, platz Elefand, Krankenhaus (hospital))

Report the fulfillment about the beginning and end of the service at 18:00 17.7.45 and 18:00 23.7.45.

Cheif of staff of the II tank Radom-Berlin
Red Banner orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov division
Major General of the tank forces
Signed (Gritsenko)

sent 2 copies
copy 1 - to file
copy 2 - to recepient
fulilled by Bavykin

17.7.45 MR

Sent at 15:50

Source: archive index temporary unavailable

Order from the commander of the forces of the 1st Belorussian front to the commander of the 48th army about temporary halting the offensive.

15th August 1944

The Army has not achieved an objective set by me. The reason for this was that the offensive was poorly organized, the combat formations of corps adn armies was was not appropriate for the situation, too much forces were left in the reserve while not enough of them was dedicated to the offensive itself. As a result adversary could organize a defence at random unprepared spots and with small numbers hold back our advancing units.

I order:

1. To teporaliry stop the advance. During the 16th and 17.08.1944 thoroughly scout the defenses and enemy's fire system; organize the battle, deliver ammo, fuel and lubricants.
2. In the morning of 18.08.1944 to attack decicively and fulfill your previous objectives.

Report when delivered. Report about the adopted decision via encrypted message at around 20:00 16.08.1944

Rokossovsky
Telegin
Malinin

ЦАМО РФ. Ф.233. Оп. 2307. Д. 33. Л. 68.

Excerpt from Stavka of the Supreme Commander directive to the Commander of the 1st Belorussian front about transition to defense.

Response to this document

Moscow
29th August 1944

1 - Left flank of the front must go defensive after receiving this directive. The right flank must continue offensive with the objective to reach river Narev and its mouth around 4.09 - 5.09 and to capture a bridgehead on the Western bank near Pultusk, Sierotsk and also go defensive after that.[...]

5 - Special attention must be payed at the following directions: Rozhan, Ostruw-Mazovetzky, Chizhaev, Pultusk, Vyshkuw, Vengruw, Warsaw, Minsk-Mazovetsk, Demblin, Lukuw, Radom, Lyublin and to holding the bridgeheads on the Western bank of rivers Vistula and Narev.[...]

Report about the issued instructions and present a detailed defensive plan to the Joint Staff no later than 5th of September.

Stavka of the Supreme Command
Stalin
Antonov

ЦХСД Ф.2\2. 1944г. Л. 18-20.

Response to this document

Stavka of the Supreme Commander directive Nr 11072 to the commanders of 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts about the necessity for humane treatment towards the German population and prisoners of war.

20 April 1945 20:40

Stavka of the Supreme Command orders:

1. To require the forces to change their treatment of Germans both towards prisoners of war and civilians and treat them better.
   Cruel treatment makes them fear and provokes more stubborn resistance without surrendering.
   The civilians, fearing revenge, gather into gangs. This situation is not good for us. More humane treatment of the Germans will make our fighting easier on their territory and without doubt will reduce their stubbornness in the defence.
2. In German regions to the West of the line between river Oder mouth, river Oder until Furstenberg and further until river Neise (western), create German administrations and put Germans as burgomasters.
   Do not touch ordinary members of the national-socialist party, if they are loyal towards the Red Army, only leaders may be taken into custody if they weren’t able to flee yet.
3. Better treatment of the Germansmust not lower your vigilance and cause familiarities with them.

Stavka of the Supreme command
J.Stalin, A.Antonov

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 212. Л. 13.

Directive Nr 11071 of the Stavka of the Supreme Commander to the Commander of the 1st Belorussian front to strike, surpassing Berlin from the North.

18 April 1945 04:00

Stavka of the Supreme Command orders:

1. After crossing Oder river no later than 22.04 with the main forces, continue the offensive to the South Westin the overall direction towards Graifenberg, Gross-Schenbekk, Birkenverder, performing a strike surpassing Berlin from the North.
2. From 24:00 on 20.04 Set up the following delimiting line with the 1st Belorussian front: until Angermunde as before, then AltHuttendorf (for 2nd Belorussian front inclusive).
3. Report about the issued instructions.

Stavka of the Supreme Command
J.Stalin, A.Antonov

Source: ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 213. Л. 85.

Directive Nr 11060 of Stavka of the Supreme Commander to the Commander of 1st Ukrainian Front about the elimination of the enemy group in the region of Kotbus and to the South of Berlin.

3 April 1945 21:00

The Stavka of the Supreme Commander orders:

1. To prepare and implement an offensive operation with the objective to eliminate the enemy group in the region of Kotbus to the South of Berlin. No later than on 10-12 day of operation take Beelitz, Wittenberg and further along Elbe to Dresden. Later, after Berlin is taken, prepare to advance towards Leipzig.
2. The main strike with forces of five combined arms armies and two tank armies should be made from the Triebel region in the direction towards Shpremberg, Beltzig.
   In the region of breakthrough gather six breakthrough artillery divisions to create artillery density of no less than 250 barrels per kilometer of 76mm and higher.
3. To support the main group from the South perform a supportive strike with forces of the 2nd Polish Army and parts of 52nd Army from the region of Kolfurt to the overall direction of Bautzen, Dresden.
4. The tank armies and combined arms armies of the second echelon must be sent in after the breakthrough is achieved to supplement the success in the direction of the main strike.
5. The left flank of the front must stay in a rigid defence with special caution to the Breslau direction.
   The 5th guards Army must be swapped and used in the offensive in the main direction.
6. Establish the following delimiting line from 15.04.1945 with the 1st Belorussian front: Up to Unrushtadt -as before, then lake Einsdorfer-Ze, Gros-Gastroze, Lubben (all points except Lubben for the Belorussian front inclusive). Responsibility for maintaining the joint as before.
7. The beginning of the operation is according to instructions you have received personally.

Stavka of the Supreme Command
J.Stalin, A.Antonov

Source: ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 139. Л. 231, 232.

Supreme commander Stavka directive Nr. 11059 to the commander of the 1st Belorussian front for preparation and execution of the operation of capturing Berlin.

2nd April 1945

The Stavka of the Supreme commander orders:

1. To prepare and to implement the offensive operation with the objective to take the capital of Germany the city of Berlin and to reach Elbe no later than on the twelfth-fifteenth day of operation.
2. The main strike must be directed from the bridgehead on Oder river to the West of Kustrin by using the forces of four combined and two tank armies. Bring five to six artillery divisions to the breakthrough region to create a density of no less than 250 barrels per 1km of 76mm guns and higher.
3. To support the main group of the front, perform two supporting strikes from the North and South with forces of two armies each. The first one from Bervalde in the general direction towards Eberswalde, Ferbellin. The second from the bridgeheads on river Oder to the North and South from Frankfurt-on-Oder to the general direction towards Furstenwalde, Potsdam, Brandenburg to surpass Berlin from South.
4. Tank armies must be sent in the direction of main strike after defenses will be breached, to facilitate the success of surpassing Berlin from North and North-East.
5. The army of the second echelon must be used to facilitate the success in the main direction.
6. Delimiting lines:
   With the 2nd Belorussian front according to the Stavka directive Nr.110531 ОП 1.04.1945;
   With the first Ukrainian front from 15.04.1945 until Unrushtadt - as before, then lake Ensdorfer-Ze, Gross-Gastroze, Lubben (all points except Lubben for the 1st Belorussian front inclusive)
7. The responsibility for ensuring joints with the 2nd Belorussian front and 1st Ukrainian fronts are the same.
8. Operation start is in accordance with instructions received personally by you.

Stavka of the Supreme Commander.
J. Stalin, A. Antonov.

Directive Nr. 220155 of Stavka of the Supreme Commander to the Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front about the usage of the tank armies and cavalry units for capturing bridgeheads on Vistula.

Follow up order of the Ukrainian Front

27 July 1944. 19:20

In connection with front forces capturing Lviv, Peremyshl and Yaroslav, the Stavka of the Supreme Commander orders:
Use the 1st Guards Tank army of Katukov and cavalry units to capture bridgeheads on the Western bank of Vistula in the region between Sandomier and river Visloka. Send there Rybalko’s 3rd Guards tank army following these units.

The directions regarding your plan that was sent on 24.07 will be given on 28.07.1944.

Please report about the issued instructions.

Stavka of the supreme commander
J.Stalin, A.Antonov.

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 166. Л. 417.

Follow up order of the Ukrainian Front

Order of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Commanders of the 13th Army, 3rd Guards Tank Army about the elimination of the Sandomierz enemy group and liberation of city Sandomier.

Based on Stavka directive Nr. 220155

03. August 1944.

In order to eliminate the Sandomierz enemy group as well as to enlarge and reinforce the bridgehead on the Western bank of Vistula river to the North West of Sandomier. As well to support Gordov’s 3rd Army crossing Vistula.

I order to:

1. The commander of the 1st Tank Army to decisively strike at Opatow, Ozharuw directions with the objective to eliminate the Sandomierz enemy group which is operating in front of the 3rd guards Army; by the end of 04.08 capture Ozharuw. To cover the army from the West, capture road links at Ostrovec and Laguv.
2. The commander of the 13th Army by using forces of five rifle divisions to strike from Kopshivnica, Klimontuw region at the direction of Kolechatuw, Sobutka with the objective to eliminate the Sandomierz enemy group in cooperation with the 1st Tank Army and to capture Sandomier by morning of 05.08. The region of Ivaniska, Bogorija, Stashuv shall be occupied by three rifle divisions to support the operation of the army from the West.
3. The commander of the 3rd guards Army must accelerate the crossing of Vistula river and while striking to Ozharuw, Ostrovec together with 13th Army and 1st Tank Army must eliminate the Sandomierz enemy group. By the end of 05.08 the main forces of the army must enter the region of Tarluw, Ozharuw, Opatuw.
4. The delimiting line between the 3rd grds and 13th Armies is the same until Ulyanuw, then the mouth of river San, Laguw, Kelytze - all the points except for Kieltze, inclusive for the 13th army.
5. Report about the given orders and their implementation.

Konev, Kraynyukov, Sokolovsky

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 236. Оп. 17062. Д. 16. Л. 435.

Based on Stavka directive Nr. 220155

Directive of Stavka Nr. 220162 of the Supreme Commander to the commander of the Belorussian front and Stavka representative.

About the offensive to Warsaw and capturing the bridgeheads on Narev and Vizsla.

28. July 1944. 24:00

The Stavka of the Supreme Command orders:

1. After taking Brest and Sedlec region proceed with offensive in general direction to Warsaw with an objective to take Prague not later than on 5 - 8 of August and capture a bridgehead on the Western bank of river Narev in the region of Pultusk, Serock. The left flank of the front must capture the bridgehead on the Western bank of Vizsla river in the region of Demblin, Zvoleny, Soletz. Use the captured bridgeheads to strike to the North-West direction to wrap the enemy’s defense along river Narev and Vizsla thus supporting the crossing the Narev river by the left flank of the 2nd Belorussian front as well as central armies of your own front. Further on, plan to advance in the general direction to Torn and Lodzy.
2. From 24:00 29.07 establish the following delimiting lines:
   • With the 2nd Belorussian front to Rozhany - as before and further to Czekhanuv, Strasburg, outskirts of Warsaw, Gradunetz (all points for the Belorussian front inclusive)
   • With 1st Ukraine front to Konske - as before and further Piotrkow, Ostruw (20km SouthWest from Kalish). Both points for the Belorussian front, inclusive.
3. Responsibility for organizing junctions with other fronts shall remain as before.
4. Report about the given orders.

Stavka of the Supreme Command
J.Stalin, A.Antonov

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 166. Л. 424. Подлинник.