About the evacuation of Orphanage from Stalingrad region.

18 August 1942

(In coordination with the executive committee of the Oblast' council)

According to command of Sovnarkom of RSFSR, the executive committee of the Oblast' council of workers deputees VKP(b) decide:

1. To evacuate to the Molotovskaya oblast' the following orphanages of the Stalingrad province:
   • Chernoyarsk orphanage - 230 people
   • Tsarevsky of Lininsjy district - 91 people
   • Bykovsky - 178 people
   • Rakhinsky of Proleysk district - 68 people
   • n.Kardalysky N.Nikolayevsky district - 208 people
   • Filonovsky - 126 people
   • Serafimovichsky Nr2 260 people
   • Nikolayevsky pre-school orphanage - 208 people
   • Nikolayevsky orphanage Nr2 - 170
   • Zaplavinsky mid.Akhtubinsky district - 137
   • Kikvidzensky - 99 people
   • Berezovsky - 105 people
   • >Malodelsky - of the Berezovsky district - 89 people
   • L.-lychagsky of the Berezovsky district - 100 people
   • Zhdanovsky - 120 people
   • Dubovsky pre-school orphanage - 85 people
   • from Astrakhan district orphanages - 520 people
2. Establish the following routes of evacuation of the orphanages:
   • Dubovsky and Rakhinsky orphanages to Dubovka dock, up along Volga until the destination.
   • Chernoyarsky orphanage to Akhtuba dock by horse-drawn transport and from Akhtuba station till the destination by railroad.
   • Tsarevsky and Zaplavinsky orphanages by railroad until the destination.
   • Bykovsky orphanage from Bykovy dock of the farm, up along Volga until the destination.
   • L.Kardailsky orphanage of L.Nikolayevsky district, until station Yelany to Kamyshin by railroad and from Kamyshin up along Volga until destination.
   • Filonovsky orphanage situated in the Gmelynsky district, from station Gmelynka by railroad until the destination.
   • Berezovsky, Malodelsky, l.-Lychagsky and Zhdanovsky orphanages until kamyshin by horse-drawn transport and from Kamyshin up by Volgauntil the destination.
3. Oblige the chief secretaries of of region committees of VKP(b) and heads of executive commitees of the region councils: Chernoyarsky, Leninsky, Bykovsky, Proletarsky, l.Nikolayevsky, Gmelnitzky, Staro-Poltavsky, Nikolayevsky, mid-Akhtubinsky districts to organize the evacuation of children, workers, and all the possessions of the orphanages and provide them with monthly supplies of food. Also organize their transportation until the places of loading on stations and docks.
4. Oblige the Olast' trading department (Oblgorotdel) com. Gromov and Oblast' consumption union (Oblpotrbsoyuz) com. Bokov to provide the necessary food for the evacuated orphanages.
5. Ask deputy of peoples commissariat of communication routes com. Bagayev to provide the necessary amount of railroad cars to transfer the evacuated orphanages according to request from OblONO.
6. Oblige the head of department NVRP com. Kachenin to provide the necessary tonnage to evacuate the orphanages according to request from OblONO.
7. Oblige the OblONO com. Agrinsky to send the responsible representatives to the field to execute all the necessary work for preparation of the evacuation of the orphanages.
8. Task the Astrakhan' district VKP(b) and executive commitee of disctrict council of the worker deputees to ensure the evacuation of 520 kids from orphanages.
9. Oblige regional commitees VKP(b) and executive district councils to handle orhpanages' auxillary farms with crops, cattle and farming tools over to schools, but the auxillary farms of Nikolayevsky orphanage Nr2 to handle over to special VVS school Nr7.

RGASPI Ф. 17. Оп. 43. Д. 1772. Л. 252–253.

Order to the commander of 20th tank regiment to organize the protection of historical material in Berlin.

To the commander of 20th tank regiment.
Fulfilling the order of the military council of the army.
The division commander has ordered:

Select 7 people from the saergeant and private staff to perform the protection tasks of the archive and precious museum materials of the German writer Goethe. The term is from 17.7 till 23.7.45.

Instructions regarding the guarding as well as places to guard shall be received from the commander of the guarding company of the staff of the 8th Guards Tank Army (Veimar, platz Elefand, Krankenhaus (hospital))

Report the fulfillment about the beginning and end of the service at 18:00 17.7.45 and 18:00 23.7.45.

Cheif of staff of the II tank Radom-Berlin
Red Banner orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov division
Major General of the tank forces
Signed (Gritsenko)

sent 2 copies
copy 1 - to file
copy 2 - to recepient
fulilled by Bavykin

17.7.45 MR

Sent at 15:50

Source: archive index temporary unavailable

Directive Nr 30144 of Stavka of the Supreme Command to the commanders of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, South-West and South fronts about the enemy's possible attack date.

2nd July 1943 02:10

According to our data the Germans can attack on our front in the period between 3 - 6 of July.

Stavka of the Supreme Command orders:

1. Increase scouting and observing the enemy in order to discover his intentions in time
2. Ground forces and Aviation must be prepared to repel the possible attack of the enemy
3. Report about the adopted measures.

Stavka of the Supreme Command
J.Stalin
A.Vasilevsky

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 143. л. 164.

Directive Nr. 220155 of Stavka of the Supreme Commander to the Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front about the usage of the tank armies and cavalry units for capturing bridgeheads on Vistula.

Follow up order of the Ukrainian Front

27 July 1944. 19:20

In connection with front forces capturing Lviv, Peremyshl and Yaroslav, the Stavka of the Supreme Commander orders:
Use the 1st Guards Tank army of Katukov and cavalry units to capture bridgeheads on the Western bank of Vistula in the region between Sandomier and river Visloka. Send there Rybalko’s 3rd Guards tank army following these units.

The directions regarding your plan that was sent on 24.07 will be given on 28.07.1944.

Please report about the issued instructions.

Stavka of the supreme commander
J.Stalin, A.Antonov.

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 166. Л. 417.

Follow up order of the Ukrainian Front

Directive of Stavka Nr. 220162 of the Supreme Commander to the commander of the Belorussian front and Stavka representative.

About the offensive to Warsaw and capturing the bridgeheads on Narev and Vizsla.

28. July 1944. 24:00

The Stavka of the Supreme Command orders:

1. After taking Brest and Sedlec region proceed with offensive in general direction to Warsaw with an objective to take Prague not later than on 5 - 8 of August and capture a bridgehead on the Western bank of river Narev in the region of Pultusk, Serock. The left flank of the front must capture the bridgehead on the Western bank of Vizsla river in the region of Demblin, Zvoleny, Soletz. Use the captured bridgeheads to strike to the North-West direction to wrap the enemy’s defense along river Narev and Vizsla thus supporting the crossing the Narev river by the left flank of the 2nd Belorussian front as well as central armies of your own front. Further on, plan to advance in the general direction to Torn and Lodzy.
2. From 24:00 29.07 establish the following delimiting lines:
   • With the 2nd Belorussian front to Rozhany - as before and further to Czekhanuv, Strasburg, outskirts of Warsaw, Gradunetz (all points for the Belorussian front inclusive)
   • With 1st Ukraine front to Konske - as before and further Piotrkow, Ostruw (20km SouthWest from Kalish). Both points for the Belorussian front, inclusive.
3. Responsibility for organizing junctions with other fronts shall remain as before.
4. Report about the given orders.

Stavka of the Supreme Command
J.Stalin, A.Antonov

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 166. Л. 424. Подлинник.

Report to the Commander of the forces of the 1st Belorussian front to deputy head of the Joint Staff of the Red Army about the difficulties with fuel supplies.

31 July 1944

Moscow
To: Joint Staff of the Red Army Antonov,
Main Logistics Headquarters of the Red Army Khrulyov

The constant cut offs from supply bases due to slow railroad repairing has caused difficulties in fuel supplies.
To mitigate this and to make it possible to supply fuel across Vizsla river, I ask to order an urgent formation of a battalion to pump the fuel. For this please provide the battalion with an imported gasoline pipeline together with all the needed gear, which is in possession of the Headquarters of the Fuel Supply of the Red Army.
The battalion must be urgently sent to Lyublin by railroad.

Rokossovsky.

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 2307. Д. 29. Л. 59.

Report of the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the chief logistics officer of the Red Army about the heavy situation with fuel supply.

18 july 1944.

To the chief logistics officer of the Red Army
com. Khrulyov

The situation with gasoline is very difficult. The troops don’t even have fuel for one full fuel tank for all vehicles. Multiple requests to intensify the shipments had no effect. Supply routes reach up to 450 km in one direction and along bad roads. The front spends 400 - 450 tons of fuel each day, when the calculated limit is 7000 tons per month.

Our telegram about increasing the fuel limit to 12 000 tons for July was left unanswered.

Units started to feel shortages of ammunition and food while reinforcement units often are idle because of lack of gasoline.

The transport 72/25720 and 72/25649 will arrive at the unloading station of the Front on 14th and 15.07.1944, but the transport 61/25552 will not arrive earlier than 19.7.1944.

Gasoline stockpile bases should be moved closer to our troops. The transport 72/25397 is re-routed from Krichev to Minsk through Orsha, but it will take 4 days to reach.

From 15th to 19.07.1944 we will have an interruption of supplies of gasoline and we ask to cover it with 1500 tons of gasoline by rerouting the nearby transports. This request however was left unfulfilled.

According to the plan of the second decade, only one transport 72/25673 was sent to us which will cause even bigger interruption of gasoline supplies.

We could have routed the transports with gasoline to Minsk, but we lack the necessary gasoline transports and due to critical situations with fuel in the troops force us to unload transports at station Lukolovo which is 200km further from the troops. We use all our barrels and even captured barrels to carry fuels and oils on flatbed transports.

Because we lack barrels, we asked to send us 2500 barrels, but we have no response yet.

To prevent this extremely difficult situation, we find ourselves in, from becoming a crisis, we must once again raise the questions about gasoline supplies for our forces.
We ask for:

1. Deliver 750 tons of gasoline for the Front each day on 16th and 17.07.1944. Failure to do so will force hundreds of vehicles waiting for gasoline at station Lukolovo as the troops will spend all the gasoline they have left and the vehicles will not be able to carry ammunition and food.
2. Urgently dispatch 2500 fuel barrels for flatbed trucks to the front.
3. Speed up the movement of the gasoline transports that are on the way. Also, until 20.07.1944 dispatch in total 6 000 tons of gasoline with equal deliveries each day.
4. Solve the question about increasing the gasoline limit for July for the front.

Please inform us about your decision. Zakharov
Mekhlis
Russkih

Source: ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 178503. Д. 3. Л. 107–109.

Talk record of Narkom of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M.Molotov with the Prime Minister of the Polish Emigrated Government S.Mikolaichik.

Moscow 31 july 1944 21:00
Also present: Grabsky, Mnishek, Romer.

Mikolaichik greets Molotov.

Molotov says that he greets Mikolaichik in Moscow.

Mikolaichik thanks for the comfortable conditions provided to him in Moscow. Simultaneously he expresses a request to be accepted by I.V.Stalin. Some time ago Grabsky has already said about that will to Lebedev.
Now he, Mikolaichik, wishes to say two things.
Firstly, the Polish government is now building up forces to assist the Soviet forces at a decisive moment with their struggle against the Germans. Polish operation plan was developed in cooperation with General Tabor who has arrived from Poland recently. The plan is handled to the English government with a request to hand it over to the Soviet government. Back in October last year all the Polish forces were ordered to fight in cooperation with the Soviet forces.
Probably V.M.Molotov has information about this being implemented already.

Molotov answers that he has some information but not quite the same character.

Mikolaichik says that Polish government has a plan to mobilize all the resources to fight the Germans. At this important moment it is important to find agreement between Polish and Soviet governments to lay the foundation of peaceful cooperation between Poland and the Soviet Union in the future. He, Mikolaichik, is sure that the entire population of Poland supports him. He, Mikolaichik, represents those political parties of Poland who are willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union and are struggling against those parties that do not wish to cooperate with the Soviet Union.

Molotov notes that he does not fully understand what Mikolaichik is speaking of. Polish government has different political parties including those whose hostile attitude cannot be argued.

Mikolaichik claims that there are no such parties in the Polish government. All four parties represented in the government are willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union.

Molotov notes that then it is better to leave that question.

Mikolaichik notes that he is positive that there are no disagreements between the Polish government and the Soviet government. He, Mikolaichik, wants to discuss all the matters with the Soviet government and to convince the Soviet government that the intentions of the Polish government are honest.

Molotov answers that it is better to talk to the Polish National Committee.

Mikolaichik says that he thinks that it would be better to talk to the Soviet government whose heroic armies are beating the Germans. The Soviet government is representing the power of its state which will rule Europe. WHen he, Mikolaichik, speaks of a historical moment, he wants to underline that if the Soviet Union will generously come towards the Polish government, then the Polish people will agree to have a union with the Soviet Russia. If he, Mikolaichik, will speak to the National Committee, then he is not sure that same will happen.

Molotov answers that as it seems to him it would be better for Mikolaichik to speak with the Polish Committee of National Liberation which is much better informed about the situation in Poland.
He, Molotov, also wants to add that the fact that Marshal Stalin has informed through Churchill about the possibility to meet with Mikolaichik is still in force. As Marshall Stalin is very busy with military matters, he, Molotov, thinks that Mikolaichik could be accepted on Wednesday or Thursday, judging by the situation in Moscow. He, Molotov, will forward Mikolaichik visit request to I.V.Stalin.

Mikolaichik says, answering Molotov note about the better situational awareness of the Polish Committee, wishes to say that Polish delegates who had arrived to London are very well informed about the situation in Poland.

Molotov answers that delegates have less information than there is on spot in Poland.

Mikolaichik agrees with Molotov and says that General Tabor is ready to take off from London anytime and report about the situation in Poland. The Polish government has been planning a general uprising in Warsaw and wants to ask the Soviet government to conduct bombing raids over the airfields of Warsaw.

Molotov notes that there are only 10km left to Warsaw.
Molotov asks whether Mikolaichik has any other questions.

Mikolaichik says that there are no more questions and he is ready to answer Molotov’s questions.

Molotov asks if Mikolaichik has any requests that he, Molotov, can forward to Marshal Stalin.

Mikolaichik answers that he has only one general will - ask Molotov to tell Stalin that he, Mikolaichik, represents the mood of the entire Polish nation.

Molotov says that he has already expressed his opinion that Mikolaichik should talk about this to the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

Mikolaichik says that he is ready to speak to the Committee. However he understands well that not all questions could be discussed with the Committee while he can discuss all the questions with the Soviet government.

Molotov says that it is possible to discuss with the Soviet government only those questions that relate to the Soviet government.

Romer asks if Mikolaichik will be able to send ciphered telegrams to London.

Molotov answered that he thinks that this will be possible.

Romer asks Molotov to issue a respective instruction.

Talk lasted for 30 minutes.

Recorded by V.Pavlov

Source: АВП РФ. Ф. 06. Оп. 6. Д. 17. Л. 91–93.

Transcript of talks of the Supreme Commander to the Commander of the Western Front.

02.07.1941

NARKOM of defenceThis is a mistake, Stalin has become NARKOM of Defence on 19.07.1941 at the device with the presence of Stavka at the device.:
We are interested if you have placed mines on the highway Orsha-Minsk? Have you found out where the 53rd division is? Are your units arriving in the defence region? Which of them remain? What work is going on in the region? And finally, do you know which Pavlov’s units have retreated towards the region that is occupied by your units and in what condition are those units? You must report these matters constantly.

Timoshenko.: Materials for the minefields are being delivered to us. Part of the explosives deliveries arrived in the defence regions yesterday. The highway is not being mined because it is used for the forces and rears of the Western front.
Secondly, the 53rd division is occupying the region on Dnieper: Shklov (inclusive) - Mogilev (Exclusive). The 172nd has begun concentrating at the Mogilev area with six echelons unloaded yesterday. The forward units of the 18th division have reached the region of Orsha (exclusive) - Shklov. The first motorized division has its forward units in the region of Tolochin. The first echelon of the 78th division has just unloaded at Smolensk together with the command and control units of the 69th corps. I decided to move the unloading place of the divisions to the region of Orsha, Krasnoe, Gusino.
Tonight, three armoured trains entered Smolensk and came under command of Remezov. Special battalion of Leningrad has arrived in the Vinogradov’s region of concentration.
We experience a serious lack of diesel fuel. Also we need additional armor piercing shells for the group’s artillery: 12 thousands of the 145mm, 7 thousands of the 76mm.
I personally visited Remezov yesterday. It appears that Remezov hasn’t had a comprehensive plan of the organization of a frontal edge {of defences of his forces}. I ordered him to immediately do a recognition of the entire region of defence together with artillerymen and engineers. I’m going to visit him once more right now in the defence region.
We are in dire need of the reconnaissance aircraft and fighter aircraft. I have no means to conduct the air reconnaissance and to cover the concentration of our forces and major objects. I ask to accelerate the arrival of the head of the aviation of the group.
Up until yesterday no Pavlov’s units had retreated to our region.
Additionally I want to report about the situation with our communications: on the night of the 29th, the enemy has bombed Smolensk for several hours and has done damage to the communication hub. The staff of the group is therefore isolated from the army and from Moscow. The city is in flames, there is close to no leadership of the firefighting efforts. That consolidated signal battalion that I have with huge strain is trying to create bypass lines around Smolensk.
We need your help regarding the communication situation. First: organize the formation of at least one signal battalion of army type and I ask you to order to immediately send a signal regiment from Bryansk to Remezov. The only communication he has with his forces is through delegates on cars.
And finally, the question about maps. Here we have a complete mess: Remezov has only a few complects and now the 73rd division has arrived which has no maps at all. Is everything clear?

Stalin.: We will take measures regarding your questions. We have instructions for you: the highway must be properly mined from the direction of Minsk to Orsha. Do you understand?

T.: And what about the highway Minsk - Mogilev, can we mine that one as well?

S.: Mine that one too. Mine several places so later it is possible to blow it up by a signal. Do you understand?

T.: Understood. I give orders now and leave to go to Remezov. I ask for one small thing. Order Trubetskoy to send us plans of transportation of our forces group otherwise we have to search for the echelons at the stations.

S.: Good. All from us, good bye.

T.: Good. All will be done. Good bye.

ЦХСД Д. У/5--б/11.

Transcript of talk of the Supreme Commander to the Commander of the Forces of the Western Direction

20.07.1941

Stalin at the device.: Hello. Until now, you were tossing up one, two or three divisions to help the front and that didn’t lead to anything notable. Perhaps it is time to stop these tactics and form forces of seven or eight divisions with cavalry on flanks. Select a direction and force the adversary to relocate their forces. For example, isn’t it possible to add two or three rifle divisions and some cavalry from the reserve, to the group of Khomenko’s three divisions, three divisions near Orlov, one tank division (which is already fighting near Yartsevo) and one motorized division and then direct all this to Smolensk region and eliminate enemy and clear that region, by knocking the enemy to Orsha. I think that the time has come to stop cheapskate {sic} and start operating with large groups of forces. Over.

Timoshenko.: I think that it will be correct to realize your plan. Especially considering the latest data that tells us that the enemy is operating all its divisions of the Smolensk region to the North West, to Yartsevo. But the main group of tanks aims at Yelnya, blocking Smolensk with tanks and motorized infantry. Of course Smolensk is under threat and on a narrower front - Yartsevo. The strike that you have recommended, that is a powerful one towards Smolensk itself without any flanking maneuvers can turn out in our favor. Over.

ЦАМО. Ф. 96а. Оп. 2011. Д. 5. Л. 1, 2.