Brief technical report about shaped charge rounds.

Approve Head of BTU GABTU RA Engineer-Colonel Afonin 15 November 1942

Approve Deputy Peoples Commissaar of the Tank industry of the USSR Popov 15 November 1942

Brief Technical Report.
About the development of means for tank protection against sub-caliber and cumulativeHere and further 'cumulative' is same as 'shaped charge' rounds.

During the war, new ammunition types have entered the service of the German army - sub-caliber and cumulative shells. The test firing of the hull of T-34 tank from the German 75mm gun and 76mm domestic gun with cumulative shells have shown the following:
I. The strength of the hull of T-34 tank against the cumulative shells.

Hull part	Tank bearing angle	Strength of part
		75mm German cumulative shells	76mm domestic cumulative shells
Frontal hull plates	0	No penetration	No penetration
Hull sides	90	Penetrated	penetration
Hull sides	60	No Penetration	Penetrated
Sloped sideThe upper sides (sloped) of the hull. "Подкрылки" in original.	90	No penetration	Penetrated
Hull rear	180	No penetration	No penetration
Turret	90	No penetration	Penetrated

From the above table it is evident that domestic shells have better penetration ability than the German ones as the former ones penetrate only the sides of the hull of a T-34 tank and only from angles that are close to normal.
The pecularity of these shells is that due to their HE capability they do not loose their penetrative capabilities with distance. Because of that the hull sides of a T-34 tank can be penetrated from a large distance.
Regarding the HE capability of these shells, it is quite significant and is even slightly bigger than that of ordinary HE shells.
Moreover, when impacting to the hull sides near the bottom, Подкрылки? Or transmission parts, cumulative rounds destroy them and make the tank inoperable. On impact to the lower part of the turret the roof is bent inwards or even breaks. When hitting the rear side, the hatches are torn off, exhaust pipe protection is torn off, bolt joints are destroyed.

РГАСПИ. Ф. 644. Оп. 2. Д. 115. Л. 80

Transcript of talk of the Supreme commander to the commander of the Leningrad front.

08.11.1941

Leningrad.: Zhdanov, Khazin at the device.

Moscow.: Stalin at the device. We are very worried by your slowness about carrying out the operation you know about. You have a term of several days. If you do not break through to the East within those several days then you will ruin the Leningrad front and the whole population of Leningrad as well. We are being told that after the artillery barrage the infantry doesn’t go forward. But you must know that infantry will not go without tanks. After the barrage you must put forth the tanks and only after them you can let the infantry attack, giving the artillery an order to redirect their fire 3-4 kilometers to the East of the frontline of your tanks. So that the tanks and the infantry could maneuver freely while the enemy couldn’t bring in fresh forces. And in general, you must redirect your artillery fire further to the East as your forces are advancing. Without such organization you will not achieve anything. Of course the aviation and RS must do their jobs also. Over.

Zhdanov.: The offense of the infantry has bumped upon a quite strong fortified construction. The artillery barrage was enough each time, but the infantry didn’t use its fire and airstrikes. The infantry usually, after starting the movement, had to stop and lie down while sustaining high casualties. Because of this there is a serious lack of forces in the divisions operating on the left bank of Neva river.
Regarding tanks, des[ite all the measures taken, we only managed to transfer 7 tanks to the left bank of Neva and those quickly went out of service. Regarding KVs, we didn’t manage to get any of those across the Neva yet. It is enough to say that three quarters of the ferry vehicles are out of service. That is why ferrying is slow and happens generally at night.
Regarding artillery, they are very good at firing against the front edge of the enemies front, but they don’t see the targets when firing deeper. The cannot do a stronger barrage at an area and the enemy has dug in very deep and has bunkers and dugouts.
Due to our losses and not yet organized ferry we were forced to hold on our offensive for a few days to put our units in order, reinforce them, organize the ferry properly, prepare the battle so there is a full cooperation between the infantry and the artillery.
Regarding the area of the 55th army, there is movement here in the direction of the supporting strike. Blocking units of sappers and supporting tanks have been created. Tanks are used at full here. We lost 29 tanks knocked out and burned. Now at night a battle is going on to capture the firing points near Usty-Tosno and the railway bridge. The commanders of the 55th army have an assignment to clear the Western bank of the Usty-Tosno today during the day, to start crossing the Usty-Tosno tomorrow.
The forces are in a combat mood. On the right bank all is dependent on the difficulties of using tanks. Low manpower of our divisions is also an issue. We are taking measures: by reducing the rear (artillery men) for 8000 men, signalmen by 5000, AA by 8000 and sending them as riflemen. Some divisions are reduced to two regiment compositions. Over.

S.: You have to choose between the captivity on one side and sacrificing several divisions on the other. I repeat, sacrifice and break through the road to the East for you, to save your entire front and Leningrad. As soon as you break through, we will make a railroad. The infantry will not go without tanks. Take actions to ferry the KV tanks to the left bank. If they are too heavy, then let them make their armor lighter for 10-20 tons. If there are lighter tanks, then ferry those. If the 55nd army can strike from the South to the North to the rear of the enemy who is at Neva, then let it strike. I repeat there is not much time left for you - you will run out of food soon. Try to form groups of hunters of the most brave men from different divisions and create one or two regiments of them. Explain the great significance of the feat that is required from them to break through. Perhaps those consolidated regiments of brave men could encourage all the rest to go after themSomething similar was mentioned later in “The last 100 yards” book, where it was said that there are some brave men who encourage others to go forward. Over.

Z.: The military council of the front not only doesn’t have any doubt, but also fully agrees with you and will not stop before any opposing force not for a minute. So that you have no doubts in our actions I report that we have transferred to the left bank 5 of our best divisions. The 168th rifle division and 20th rifle division after 3-4 days of fighting have only around 200-300 men but nevertheless they don’t have any deserters or those avoiding the battle. We throw into battle everything we have in our hands. We will not be able to transfer light tanks to the left bank because those, a few dozen machines, are used by the 55th army near Usty-Tosno.

S.: If you do not agree or have any doubts, then say it directly. You are using your forces poorly. If you have such good divisions operating at the front, then it is very sad that you have used them poorly. Infantry division, armed with machine guns and rifles, cannot go against enemy fortified positions. Fortified regions must firstly be destroyed with artillery, mortars, then you should let tanks go there and only then, behind the tanks the infantry division can show itself as a real force. Without tanks the infantry is helpless against enemies fortified regions.

Z.: We will re organize our artillery work as you have instructed. We will immediately create consolidated regiments of hunters. Units of hunters are operating in the 55th army and are used to capture enemy dugouts and bunkers. Over.

S.: I ask you and comrade Khazin to inform us about the situation with this matter at around 12PM. Over.

Z.: All from us.

S.: Wish you well. Wish you luck. I’m waiting for the first information via the direct wire tonight at 12 o’clock. Call me to the device on 8.11.1941, 6.00. Stalin.

Z.: Good bye comrade Stalin, we are getting down to the implementation of your instructions and will inform you at 12:00 in the night.

ЦАМО. Ф. 96а. Оп. 2011. Д. 5. Л. 151-155.

Transcript of talks of the Supreme Commander to the Commander of the Leningrad front

09.11.1941

Leningrad.: Zhdanov and Khozin at the device. Good day com. Stalin. Reporting about fulfillment of your orders. The following measures are taken:

• Forming three volunteer regiments of selected people. The formation will be finished by the end of today. By morning of 10.XI we hope to transfer them to the other side of Neva.
• Thanks to the shrinking rear we reinforced the divisions that are on the left bank of Neva.
• We gathered around 40 medium and light tanks which will be shipped to the left bank of Neva at night between 9th and 10th of November.
• Today we have listened to the combat plans, presented by the Military Council of the 8th army. We achieved that the Military council of the 8th army fully understands how to organize the operation of breakthrough and plan the breakthrough operation according to indications of comrade Stalin.
• Ready time for operation start is set to 10th - 11th of November. On the direction of a support blow of the 55th Army we started to form a volunteer regiment. The nearest objective for the army is to clear the Western bank of river Tosna; following with capturing the ferries on the river Tosna and advancing in the direction of Mga station to meet up with the 8th and 54th Armies.

Considering the experience of previous battles, we have given instructions about carrying out the offensive towards a dug-in enemy. Our forces have shown their weakness in performing such operations, especially on company, battalion and regiment levels. Considering this, instructions have been given to reform the work of artillery.

Stalin.: Pause the transmission. Tikhvin is occupied by the enemy. We are clearing the situation. If it will be possible, we will connect to you by the wire. This wire goes through Tikhvin. Over. Stand by the device.

Z.: All clear, standing by.

Zhdanov and Khozin by the device.: Continuing the report. Instructions to reform the work of artillery were given, according to your indications. We now got information from the 54th Army that the enemy has occupied Tikhvin but in the Volkhov direction the enemy is 15-18km away from Volkhov. The commander of the 54th Army asks for a division to be transferred to cover Volkhov. We think that it is better to take that division from the 54th Army, because transferring from us is difficult because of the transport issues. Over. Waiting for indications.

Stalin at the device.: Sorry, I was late. To eliminate the enemy forces we have transferred Meretskov with some units of the 7th army to Tikhvino region. We are sending tanks and one full division there. I think that the 54th army could move one of its divisions to cover its rear. As you see, the enemy wants to create the second line of encirclement around Leningrad and completely cut it off from the rest of the country. It is very dangerous to wait any longer. Be hurry to create a large group of forces, concentrate all the fire: artillery, aviation, 120mm mortars and RS on a large he said “narrow” as it is evident from the reply, but the document has a typo areas and punch through and create a road to the East until it’s not too late. We will eliminate the Tikhvino enemy group by ourselves I suppose.
Could you ship disassembled KVs across the Neva or handle large amounts of KV to your Tosno groups and let them go along the Southern bank of Neva to the enemy rears? Over.

Z.: Comrade Stalin! Reporting: your instructions are being implemented. We have considered an offensive plan and we are creating quite a powerful artillery group in the 1km wide breakthrough region which consists of 600 guns and mortars as well as three RS batteries. All the aviation will operate there as well. Shipping KV tanks across Neva is a very difficult and very lengthy task. We have already transferred one brigade to the region of the 55th army and will transfer one more brigade there. We are doing as you said - forming one motorised regiment for these brigades. We will be setting them the following objective: as soon as we capture the ferries across Tosna river, they will strike the enemy rear towards station Mga. Over.

Comrade Stalin, we have a request. Due to unreliability of supply across the Ladoga lake, we ask to give us 30 additional “Douglas” aircrafts and 10 TB-3 for evacuating the war materials from Leningrad and bringing in food concentrates and other provisions. Additionally they will need a regiment of fighters to support their actions. We ask for your instructions on what to do with the 69 regimental artillery pieces you have ordered us to transfer. Those are at Volkhov. Over.

S.: We will do our best to provide “Douglas” and TB-3 for you. As for the 69 regiment cannons, let the 54th army take them for storage.

Over. Good bye.

Z.: Over. Good bye.

ЦАМО. Ф.96а. Оп. 2011. Д. 5. Л. 156-159.

Transcript of talk of the Supreme Commander to Stavka Representative and commander of the South-West front

27.11.1942

Mikhailov and Fyodorov at the device.

Stalin at the device.

Stalin.: Comrade Mikhailov, report what you have done there in the region of Filippov.

M.: Reporting. All day yesterday together with Voronin and Filippov and the division commanders we were in the operative regions. We made clarifications to the decision and issued all the necessary orders for the division commanders to start their work today, together with specialists and regiment commanders. Some unresolved questions remain with the RS - we have three, but need five M-13. The question about returning the second air army from Fyodorov before the start of operation. Filippov could be ready to begin relocation 1-2 [December] if Moscow will accelerate the delivery of fuel and ammunition. In three days I will be at him to check the preparation progress on the spot and to help. Tomorrow I, together with com. Voronov plan to go to Lelyushenko’s right flank to start full scale preparations there, because factually nothing is done there yet. Both me and Fyodorov have big doubts that Lelyushenko will handle the preparations and commanding the operations on his left and right flanks simultaneously, especially given the events on his left flank.
We decided to ask your permission to handle the operative command to Kuznetsov, who will immediately go there and make all preparations through him. Lelyushenko could be given direct command of the left flank group. We have just spoken to Lelyushenko about this, he not only shares this point of view, but also asks us to do so. In this case Lelyushenko will have 8 I.D. one mechanized corps and reinforcement units, because we think to reinforce him additionally with three I.D. from Romanenko. Lelyushenko’s preparation is lagging overall, because of slow arriving of forces, for instance the rifle corps have unloaded up to 50-70%, while tank corps and tank regiments as well as artillery and AA divisions have not yet arrived. We ask to accelerate this. Beginning on 29th we will start field training with the arriving commanding staff for what as I reported already, I will be leaving together with comrade Voronov to the right flank.

S.: But who will unify the actions of Dontsov and Ivanov? This is a very responsible task.

M.: It would be very hard for me to command them, being on the right flank of Lelyushenko’s forces, from where communication with Dontsov and Ivanov is possible only through Moscow. On the other hand, to accelerate preparations, our presence there is is absolutely necessary for at least three days. I ask for your directions.

S.: It is unreasonable to underdo one thing and rush to another. Enemy forces near Stalingrad are surrounded and they must be eliminated to free up our three armies. But there is no one to lead this task and no one to align the actions of Ivanov and Dontsov. Mikhailov needs a small operation point of around 10-15 people somewhere around or to the West of Lyapichev and lead the elimination of the enemy Stalingrad group from there, gradually squeezing the encirclement more and more. This is a very important task, more important than operation “Saturn”. Mikhailov must concentrate solely on this task. Concerning the operation “Saturn”, let Vatutin and Kuznetsov deal with it. Moscow will help.
I cannot understand from where did Lyashkov get 8 divisions and what kind of phrase is this “left Lelushenko’s flank” and “right Lelyushenko’s flank” when Lelyushenko has to have one army - the First Guards Army. If we follow Your proposals, what will be left on Lelyushenko’s right flank, what forces?

M.: I perfectly understand that the elimination of the enemy group surrounded in Stalingrad is a primary task at this time. I was following your directions when I took the lead of preparing the operation “Saturn”. Starting from tomorrow with great satisfaction I will take over aligning and leading actions of Dontsov and Ivanov, which I stopped doing since 24th because of my departure to Filippov and Lelyushenko’s right flank.
Secondly. Saying “Lelyushenko’s right flank” I meant his strike group positioned on the right flank which consists of two guards corps, one tank corps and other reinforcement units. Saying “Lelyushenko’s left flank” I meant his left flank group which consists of eight rifle divisions, five of which are already there and three are planned to be transferred over to him from Romanenko. All from me regarding these questions.

S.: What other questions do you have? Where do you plan to organize your operative point to lead actions of Dontsov and Ivanov? Will Voronov stay with you or leave for the “Saturn” region? Over.

M.: I need to report the situation for the current moment. The situation is as follows: against Lelyusheno’s left flank from the region of Bokovskaya and to the North the German divisions are attacking for three days now: 62nd infantry and 22nd tank division as well as 1st Romanian motorized division. Today we discovered also the German 294 I.D. Lelyshenko’s units were forced back by this offence, to the region of river Krivaya. On the direction Astakhov - Pronin, the Germans have crossed to the Eastern bank of the river. To the North of this region, on the direction to Yagodniy the attempts of Romanian 7th, 11th and the remnants of 9th infantry divisions were repelled by our forces. To stop the attacks of German divisions and eliminate them the 47th guards rifle division and two tank brigades are on the way from the Pronin area as well as one motorcycle regiment from the region of Lipovskaya which is to the South West of Perelazovskoye. These units are heading North East to strike against the enemy’s flank.
To meet them from the north along the river Krivaya Lelyshenko’s 226th rifle division will strike, supported by tanks. We consider it necessary to move Lelyshenko’s 1st mechanized corps to river Don to the region of Elanskiy, to…

S.: You can move that mechanized corps and use it as situationally needed according to Vatutin’s view. Please continue.

M.: While preparing “Saturn” have it ready, especially because there is a possibility to commit heavy attacks against the flanks and rear of the attacking enemy group and eliminate it. The situation may require a mechinized corps to perform strikes on beneficial directions.
Second. Regarding the question of leading Dontsov and Ivanov. I am ready to go to Lyagichev region right now, but I think that it will be too difficult to organize control of everything from there. Only Kalach forces could be controlled from there to stop the enemy breakthrough from within the Stalingrad circle to the direction of Tormosin. Immediate control of both fronts could be organized from the Dontsov control point region, where there are communications and where I could be as soon as tomorrow. I ask for your final instructions, so I can start fulfilling them immediately. Over.

S.: Speak about Voronov.

M.: Comrade Voronov is here with me now. Comrade Vatutin asks to allow Voronov to go to him for two days and then together to go to Lelyushenko to help him organize “Saturn” quickly.

S.: And where is Dontsov’s control point?

M.: Answering - in the area of the 24th army.

S.: Good. Then go now to Dontsov’s control point, take needed staff and organize coordination of Dontsov and Ivanov’s actions. Let Voronov go with Vatutin to prepare “Saturn”. You can put Lelyushenko with face to the West, so he can repel actions of the Germans with his 8 divisions and other reinforcement units. It is not clear to me who will command the 1st guards considering two rifle corps and a tank corps.

M.: Good, I proceed to execution immediately. Please allow to take with me...

S.: I’m asking who will command the 1st guards army, situated on the right flank of Lelyushenko - Kuznetsov or someone else?

M.,F.: Answering. We ask to allow all the preparations for two guards and tank corps to lay down on Kuznetsov under the direct supervision of Vatutin. Lelyushenko will be very busy fighting off the German attack on his left flank and will not be able to handle both tasks simultaneously. These forces within these conditions must be controlled by Kuznetsov or send Lelyushenko to command that group, but make Kuznetsov command the left flank group consisting of 8 divisions.

S.: And where the 1st guards Staff will be - at Lelyushenko or at Kuznetsov?

M.,F.: The Staff of group of troops is already organized at Krasnoselovsk South West of Kalach (Voronezhsky), control point of the left group - 7km South of Elanskaya is also organized and functional. I ask to take Novikov with me. Falalayev when he arrives to command the aviation of “Saturn”. I ask Bokov immediately, that is tomorrow by plane to send me eight men for operative works with a good signalman {radio operator maybe?} and a logistician. Over.

S.: So who will command the right group Lellyushenko or Kuznetsov? Please answer.

M., F.: If you will not object, then allow us to do like this: we will immediately put Kuznetsov on Lelyushenko’s left flank to command the defence against German attacks and also he will prepare the operation “Saturn” for this group. Staff crew will be given to him from the Staff of the front. We will send Lelyushenko to the right flank no later than tomorrow evening, he will essentially command the 1st guards army, consisting of two guards corps and a tank corps.

S.: Lelyushenko already commands the front against the Germans, perhaps better to leave him in the area of the left group, but to assign Kuznetsov to the right group. In this case Kuznetsov could do preparations for “Saturn”. Do you agree?

M., F.: Good, will do like that.

S.: Now to comrade Mikhailov. Take these instructions:
1) In the current situation Your objective is to align the actions of Dontsov and Ivanov to eliminate the surrounded enemy group. I ask you to do this task only and not to bother with anything else.
2) All the aviation of Don and Stalingrad fronts together with Novikov as well as Pe-2 bomber corps which is arriving now to the Don front, will be at your disposal. The objective of aviation is to smash the surrounded enemy group without giving it a break.
3) It is possible to send one tank corps to Your reserve, which you can use to reinforce Dontsov or Ivanov. If you will need more reserve forces, report tomorrow.
4) You must have a direct connection to Stavka and regularly inform it about all the events happening in the region of Dontsov and Ivanov.
5) Tomorrow report whether it is necessary to incorporate the 62nd army to the Don front, tomorrow report about where to send the tank corps. Do you have any questions, is everything clear?

M.: All is clear and will be fulfilled.
1) Tank corps I ask to route from unloading spot in the region of Ilovlinskaya, Log.
2) I will report to you daily about the progress of my work and the overall situation. About the 62nd I will report immediately after arriving at the new control point. I will depart immediately and will report when arrived.

S.: It seems to me that it would be good for you to have that tank corps somewhere in the junction area of the Stalingrad and Don fronts. I mean the region of Kalach or Krivaya Muzga.

M.: That is correct, but here it will be easier for it to get from Ilovlinskaya, because if it arrived at Stalingrad we will have to ship it across Volga which takes a lot of time.

S.: Good, the tank corps will be sent to Ilovlinskaya, Log region. Please, Fedorov to the device.

Fedorov:Fedorov at the device.

S.: Comrade Fedorov, please accept the following instructions.
1) You have a dual task now, one is to direct the actions of Romanenko and Lelyushenko from the region of Nizne-Chirskaya to Nizne-Krivskaya; second is to make preparations for operation “Saturn”.
2) Leave comrade Voronov at Fedorov to prepare “Saturn” and also to help Lelyushenko.
3) Additionally to the first mixed aviation corps which remains at Fedorov’s disposal, you will get one more mixed aviation corps with a division of fighters and division of attack aircraft. Entire Fedorov’s group will be under control of Falaleyev who will be arriving to you in the following days.
4) If 5th mech. corps is being transferred to Romanenko, is that so?

F.: Reporting, In the current situation it is better to plan it for Romanenko. In case the situation changes and we will need to reinforce Lelyushenko, then it can be done seamlessly a bit later, but now better plan it for Romanenko.

S.: Under whose disposal does the guards mech. corps arrive?

F.: Guards mech. corps remains at Lelyushenko at his left flank, where it must be kept even now. 1 Krivomuzginskaya.

S.: I repeat:
4) Both mech. corps and 5th guards could be used if needed in the region of Lelyushenko’s left group or in Romanenko’s region, depending on the situation. For operation “Saturn” on additional mech. corps and one tank corps will be sent to you. This would be Fedorov’s reserve.
5) Immediately put Kuznetsov to the region of Lelyshenko’s right group, that is into the 1st guards army and make him do preparations for “Saturn”.
6) Filippov’s and Fyodorov’s divisions for “Saturn” operation will be commanded by Moscow. You must regularly inform Moscow about the progress of preparation of “Saturn”. Over. All is clear, are there any questions?

F.: all the instructions are clear and their execution will begin immediately with all the energy. One question - I have not yet received an artillery division RGK and AA division and it is not known whether they are dispatched. I ask for the 9th division.

S.: RGK division and AA division are already loaded and soon will be at you.

F.: Understood, please tell me their numbers. I have only three RS regiments left, M-13 and M-8. All the others were transferred to together with the 21st army. I ask to dispatch 4 regiments immediately.

S.: I inform that guards motorcycle regiment cannot be taken from Western front and be sent to Lelyushenko. Instead the 1st guards army will receive 3 motorcycle battalions. Please send your requests about the RS and other things to Stavka. I can send you two RS M-13 regiments and will dispatch them tomorrow. Over.

F.: All clear about the motorcycle battalions. Good luck.

S.: Thank you, good bye.

ЦАМО. Ф. 96а. Оп. 2011. Д. 26. Л. 195—205.