Description of battle between the 53rd grds tank brigade and “Tiger B” type tanks.

19.08.1944

To head of staff of the 3rd Tank Army.

With order Nr. … From 11th August 1944 the Commander of the 16 tank division has set up a task to take the small Schidlow with two columns to slice our combat order, with the right column through Otamuw and the left column through Rakuw.

The corps intel has timely discovered a tank gathering place near small Schidlow, with either Tiger or Panther type tanks assembling and moving to the East. The left enemy formation managed to push back units of the 112 rifle division and take Rakuw. Fierce battles were raging in the direction to Stashuw where separate enemy tanks managed to rip through the defenses to the Eastern border of Stashuw.

53rd tank brigade with separate tanks from 71st grds heavy tank regiment after organizing several tank ambushes in the region: Zelebitza, hill 247.9, Ponik, along the reverse sides of hills, has engaged in battles to the North West and West of the Eastern border of Stashuw.

52nd tank brigade was sent to strike the enemy from the rear and to capture the hill 272.1 and to advance in the direction towards Oseletz, Kshiv[unclear], kol. Zhendruw, Pechenogi Gatzki, Mokre, has reached the region of Mokre and organized tank ambushes at Mokre and on the Northern edge of the grove which is East of the Mokre.

This way enemies' routes to the South and retreat to the West were cut off. When moving further enemy tanks have exposed their sides to the fire of tanks of the 53rd grds tank brigade and 71st grds heavy tank regiment which were in the ambush. The distance of fire was 200-250m.

As a result 3 tanks burned down and 3 were knocked out (caterpillars were broken). Trying to help these tanks the enemy has attempted several attacks from Schidluw, but tanks of 52nd and 53rd grds tank brigades have repelled all of them, firing from the ambushes, destroying 9 enemy tanks as well as the enemy's towing vehicle.

Without the possibility to evacuate the knocked out tanks, their crews abandoned them and ran away. Groups of sub machine gunners who supported the tanks were hit by RS [Katyushas] several times which resulted in most of them being killed, while the rest fled to the North and North West directions.

Enemy attempt to break through to Yaseny direction was not successful and was stopped by the fire of the 1893 self-propelled artillery regiment [unclear] which was dropped near hill 284.2 and destroyed 5 enemy tanks.

As a result of three day battles the 501st separate heavy tank battalion which was armed with “Tiger B” tanks, lost 20 tanks and was forced to retreat and go defensive near Eastern part of small Schidluw.

The first evacuated tank was sent to the commander of the forces of the 1st Ukrainian front Marshal of the Soviet Union, comrade Konev. This tank didn’t make a single shot.

Chief of staff of the 6th grds tank corps. Guards Colonel Lebedev.

ЦАМО, Фонд: 315, Опись: 4440, Дело: 172
ЦАМО, Фонд: 315, Опись: 4440, Дело: 172

Interrogation of a German deserter on 20.06.1941

Encrypted message Nr 133, 136

From 11th Army.

Received 20.06.1941 23:46

Arrived to district cyphering department 20.06.1941 5:30

Accepted 21.06.1941 5:23

To head of the Staff of the Front.

The deserter, captured at night on 20.06.1941 from the 13th company of the 58th infantry regiment of the 6th infantry division has testified that their company is at Pshierosly (a company of 150mm heavy guns). The 6th infantry division was transfered to the region of Suvalki in the end of May from Paris and has unloaded 180km from Pshierosly.

At Suvalki, as the deserter testifies, most of the forces, all of them at this time, were transferred from Suvalki to the border.

The infantry is positioned 5km from the border, artillery is at the positions, as for big tank formations, the deserter has not seen them.

The deserter has testified that the German units are not digging trenches near the border as they are planning offensive actions. According to the deserter claims the military actions will begin within 8-10 days. For 2 months now the officers are agitating the soldiers, saying that the USSR is the main enemy for the Germany. 50% of soldiers are are against the war.

Nr 1019/Sh Shlemin

Decrypted on: 09 hours 00 minutes "21" June 1941

Original.

Report from the Commander of the forces of the 1st Ukrainian front to the Supreme Commander about adversary's attempts to eliminate the bridgehead on Vistula.

23rd August 1944

Beginning on this year's 5th of August the forces of the 1st Ukrainian front are in constant fierce battles aimed at holding on and enlargening the bridgeheads on the Western bank of Vistula river and Vistloka river.

The enemy considers Krakow direction as very important because it covers the largest German industrial region in Silesia and has gathered considerable tank and infantry forces, pulled from the reserves of other fronts. In front of our bridgeheads the adversary has concentrated 8 tank divisions, 4 separate tank battallions, 2 separate brigades of self propelled guns (alltogether 600-700 tanks and SPGs), 9 infantry divisions, 1 motodivision, 5 separate infantry brigades, 1 artillery division.

Alltogether there are
8 tank divisions that operate against our front (1, 3, 8, 16, 17, 66, 23, 24),
1 motodivision (20th),
14 infantry divisions (253, 342, 241, 72, 88, 371, 213th protective, 96, 7, 544, 545, 208, 68, 114)
5 separate infantry brigades (1, 1133, 1134, 1135, 1136),
1 artillery division (18th),
4 separate tank battallions,
2 separate SPG brigades,
6 separate infantry regiments,
and up to 50 various separate battalions (reserve, sapper, protective, builder)

Adversary (for the period from 5th to 22nd August) has created a strike force on the Western bank of Vistula consisting of six tank divisions, one motodivision, and seven infantry divisions and others. He has launched four large counter attacks against our forces with objective (as discovered from prisoner interrogations and captured documents) to eliminate and throw back our forces to the Eastern bank of Vistula river.

In fierce battles our forces have broken the offensive intentions of the advarsary to eliminate the bridgeheads on the Western bank of Vistula and Vistloka and inflicted massive damage to the enemy in manforce, tanks and materials.

Over 40 thousand German soldiers and officers killed. Knocked out and destroyed 678 tanks and SPG, 465 artillery systems, 137 APCs, 119 airplanes, 484 mortars 854 machine guns.

Adversary, as the prisoner interrogations show, plans to continue his offensives with aim to eliminate our bridgeheads; is constantly reinforcing his troops and reparing vehicles. We get daily reports about reinforcements heading towards the front by railroads and highways from Krakow and Chenstohow in form of tanks, artillery and infantry.

Konev
Sokolovsky
Krainyukov

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 236. Оп. 2712. Д. 56. Л. 429-430.

Order from the commander of the 1st Belorussian front to the commander of the 1st Polish Army and the 47th Army about transferring the 1st Polish infantry division under the operative command of the commander of the 47th Army to use it in offensive towards Prague.

4th September 1944

To the Commander of the 1st Polish Army

From 05.09.1944 trnsfer the 1st infantry divisoin in its full staff under the operative command of the commander of the 47th Army. Leave the supply reponsibility under the jurisdiction of the Polish army.
Commander of the 47th Army shall use the 1st infantry division to attack the Prague city according to my instructions.

Report when received.

Rokossovsky
Telegin
Malinin

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 2307. Д. 29. Л. 249.

Order from the commander of the forces of the 1st Belorussian front to the commander of the 48th army about temporary halting the offensive.

15th August 1944

The Army has not achieved an objective set by me. The reason for this was that the offensive was poorly organized, the combat formations of corps adn armies was was not appropriate for the situation, too much forces were left in the reserve while not enough of them was dedicated to the offensive itself. As a result adversary could organize a defence at random unprepared spots and with small numbers hold back our advancing units.

I order:

1. To teporaliry stop the advance. During the 16th and 17.08.1944 thoroughly scout the defenses and enemy's fire system; organize the battle, deliver ammo, fuel and lubricants.
2. In the morning of 18.08.1944 to attack decicively and fulfill your previous objectives.

Report when delivered. Report about the adopted decision via encrypted message at around 20:00 16.08.1944

Rokossovsky
Telegin
Malinin

ЦАМО РФ. Ф.233. Оп. 2307. Д. 33. Л. 68.

Directive Nr 30144 of Stavka of the Supreme Command to the commanders of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, South-West and South fronts about the enemy's possible attack date.

2nd July 1943 02:10

According to our data the Germans can attack on our front in the period between 3 - 6 of July.

Stavka of the Supreme Command orders:

1. Increase scouting and observing the enemy in order to discover his intentions in time
2. Ground forces and Aviation must be prepared to repel the possible attack of the enemy
3. Report about the adopted measures.

Stavka of the Supreme Command
J.Stalin
A.Vasilevsky

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 143. л. 164.

Directive Nr 30123 of Stavka of the Supreme Command to the commanders of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and South-West fronts about the enemy's possible attack date.

8th May 1943 23:35

According to some sources adversary can go offensive on 10-12 of May in Orlov-Kursk direction or in Belogorod-Oboyansk direction or in both at the same time.

The Stavka of the Supreme command orders to have all forces of the first defence line as well as reserves be prepared and on full alert by morning of 10th of May and ready to meet the possible enemy strike. Special attention shall be payed to our aviation readiness in order to not just repel the enemy aviation attacks, but also to capture air superiority at first moments of their offensive.

Confirm the receiving. Report about the adopted measures.

Stavka of the Supreme command.
J.Stalin
A.Vasilevsky

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 139. Л. 184.