Friday, April 30, 2021

24th Army Losses 15-26 September 1942

Information about the losses within the Rifle Divisions of the 24th Army.

For period from 15.09 to 26.09.1942

Division name Staff Horses
KIA WIA, Shell-shocked, Sick MIA or Captured Total
396 Rifle Division 387 1762 34 2177 38
49 Rifle Division 494 2029 185 2708 169
231 Rifle Division 249 1304 29 1582 93
233 Rifle Division 1587 5097 289 6968 194
2701 10192 532 13435 494

Division name Equipment
Guns 152mm Guns 122mm Guns 76mm AT guns Mortars Mounted MG Light MG PPSh AT rifles
396 Rifle Division - - - 4 - 5 - 86 2
49 Rifle Division - - 2 3 21 30 60 - 19
231 Rifle Division - 1 1 4 27 10 4 1 1
233 Rifle Division - 1 1 - - - - - -
- 2 4 11 48 45 64 87 22

24th Army, captain Nikitchenko,
2 rank intendant-technician Sholomin

Original scan

ЦАМО, Фонд: 206, Опись: 262, Дело: 107

Meeting of command staff of the 1st guards Army

Meeting

Of division and separate units commanders, commissars,
Artillery leaders and heads of command staff of the 1st guards Army.

29.9.1942
(2km South East from Sovkhoz Kotluban) ravine.

Report of the head of staff of army colonel Ivanov.

Results of combat operations of the 1st guards army from 18.09 to 30.09.1942

  1. The objective, set for the 1st guards army to break through the enemy’s defense line and connecting with the Stalingrad defenders
  2. We had enough forces to fulfill the objective. The force balance was on our side, especially in manpower, vehicles and weapons. The enemy had supremacy mostly (1000 planes) in the air. The enemy had 76th infantry division, parts of 60th and 3rd motorised division.
  3. the concentration of forces was not properly concealed because:
    • constant enemy air scouting and
    • possible information leak caused by defectors from 173 rifle division on 17.09 (this data requires checking).
  4. The main strike was performed by the left flank of the 1st guards army (in the strip of 316 rifle division and 7th tank corps).
  5. The execution of the operation.
    The fighting has begun:
    • 18.09. The defense of the enemy was broken in the strip of the 316 rifle division. Hill 154.2 was taken by one regiment of the 316th rd and the advancing units rushed towards farm Borodkin. 4th Tank Corps did not enter the breakthrough in time. Due to absolutely unsatisfactory leadership of the 316rd, they did not gain a foothold on the hill 154.2 and no weapons {like cannons} were brought in, no recon was organized. The enemy could attack (supported by 50 tanks) this hill in the second part of the day and retake it. Commander and commissaar of the 1073 regiment deserted from the battlefield and were sent to court-martial. The commander and commissar of the 316rd have let the command out of their hands. The hill 154.2 has a high importance within the strip of offense of the 1st guards army because it is dominant on the front of offensive operations of our army and possessing it will put our forces in a better position. Further on a fight was ongoing for a few days for possessing that hill. The 260th rifle division and 4th tank corps (7th tank corps went dry) were sent to battle. At this time the Germans were concentrating their forces and intensified the bombing.
    • Due to lack of results of this offensive, future operations were transferred to the right flank . The main strike was performed in the strip of the 273rd, 258th rifle divisions and 16th tank corps. According to the new order of the commander of the army the 273rd rifle division, acting quite energetically has taken hill 130,4. The 16th tank corps entered the battle and did provide help, but the infantry did not gain a foothold (by this time some artillery regiments and mortar regiments were taken away from the army).
  6. By this time the situation in the army is as follows. The attacks will be continued in order to tie up enemy forces from the siege of Stalingrad, thus supporting the Stalingrad defenders. For this, units of the rear should be cleared and part of the forces should be sent to the front units to reinforce them.
  7. the result of the offensive actions of the army was:
    • partially the forces enemy were taken away from Stalingrad,
    • same for the German aviation
  8. Operations of our divisions.
    • 173rd did not accomplish its task. It reported its initial location on hill 108.4 wrongly. This hill was in the hands of the Germans. It moved only for a small distance throughout the entire offensive period.
    • 273rd was taking part in the 2nd period of the offensive in the direction of the main attack and did fulfill its objective. The division has organized a breakthrough in the region of hill 130.4 but did not gain a foothold.
    • 258rd within the first period of the fighting did not take hill 118.1 despite having a lot of supporting weapons.
      Unsatisfactory leadership of the division played a role in that.
    • 292rd for ten days of fighting did not move a bit, but lost a lot of men and only by 29.09 approached the frontal edge of the enemy defense.
    • 260rd is totally disorganized. Absolutely unsatisfactory leadership from the commander and commissar of the division. The staff is not put-together and is poor at controlling the combat. Units of the division took a long time to cross the balkas and were only brought in the proper direction by the staff commanders of the staff of the Army. Did not meet its objective.
    • 221rd has low manpower. Accomplished the objective on a satisfactory level.
    • The artillery was miserable during the offensive. The fire was unaimed (they cannot even concentrate fire). The artillery did not make way for the infantry with its fire, because of this very few enemy fire-positions were suppressed and did not follow up the infantry while in offence. This altogether does not help the overall progress of the attack.
    • Tank actions. Tanks move very slowly during the offensive. Tankers do not trust the artillery men because the latter do not support tank attacks. There were cases of attacks in the wrong directions.
    • Staff work. Account of the losses is very poor. Urgent messages are delivered to staff with huge delays. Leadership is not precise. Frequently the control is lost. Unit work checking is not organized which results in many mistakes and frequent lying.
    • The main drawback in staff and unit work is poor organization of cooperation between infantry, artillery and tanks. More precisely, there is no cooperation at all. That is why units operate without proper cooperation and naturally don’t have success in their offensive.
    • One of big drawbacks in actions is lack of cooperation between the neighboring units. They do not support each other which also does not help the offensive.

Objectives on 30.09

  • Eliminate the German bulge in the region of hill 123.6 because it interferes with the future offensive.
  • Use existing forces to attack and use rear units to increase the numbers of frontal units.

Instructions of the Army Commander.

  • many commanders show signs of lack of belief in victory. (Commanders, 316rd, 260rd), which undoubtedly has a negative effect on the fighting. We must fight these moods. Those who think in such a way should free up their posts and not interfere with fighting.
    We have all the necessary forces and equipment to crush the German fascists.
  • By this time, the situation is such that the enemy wants to take Stalingrad despite any losses. Our mission is to help the Stalingrad garrison to repel all the attacks and prevent the enemy from reaching Volga.
  • despite us breaking the German defenses twice (316rd, 273rd) we were unable to exploit the success. One of the reasons for this is poor division leadership and also unsatisfactory organization of cooperation.
  • 16th tank corps during the offensive lost the attack direction twice and did not fulfill its objective.
  • A drawback of our attacks is that the infantry uses little machine guns, submachine guns and rifle fire. Evidence to that is the fact that for ten days of fighting there were no ammo requests from the divisions.
  • We observe German submachine gunners operating near our Command posts and Observing posts. We must urgently clear those areas.
  • Please keep in mind that German submachine gunners and snipers are hunting primarily lower ranked officers.

Conclusion:

  1. immediately address the errors pointed out by me and the head of the staff and by all means resolve them.
  2. clarify the international situation {to the subordinates} and address the moods that do not facilitate the fulfillment of our common goals.

Member of the Military Council division commissar Abramov points out:

  1. The military Council during the offensive was sending its representatives to 35 battalions and they have presented the material proving the unsatisfactory work performed to organize the offensive. Most of the issues were pointed out buy the army commander and the chief of staff.
    Additionally to that:
    • not everywhere the commanders are leading the offensive spirit of the soldiers.
    • We see a lot of cases of unskilled use of weapons. During the 10 days of fighting we have spent 10 railroad cars of ammo with absolutely unsatisfactory results.
    • There are many cases of poor responsibility shown by the leadership regarding the implementation of orders.
    • The condition of party and political work is not satisfactory because it does not address the most basic questions regarding the combat support.
    • term is understood incorrectly in the divisions, for instance: a regiment has just over a 1000 of men, but only several active bayonets are accounted for. This is wrong. We must account for all the specialists that have individual and collective weapons as well.
    • Brigade commissar Layok adds about the unsatisfactory work of evacuation services. Treatment of wounded is poorly organized especially if they get to other sanitary battalions which belong to other divisions.

ЦАМО, Фонд: 292, Опись: 6911, Дело: 41

Wednesday, April 28, 2021

Directive Nr. 220155 of Stavka of the Supreme Commander to the Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front about the usage of the tank armies and cavalry units for capturing bridgeheads on Vistula.

27 July 1944. 19:20

In connection with front forces capturing Lviv, Peremyshl and Yaroslav, the Stavka of the Supreme Commander orders:
Use the 1st Guards Tank army of Katukov and cavalry units to capture bridgeheads on the Western bank of Vistula in the region between Sandomier and river Visloka. Send there Rybalko’s 3rd Guards tank army following these units.

The directions regarding your plan that was sent on 24.07 will be given on 28.07.1944.

Please report about the issued instructions.

Stavka of the supreme commander
J.Stalin, A.Antonov.

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 166. Л. 417.

Order of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Commanders of the 13th Army, 3rd Guards Tank Army about the elimination of the Sandomierz enemy group and liberation of city Sandomier.

03. August 1944.

In order to eliminate the Sandomierz enemy group as well as to enlarge and reinforce the bridgehead on the Western bank of Vistula river to the North West of Sandomier. As well to support Gordov’s 3rd Army crossing Vistula.

I order to:

  1. The commander of the 1st Tank Army to decisively strike at Opatow, Ozharuw directions with the objective to eliminate the Sandomierz enemy group which is operating in front of the 3rd guards Army; by the end of 04.08 capture Ozharuw. To cover the army from the West, capture road links at Ostrovec and Laguv.
  2. The commander of the 13th Army by using forces of five rifle divisions to strike from Kopshivnica, Klimontuw region at the direction of Kolechatuw, Sobutka with the objective to eliminate the Sandomierz enemy group in cooperation with the 1st Tank Army and to capture Sandomier by morning of 05.08. The region of Ivaniska, Bogorija, Stashuv shall be occupied by three rifle divisions to support the operation of the army from the West.
  3. The commander of the 3rd guards Army must accelerate the crossing of Vistula river and while striking to Ozharuw, Ostrovec together with 13th Army and 1st Tank Army must eliminate the Sandomierz enemy group. By the end of 05.08 the main forces of the army must enter the region of Tarluw, Ozharuw, Opatuw.
  4. The delimiting line between the 3rd grds and 13th Armies is the same until Ulyanuw, then the mouth of river San, Laguw, Kelytze - all the points except for Kieltze, inclusive for the 13th army.
  5. Report about the given orders and their implementation.

Konev, Kraynyukov, Sokolovsky

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 236. Оп. 17062. Д. 16. Л. 435.

Thursday, April 22, 2021

Directive of Stavka Nr. 220162 of the Supreme Commander to the commander of the Belorussian front and Stavka representative.

About the offensive to Warsaw and capturing the bridgeheads on Narev and Vizsla.

28. July 1944. 24:00

The Stavka of the Supreme Command orders:

  1. After taking Brest and Sedlec region proceed with offensive in general direction to Warsaw with an objective to take Prague not later than on 5 - 8 of August and capture a bridgehead on the Western bank of river Narev in the region of Pultusk, Serock. The left flank of the front must capture the bridgehead on the Western bank of Vizsla river in the region of Demblin, Zvoleny, Soletz. Use the captured bridgeheads to strike to the North-West direction to wrap the enemy’s defense along river Narev and Vizsla thus supporting the crossing the Narev river by the left flank of the 2nd Belorussian front as well as central armies of your own front. Further on, plan to advance in the general direction to Torn and Lodzy.
  2. From 24:00 29.07 establish the following delimiting lines:
    • With the 2nd Belorussian front to Rozhany - as before and further to Czekhanuv, Strasburg, outskirts of Warsaw, Gradunetz (all points for the Belorussian front inclusive)
    • With 1st Ukraine front to Konske - as before and further Piotrkow, Ostruw (20km SouthWest from Kalish). Both points for the Belorussian front, inclusive.
  3. Responsibility for organizing junctions with other fronts shall remain as before.
  4. Report about the given orders.

Stavka of the Supreme Command
J.Stalin, A.Antonov

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 166. Л. 424. Подлинник.

Wednesday, April 21, 2021

USSR vs Germany artillery shell usage in 1942

Source: This post was created long ago on VIF2 forum by famous historian V.Isaev and based on his research. However now that link doesn't work anymore. This is a translation of multiple reposts of Isaev's original post, like this one.

USSR Germany
Gun caliber Amount Gun caliber Amount
Regiment artillery(thousands shells)
107 mm mortar. 293,8 12cm Gr.W. 2,9
120 mm mortar 3 008,2 10cm Nb.W 551,9
76 mm regimental 1927 5 063,1 7.5cm le.I.G.18 6 200,4
76 mm regimental 1943 0 7,5cm LG 40 0
76 mm mountain 1938 654,0 7,5cm Geb.G and К 749,7
7,62cm IKH 290(r) 0
10,5cm LG 40 & 42 43,3
15cm s.I.G.33 1 115,6
Total: 3 302 thousand mines and 5 717thousand shells, weight 84 724 ton Total: 555 thousand mines and 8 109 thousand shells, weight 88 879 ton
Mid caliber division and corps artillery (thousands shells)
76 mm 02/30-36 year. 10 024,2 7,5cm Pak /KwK/FK 1 581,2
75mm M1 Howitzer 1 162,8 7,62cm Pak 36(r) 162,3
76,2mm Gun 242,1
85 mm cannon 0 8,8cm Pak /KwK /FK 15,7
122 mm howitzer 4 306,2 12,8cm Pak 0
100 mm cannon 0 10cm le.FH 30(t) and 14/19(t) 169,1
10,5cm Geb.H 40 2,4
107 mm 10/30 year. 322,0 10cm le.FK 18 17 751 ,0
10cm s.K 18 1 209,8
122 mm cannon 31 year. 599,1 10,5cm s.K 35(t) 39,4
100 and 102mm cannon 21,0 10,5cm K 331(f) and 332(f) 35,8
120mm cannon 9,5 12cm Haubitze 14 & 15/16(t) 0,2
12,2cm le.FH 388(r) [10/30] 3,2
130 mm cannon 67,2 12,2cm le.FH 396(r) [M-30] 6,1
12,2cm K 390(r) [A-19] 4,9
Total: 16 754 thousand shells, weight 187 479 ton Total: 20 981 thousand shells, weight 295 380 ton
Divisional and corps heavy artillery (thousands shells)
15cm s.FH 18 4 481,9
152 mm howitzer 706,3 15,5cm s.FH 414(f) 175,1
152 mm reg.how. 37 year. 1 508,8 15cm s.FH 25(t) and 37(t) 115,4
15,2cm s.FH 445(r) [09/30] 0
15,2cm s.FH 443(r) [M-10] 0
15,2cm K.H. 433(r) [ML-20] 12 ,3
Total: 2 215 thousand shells, weight 94 742 ton Total: 4 785 thousand shells, weight 207 983 ton
Heavy guns, caliber 152-203mm
15cm K 126,6
15cm K. 15/16(t) 0
15,5cm K 416(f) and 418(f) 213,6
17cm K Mrs.Laf. 25,7
203 mm howitzer 31 year. 107,4
21cm Mrs 341,2
21cm K 38 & 39/40 3,7
21cm Kz.Mrs(t) 0,45
22cm Mrs 531(f) 65,3
Total: 107 thousand shells, weight 10 472 ton Total: 776,5 thousand shells, weight 62 001 ton
Superheavy guns (single shells)
none
24cm K 3 1 352
24cm H 39 3 070
24cm s.K(t) 470
28cm Kusten Haubitze 3 600
30,5cm Mrs(t) 7 350
35,5cm Haubitze M1 513
42cm Gamma Mrs. 449
60cm Karl 197
Total :17 thousand shells, weight 5 186 tons

Report to the Commander of the forces of the 1st Belorussian front to deputy head of the Joint Staff of the Red Army about the difficulties with fuel supplies.

31 July 1944

Moscow
To: Joint Staff of the Red Army Antonov,
Main Logistics Headquarters of the Red Army Khrulyov

The constant cut offs from supply bases due to slow railroad repairing has caused difficulties in fuel supplies.
To mitigate this and to make it possible to supply fuel across Vizsla river, I ask to order an urgent formation of a battalion to pump the fuel. For this please provide the battalion with an imported gasoline pipeline together with all the needed gear, which is in possession of the Headquarters of the Fuel Supply of the Red Army.
The battalion must be urgently sent to Lyublin by railroad.

Rokossovsky.

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 2307. Д. 29. Л. 59.

Monday, April 12, 2021

Excerpt from transcript of talk to the crew of an allied plane, downed by German artillery over Warsaw.

16-18 August 1944

The "Liberator" heavy bomber has the following characteristics:

  • Maximum speed up to 350km\h
  • Range 12h
  • Maximum weight 32t
  • Armament 12 heavy machine guns which provide all round fire
  • Bombing load 3-4 tons, maximum 5 tons
  • Crew - 8 members: 2 pilots, navigator, radio operator, bomber, 3 shooters.

Crew composition of this airplane:

  • commander senior pilot Van Eissen
  • 2nd pilot - lieutenant Hamilton
  • Navigator - senior lieutenant Holliday
  • Radio operator - lieutenant Austin
  • Bomber - sergeant aviator of British Royal aviation Leechfield
  • Shooters - sergeants of British Royal aviation Piston, Mais and Hudson

Of mentioned crew all of the officers are from staff of South African aviation while sergeants are from the British aviation. This is explained by a lack of personnel in the South African aviation which consists solely of volunteers. At the same time there is an excess of personnel in the British aviation. In the latest time the losses among the flight crews appeared to be lower than expected as a result of what considerable human resources are available and recruiting into the British air force was stopped. There are also a lot of materiel reserves and all the units have considerable amounts of backup vehicles, so if an airplane is damaged the crew gets a replacement immediately.

Of the crew, the commander capt. Van Eissen is a South African of Dutch (Boer) descent.
26 years of age.
Flying for 8 years.
Education: mining engineer, gold mining specialist.

According to claims of all other crew members, Van Eissen is a very experienced, brave and capable pilot who has rescued the lives of the entire crew three times. Flew various aircrafts. Flies on the “Liberator” only recently.

In its current composition the crew is flying for 2 months. They flew 9 combat missions, two of which to South France, others to Ploeshti, Bucharest to objects near Vien, mining Danube and the most recent flight to Warsaw. [...]

In Italy the South African aviation is part of the 15th Air Fleet which has a mixed composition because it has both AMerican and English units. Heavy bombers are based at a powerful airfield center at Fodin region.

In the night from 13 to 14 August some very difficult operations to support the expected landing missions in South France were expected. However absolutely unexpectedly Churchill who then was at Neapoles has personally ordered to take 40-50 liberators and send them to Warsaw. He allegedly claimed that this operation is even more important than the support of invasion of South France. The case is that Polish partisan staff has a radio connection with the allied command in Italy and Churchill while in Neapoles received a help request from the Poles.
He ordered to send over 100 heavy bombers within 3 nights so that each would airdrop around 3 tons of weapons, ammo and food for the Polish partisans.

On the first night from 13th to 14th of August 5 units of 8 aircraft each flew out. The mission was to drop supplies from low altitude of 450 - 500 feet above the objects precisely marked on the Warsaw map.

Austin calls this operation “suicide” and others agree with him.

At that night only one of the units, part of which was Van Eissen’s crew, lost two aircraft of eight. The losses of other units are unknown, but there were losses for sure. Also part of the aircraft returned without fulfilling their mission because of strong winds in the area of the city. The Polish partisans have thanked over the radio and reported that the cargo was dropped precisely and they received it. They also said that one of “Liberators” fell on the Warsaw train station.

On the next day in the evening of August 14th approximately the same quantity of aircraft was sent as before. Wherein one vehicle from the South African unit flew for the second time.

No special instructions, clarifications or explanations were given to the crews before their flight to Warsaw. The flight was a special high importance mission by the personal order of the Prime Minister.

The crew and their commander only know about the situation in Poland from the English press, that is that there are partisans that take orders from the London government and the partisans that are connected with the Red Army. It is not clear to them why those two groups have disagreements.
Lieutenant Austin thinks that the situation in Poland is somewhat similar to the situation in Yugoslavia: both here and there the governments in London have little communication to their country which causes friction between them.

Before the flight captain Van Eissen received a detailed plan of Warsaw with regions occupied by the Polish rebels marked on it. They explained to him that the Poles will set up lighting marks and the cargou must be dropped above those marks. They succeeded in doing so in the previous night.

The duration of the operation was planned to be 10 hours from 7 o’clock in the evening till 5 o’clock in the morning. In the previous night one of the crews had been in the air for 11 hours and 45 minutes, that is returned with dry fuel tanks, but still made it to the airfield.

Radio communication was only with the base, but not the Poles. They flew on sensors only. Foreseeing the German night fighters they were dropping silver foil chaff. In the latest time the Germans frequently use radio direction finding when fighting the night bombers. Such devices are found not only on the approach to the important objects, but also installed on the night fighters made of ordinary JU-88. The silver foil causes electrical discharge and makes the screens of radio direction finders become covered in dots and basically useless.

Along the way the crew observed many fires. The crew members suppose that those were caused by Germans-barbarians who burn Polish villages and cities when retreating. Warsaw was also on fire.

When approaching Warsaw the “Liberator” encountered heavy and very precise anti-air fire. Austin thinks that this was the most precise fire of those he had experienced and he was in Ploiesti, Bucharest and Vein.

They failed their mission despite having a strict order to go as low as possible despite any enemy fire. Two shooters were killed: Meis and Hudson. Two engines caught flames and went out of order. Then the third one bursted in flames. The commander had an instruction to go East in case of emergency and try to reach the Russians. He didn't know the precise place where they crossed the front.

In case the crew fell into German hands, they had an instruction to only call their name and surname, rank and number; not to give any other testimonies. However all the crew members think that the Germans would still kill them anyways.

Fulfilling his instructions the commander turned East, but the burning plane began to fall. Then he dropped the supplies because those were blocking the exits. According to his calculations all of the 12 parachutes with a total weight of 3 tons had to land on the Soviet side with the exception of one that caught fire.

They failed to land and the commander ordered the crew to jump. When the aircraft was less than 300 meters above the ground, the commander pushed out the disturbed second pilot Hamilton out and jumped after him. Hamilton however was so much out of focus that he opened his parachute too late and crashed to death. Van Eissen hurt his leg when landing and others landed successfully.

All in all the following are alive: Van Eissen, Holliday, Austin, Lichfield, Piston. All found themselves on the Soviet territory. The aircraft crashed and exploded to pieces.

The crew was received very well by both the Soviet soldiers and officers and Polish civilians. Many flowers were brought to the graves of the dead pilots and English pilots were deeply touched by that.

Both Van Eissen and Austin think that there is “something wrong” with these flights to Warsaw because they caused a lot of casualties. At the same time it is doubtful that those supplies would significantly help the Polish partisans. Probably the Polish government in London has miscalculated something or maybe deliberately gave incorrect information to Churchill.

They think that due to high casualties on the third night the flights above Warsaw could be cancelled.

About the relationship between the government in exile in London. The position of the Soviet government regarding the Polish question was explained to the crew, highlighting that the Polish government did not establish any connection with the Red Army. Also it was noted that the actions of the Polish government in exile have caused unneeded sacrifices both among the partisans and Polish civilians and also among the British pilots.

Captain Van Eissen and lieutenant Austin have fully agreed with our point of view. They told us that even before the flight they considered it useless to fly to Warsaw for almost 1500km while the Russian forces are mere 20km away from Warsaw.

Lieutenant Austin says that he considered this a “suicide” flight. Captain Van-Eissen adds that the “Liberator” is designed to drop bombs from a height no less than 14 000 feet (5000m) and not to fly over the enemy AA artillery at a height of 100-150 meters. In such conditions they would almost certainly be shot down by enemy’s small-caliber AA guns. Lieutenant Austin said that before the flight he has given away some of his belongings, thinking that he will never return. He didn’t do that before the other flights.

Both of them say that they were very surprised that they were not told where the frontline and the closest Russian airfields were. They both claim that they did not object against this, in their opinion wrong mission aloud because the military discipline forbids that and they would go under trial for that.

Head of intelligence department of the 16th Air Army
Colonel Prusakov.

Source: ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 2380. Д. 16. Л. 77–82.

Friday, April 9, 2021

Report of the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the chief logistics officer of the Red Army about the heavy situation with fuel supply.

18 july 1944.

To the chief logistics officer of the Red Army
com. Khrulyov

The situation with gasoline is very difficult. The troops don’t even have fuel for one full fuel tank for all vehicles. Multiple requests to intensify the shipments had no effect. Supply routes reach up to 450 km in one direction and along bad roads. The front spends 400 - 450 tons of fuel each day, when the calculated limit is 7000 tons per month.

Our telegram about increasing the fuel limit to 12 000 tons for July was left unanswered.

Units started to feel shortages of ammunition and food while reinforcement units often are idle because of lack of gasoline.

The transport 72/25720 and 72/25649 will arrive at the unloading station of the Front on 14th and 15.07.1944, but the transport 61/25552 will not arrive earlier than 19.7.1944.

Gasoline stockpile bases should be moved closer to our troops. The transport 72/25397 is re-routed from Krichev to Minsk through Orsha, but it will take 4 days to reach.

From 15th to 19.07.1944 we will have an interruption of supplies of gasoline and we ask to cover it with 1500 tons of gasoline by rerouting the nearby transports. This request however was left unfulfilled.

According to the plan of the second decade, only one transport 72/25673 was sent to us which will cause even bigger interruption of gasoline supplies.

We could have routed the transports with gasoline to Minsk, but we lack the necessary gasoline transports and due to critical situations with fuel in the troops force us to unload transports at station Lukolovo which is 200km further from the troops. We use all our barrels and even captured barrels to carry fuels and oils on flatbed transports.

Because we lack barrels, we asked to send us 2500 barrels, but we have no response yet.

To prevent this extremely difficult situation, we find ourselves in, from becoming a crisis, we must once again raise the questions about gasoline supplies for our forces.
We ask for:

  1. Deliver 750 tons of gasoline for the Front each day on 16th and 17.07.1944. Failure to do so will force hundreds of vehicles waiting for gasoline at station Lukolovo as the troops will spend all the gasoline they have left and the vehicles will not be able to carry ammunition and food.
  2. Urgently dispatch 2500 fuel barrels for flatbed trucks to the front.
  3. Speed up the movement of the gasoline transports that are on the way. Also, until 20.07.1944 dispatch in total 6 000 tons of gasoline with equal deliveries each day.
  4. Solve the question about increasing the gasoline limit for July for the front.

Please inform us about your decision. Zakharov
Mekhlis
Russkih

Source: ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 178503. Д. 3. Л. 107–109.

Thursday, April 8, 2021

Talk record of Narkom of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M.Molotov with the Prime Minister of the Polish Emigrated Government S.Mikolaichik.

Moscow 31 july 1944 21:00
Also present: Grabsky, Mnishek, Romer.

Mikolaichik greets Molotov.

Molotov says that he greets Mikolaichik in Moscow.

Mikolaichik thanks for the comfortable conditions provided to him in Moscow. Simultaneously he expresses a request to be accepted by I.V.Stalin. Some time ago Grabsky has already said about that will to Lebedev.
Now he, Mikolaichik, wishes to say two things.
Firstly, the Polish government is now building up forces to assist the Soviet forces at a decisive moment with their struggle against the Germans. Polish operation plan was developed in cooperation with General Tabor who has arrived from Poland recently. The plan is handled to the English government with a request to hand it over to the Soviet government. Back in October last year all the Polish forces were ordered to fight in cooperation with the Soviet forces.
Probably V.M.Molotov has information about this being implemented already.

Molotov answers that he has some information but not quite the same character.

Mikolaichik says that Polish government has a plan to mobilize all the resources to fight the Germans. At this important moment it is important to find agreement between Polish and Soviet governments to lay the foundation of peaceful cooperation between Poland and the Soviet Union in the future. He, Mikolaichik, is sure that the entire population of Poland supports him. He, Mikolaichik, represents those political parties of Poland who are willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union and are struggling against those parties that do not wish to cooperate with the Soviet Union.

Molotov notes that he does not fully understand what Mikolaichik is speaking of. Polish government has different political parties including those whose hostile attitude cannot be argued.

Mikolaichik claims that there are no such parties in the Polish government. All four parties represented in the government are willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union.

Molotov notes that then it is better to leave that question.

Mikolaichik notes that he is positive that there are no disagreements between the Polish government and the Soviet government. He, Mikolaichik, wants to discuss all the matters with the Soviet government and to convince the Soviet government that the intentions of the Polish government are honest.

Molotov answers that it is better to talk to the Polish National Committee.

Mikolaichik says that he thinks that it would be better to talk to the Soviet government whose heroic armies are beating the Germans. The Soviet government is representing the power of its state which will rule Europe. WHen he, Mikolaichik, speaks of a historical moment, he wants to underline that if the Soviet Union will generously come towards the Polish government, then the Polish people will agree to have a union with the Soviet Russia. If he, Mikolaichik, will speak to the National Committee, then he is not sure that same will happen.

Molotov answers that as it seems to him it would be better for Mikolaichik to speak with the Polish Committee of National Liberation which is much better informed about the situation in Poland.
He, Molotov, also wants to add that the fact that Marshal Stalin has informed through Churchill about the possibility to meet with Mikolaichik is still in force. As Marshall Stalin is very busy with military matters, he, Molotov, thinks that Mikolaichik could be accepted on Wednesday or Thursday, judging by the situation in Moscow. He, Molotov, will forward Mikolaichik visit request to I.V.Stalin.

Mikolaichik says, answering Molotov note about the better situational awareness of the Polish Committee, wishes to say that Polish delegates who had arrived to London are very well informed about the situation in Poland.

Molotov answers that delegates have less information than there is on spot in Poland.

Mikolaichik agrees with Molotov and says that General Tabor is ready to take off from London anytime and report about the situation in Poland. The Polish government has been planning a general uprising in Warsaw and wants to ask the Soviet government to conduct bombing raids over the airfields of Warsaw.

Molotov notes that there are only 10km left to Warsaw.
Molotov asks whether Mikolaichik has any other questions.

Mikolaichik says that there are no more questions and he is ready to answer Molotov’s questions.

Molotov asks if Mikolaichik has any requests that he, Molotov, can forward to Marshal Stalin.

Mikolaichik answers that he has only one general will - ask Molotov to tell Stalin that he, Mikolaichik, represents the mood of the entire Polish nation.

Molotov says that he has already expressed his opinion that Mikolaichik should talk about this to the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

Mikolaichik says that he is ready to speak to the Committee. However he understands well that not all questions could be discussed with the Committee while he can discuss all the questions with the Soviet government.

Molotov says that it is possible to discuss with the Soviet government only those questions that relate to the Soviet government.

Romer asks if Mikolaichik will be able to send ciphered telegrams to London.

Molotov answered that he thinks that this will be possible.

Romer asks Molotov to issue a respective instruction.

Talk lasted for 30 minutes.

Recorded by V.Pavlov

Source: АВП РФ. Ф. 06. Оп. 6. Д. 17. Л. 91–93.

A message of the Prime I.V.Stalin to the Prime Minister of Great Britain Mr. W.Churchill

Secret and personal.
5th of August 1944

I have received your message about Warsaw.
I think that your information about the Polish is very exaggerated and is not trustworthy. That is something one can conclude from the claims of Polish who say that some Armia Krayowi units have already taken Vilno, which they even announced on the radio. This without doubt is not true. Polish Armia Krajowa consists of several units which are incorrectly named “divisions”. They don’t have artillery, tanks or aviation. I have no idea how such units can take Warsaw which is defended by four full German tank divisions including the “German Goring” division.

Source: Correspondence of the head of the Minister Council of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. 2nd edition 1989 Vol.1 p. 290-291

Wednesday, April 7, 2021

A reference of the Staff of the 4th Army about the composition and supply availability by 4th of August 1944.

Active army, 4th of August 1944.

3rd tank corps:

ArmorSU-85 SU-76 SU-57
Quantity672

Armor ammo supplies - [SAI].

Guns76mm 57mm 37mm 45mm
Quantity12 6 6 2
Standard Ammo Issues0,5 2 - 0,5
Mortars120mm 82mmM-13
Quantity17286
Standard Ammo Issues0,30,33 volleys

Fuel and lubricants: diesel 1refuelling, gasoline 2s 0,8 refuellings

8th guards tank corps

Armor:

T-3429
M4A257
IS-214
SU-8514
SU-7612
SU-578
Total129

Supplies:
ammo - 1,5 standard ammo issue,
diesel 1 refuel,
gasoline 2s - 0,2 refuels.

16th tank corps

T-3482
SU-8514
SU-7616
IS-210
SU-574
Total127

Also, there are 4 running tanks without crews and two tanks with crews on the march.
Supplies:
ammo - 1 standard ammo issue,
diesel 1 refuel,
gasoline 2s - 0,8 refuel.

109 tank brigade
T-34: 56,
ammo: 1,5,
diesel: 1 refuel.

9th separate signal regiment
T-34: 5

87th separate motorcycle battalion.
T-34: 7

5th separate motorcycle battalion
MK-9: 7
SU-57: 7

Total in army (without 3rd Tank Corps):

T-34186
М4-А257
IS-224
SU-8528
SU-7628
SU-5714
MK-97
Total344

Chief of operative department
Colonel G. Klein

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 307. Оп. 4148. Д. 225. Л. 315.

Friday, April 2, 2021

Survey Protocol (part 5). Warsaw uprising. Capitulation.

Attitude of Armia Ludowa regarding the capitulation.

The leadership of Armia Ludowa [AL] and other democratic organizations were not informed by the representatives of Armia Krajowa [AK] about the preparations of the capitulation. The leadership of AL were strictly against it and expressed their protests, requesting to continue the resistance.

On 27.09 during a converstation with me, general Skakowsky has said that: “I will act against the capitulation”. Skakowsky has approved the plans of escaping and uniting with the army of Berling. The unit leaders of the AL awere also supporting the continuation of the struggle and for contacting the Red Army.

However the political leadership of AL was hesitating to break up with the AK considering the difficulty of the situation. AL, which was against surrendering, was joined by the democratic elements from AK and also a considerable number of the civilians, who were counting on the Red Army.

Degradation within AK

The leadership and especially middle and lower ranks of the AK organization were torn apart by big contradictions regarding military and political questions. The anti Soviet policy of the government in London has suffered a complete disaster and has discredited itself within the eyes of the population and ordinary soldiers of AK. London delegates could not hold off sympathy among the rebels towards the Red Army anymore.
I personally know several officers who at first were strictly against any union with the Red Army or Berling, but later claimed that they are ready to join AL.

The terrorist actions of PKB began to cause protests. The leadership of AK began to hesitate to prosecute the Russian prisoners. If earlier, Russians who were in AK captivity did not receive any food, then later the AK leadership was forced to acknowledge their equality. It also allowed major Volkov (from former POWs) to form a unit consisting of Russian POWs.

There were people in the AK who were against surrendering, such as colonel Bogumil the commander of one of the districts. The AK has begun searching for compromise between the policy of government in London and rebel demands to form a stable contact with the Red Army. Willing to reestablish its authority, even such reactionists as Vakhnowsky began talking about the will to find a compromise between Rolya-Zhimersky and London. However at the same time they were preparing the full capitulation.

In the military respect carelessness prevailed among the leadership of AK. Only in the last period trenching was activated. The barricades were not improved. There were drinking and revelry cases among the officers of AK, especially at Mokotuv district.

Within the AK signs of political degradation were evident. It became known that general Sosnowsky was replaced by “Bor”. There were rumors about the forthcoming dismissal of “Bor”. Messages arriving from London testified that there were contradictions within Mikolaichik and the ministers.

In the evening of 29.09 Mikolaichik deputy (allegedly in the rank of colonel) invited general Skakovsky. Two questions were discussed there:

  1. Skakowsky’s attitude regarding the capitulation. Skakowsky has replied in a sharply negative manner, demanding struggle till the end.
  2. Skakowsky’s attitude regarding his promotion to replace general “Bor”. Mikolaichik’s deputy has underlined that Skakowsky’s candidacy is supported by the government in London and Lyublin. Skakowsky allegedly didn’t respond positively to this matter.

Surrendering

On 29-30.09 the leadership of AK has finished the preparation to surrender. Money reserve of amount up to 1,5 million zloty was buried and respective organization have prepared themselves to go underground.

According to the agreement with Germans, on 30.09 the first exit of the civil population has begun. The time window was established every day from 5:00 till 19:00, military operations continued outside of these hours. AK soldiers and officers started to panic. They were trying to dress as civilians and leave among them. AL was still objecting the capitulation.

In the evening of 28.09 I visited General “Monter”. Colonel Vakhnowsky was present during this meeting as well as chief of staff colonel “Hirurg”.
I said to General “Monter”: “As a Soviet Officer I propose to develop a plan on how to cross Visla. I will coordinate the actions with the Red Army to provide artillery covering fire and infantry support from the other bank. We must concentrate all the rebel forces to perform a strike. We have enough machine guns, ATRs and amoo for them. I ask you to develop a plan and inform me”.
General “Monter” answered: “I will think about this. However it is strange that the Red Army doesn’t come to help us”.
Colonel Vakhnowsky said: “This is a good plan, but we have no ammo”.
When I noted that despite the lack of ammo they still managed to hold on until now, Vakhnowsky answered that the uprising was not planned for such a long period etc.
In that way I didn’t receive an answer to my proposal.

During the talk with colonel Slabvor and Bogumil I also expressed this plan to them. They cheerfully approved it, but said that they will obey the leadership of AK and will not go against its orders.

As noted before, the leadership of AL has agreed with my plan.
On 29.09 I requested answer from “Monter” twice in written form and by telephone, but I received no answer. On this day at “Monter’s” staff they refused to give me the information about the enemy, motivating it with absence of new data.
In the evening of 01.10 I was visited by general “Monter’s” adjutant captain Boguslawsky callsign “Korob” who was very sympathetic towards me and the Red Army.

Boguslawsky has warned me of the following:

  1. The leadership of AK has decided to surrender.
  2. I must leave immediately, because assasination attempt is being prepared against me as a representative of the Red Army.

After assessing the situation, I made a decision to leave about which I reported on the radio. I went down the manhole, went along the pipes following previously scouted path to Visla, swam across the river and went ashore around the bridge of Ponyatowsky. I notified the members of the Lyublin government in Warsaw about this route.

About the actions of captain Kalugin

After arriving to Warsaw I found out that 3-4 days prior to my arrival captain Kalugin has went to the Soviet side. He was at “Monter’s” staff and was considered an official representative of the Soviet command.

The officers of AL said me that Kalugin was exceptionally trusted by “Monter” and was called “Soviet military attache”. Kalugin has taken part in all the meetings of AK staff.
Kalugin has issued leaflets addressing the Russian cossacks, traitors who were on the German side. He called them to join the Red Army or the rebels. These leaflets were dropped from airplanes.

Of Kalugin’s personal omens I know only that he lacks 2-3 fingers on his hand. Kalugin was sent by “Monter” on the Eastern bank and allegedly had some important plans with him.

Survey performed by: deputy head of intelligence staff of the 1st Belorussian front colonel Ozeryansky and captain Bezimensky.

Source: ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 2380. Д. 22. Л. 238–244.

Source: warsaw75.mil.ru

Brief technical report about shaped charge rounds.

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