Report from the Commander of the forces of the 1st Ukrainian front to the Supreme Commander about adversary's attempts to eliminate the bridgehead on Vistula.

23rd August 1944

Beginning on this year's 5th of August the forces of the 1st Ukrainian front are in constant fierce battles aimed at holding on and enlargening the bridgeheads on the Western bank of Vistula river and Vistloka river.

The enemy considers Krakow direction as very important because it covers the largest German industrial region in Silesia and has gathered considerable tank and infantry forces, pulled from the reserves of other fronts. In front of our bridgeheads the adversary has concentrated 8 tank divisions, 4 separate tank battallions, 2 separate brigades of self propelled guns (alltogether 600-700 tanks and SPGs), 9 infantry divisions, 1 motodivision, 5 separate infantry brigades, 1 artillery division.

Alltogether there are
8 tank divisions that operate against our front (1, 3, 8, 16, 17, 66, 23, 24),
1 motodivision (20th),
14 infantry divisions (253, 342, 241, 72, 88, 371, 213th protective, 96, 7, 544, 545, 208, 68, 114)
5 separate infantry brigades (1, 1133, 1134, 1135, 1136),
1 artillery division (18th),
4 separate tank battallions,
2 separate SPG brigades,
6 separate infantry regiments,
and up to 50 various separate battalions (reserve, sapper, protective, builder)

Adversary (for the period from 5th to 22nd August) has created a strike force on the Western bank of Vistula consisting of six tank divisions, one motodivision, and seven infantry divisions and others. He has launched four large counter attacks against our forces with objective (as discovered from prisoner interrogations and captured documents) to eliminate and throw back our forces to the Eastern bank of Vistula river.

In fierce battles our forces have broken the offensive intentions of the advarsary to eliminate the bridgeheads on the Western bank of Vistula and Vistloka and inflicted massive damage to the enemy in manforce, tanks and materials.

Over 40 thousand German soldiers and officers killed. Knocked out and destroyed 678 tanks and SPG, 465 artillery systems, 137 APCs, 119 airplanes, 484 mortars 854 machine guns.

Adversary, as the prisoner interrogations show, plans to continue his offensives with aim to eliminate our bridgeheads; is constantly reinforcing his troops and reparing vehicles. We get daily reports about reinforcements heading towards the front by railroads and highways from Krakow and Chenstohow in form of tanks, artillery and infantry.

Konev
Sokolovsky
Krainyukov

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 236. Оп. 2712. Д. 56. Л. 429-430.

Order from the commander of the 1st Belorussian front to the commander of the 1st Polish Army and the 47th Army about transferring the 1st Polish infantry division under the operative command of the commander of the 47th Army to use it in offensive towards Prague.

4th September 1944

To the Commander of the 1st Polish Army

From 05.09.1944 trnsfer the 1st infantry divisoin in its full staff under the operative command of the commander of the 47th Army. Leave the supply reponsibility under the jurisdiction of the Polish army.
Commander of the 47th Army shall use the 1st infantry division to attack the Prague city according to my instructions.

Report when received.

Rokossovsky
Telegin
Malinin

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 2307. Д. 29. Л. 249.

Order from the commander of the forces of the 1st Belorussian front to the commander of the 48th army about temporary halting the offensive.

15th August 1944

The Army has not achieved an objective set by me. The reason for this was that the offensive was poorly organized, the combat formations of corps adn armies was was not appropriate for the situation, too much forces were left in the reserve while not enough of them was dedicated to the offensive itself. As a result adversary could organize a defence at random unprepared spots and with small numbers hold back our advancing units.

I order:

1. To teporaliry stop the advance. During the 16th and 17.08.1944 thoroughly scout the defenses and enemy's fire system; organize the battle, deliver ammo, fuel and lubricants.
2. In the morning of 18.08.1944 to attack decicively and fulfill your previous objectives.

Report when delivered. Report about the adopted decision via encrypted message at around 20:00 16.08.1944

Rokossovsky
Telegin
Malinin

ЦАМО РФ. Ф.233. Оп. 2307. Д. 33. Л. 68.

Directive Nr 30144 of Stavka of the Supreme Command to the commanders of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, South-West and South fronts about the enemy's possible attack date.

2nd July 1943 02:10

According to our data the Germans can attack on our front in the period between 3 - 6 of July.

Stavka of the Supreme Command orders:

1. Increase scouting and observing the enemy in order to discover his intentions in time
2. Ground forces and Aviation must be prepared to repel the possible attack of the enemy
3. Report about the adopted measures.

Stavka of the Supreme Command
J.Stalin
A.Vasilevsky

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 143. л. 164.

Directive Nr 30123 of Stavka of the Supreme Command to the commanders of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and South-West fronts about the enemy's possible attack date.

8th May 1943 23:35

According to some sources adversary can go offensive on 10-12 of May in Orlov-Kursk direction or in Belogorod-Oboyansk direction or in both at the same time.

The Stavka of the Supreme command orders to have all forces of the first defence line as well as reserves be prepared and on full alert by morning of 10th of May and ready to meet the possible enemy strike. Special attention shall be payed to our aviation readiness in order to not just repel the enemy aviation attacks, but also to capture air superiority at first moments of their offensive.

Confirm the receiving. Report about the adopted measures.

Stavka of the Supreme command.
J.Stalin
A.Vasilevsky

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 139. Л. 184.

Directive Nr 30131 of Stavka of the Supreme Command to the commanders of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, South-West and South fronts about the enemy's possible attack date.

Copy: to the commander of the the Steppe military district.

20th May 1943 03:30

According to information from agent intelligence the Germans are planning an attack on our front in the period between 19 - 26 of May. I order not loose vigilance and combat readiness of forces, keep aviation on full alert. Use recon and capture prisoners to discover enemy groups and his true intentions.

J.Stalin.

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 143. Л. 152.

Excerpt from Stavka of the Supreme Commander directive to the Commander of the 1st Belorussian front about transition to defense.

Response to this document

Moscow
29th August 1944

1 - Left flank of the front must go defensive after receiving this directive. The right flank must continue offensive with the objective to reach river Narev and its mouth around 4.09 - 5.09 and to capture a bridgehead on the Western bank near Pultusk, Sierotsk and also go defensive after that.[...]

5 - Special attention must be payed at the following directions: Rozhan, Ostruw-Mazovetzky, Chizhaev, Pultusk, Vyshkuw, Vengruw, Warsaw, Minsk-Mazovetsk, Demblin, Lukuw, Radom, Lyublin and to holding the bridgeheads on the Western bank of rivers Vistula and Narev.[...]

Report about the issued instructions and present a detailed defensive plan to the Joint Staff no later than 5th of September.

Stavka of the Supreme Command
Stalin
Antonov

ЦХСД Ф.2\2. 1944г. Л. 18-20.

Response to this document

8th Army Losses Report for August from the representative of the Joint Staff of the Red Army to deputy Supreme Commander

Stavka response to this document

28th August 1944

1. From 01.08.1944 to 26.08.1944 the army has lost 35649 men (killed, wounded, missing) and received 10237 men as reinforcments, which does not cover its losses. For example: 4th grds rifle corps has lost 7777 men while fighting for the bridgehead and received only 3081 reinforcements.
   At present time the divisions have shrinked down to just 4000 - 4200 men, mainly because of the rifle companies which have only 30 -35 men.
2. In the last days of fighting for enlargening the bridgehead exhaustness is observable in the units. There is no combat impulse anymore, letargy is evident. Daily losses shrink the numbers of already small companies as a result of what there is no success in the battles for enlarging the bridgehead. For example: 4th grds rifle corps has moved only about 1-2 km (on a 10km front) for a whole day of fighting on 26.08.1944 and lost 405 men mainly active bayonets which is roughly equal to 11 rifle companies (counting 35 men each).
3. I consider the following:
   • Widen the defensive strip for the Polish army on the bridgehead and place one rifle division from the 8th grds Army behind it. Thereby the rifle corps of the 8th grds Army could be gradually pulled back for rest, refilling their numbers and train them to prepare for the forthcomming offensive operations.
   • To further widen the bridgehead the Polish army could solve local offensive tasks.
4. 7th grds corps - to cross the Vistula river in the Kobilnitza - Vargotzyn region and in cooperation with the forces of 8th army to clear the region of river Rodomka, road Severynuw - Kuzenitze.

Lieutenant colonel
Rybak

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 178503. Д. 9. Л. 79-80.

Stavka response to this document

Report from the Staff of the 2nd Tank Army about the losses sustained from 20th July till 8th August.

1. Men killed - 991
2. Men injured - 2852
3. Missing - 442
4. Irreversable losses of material:
1. T-34 - 155
2. M4-A2 - 48
3. IS-2 - 4
4. Mk9 - 3
5. SU-85 - 18
6. SU-76 - 15
7. SU-57 - 1
Armoured units in total - 244
8. Guns destroyed - 36
9. Mortars - 11
10. Mounted MG - 26
11. Light MG - 58
12. Armoured cars - 11
13. Motorcicles - 102
14. Cars - 82

Staff head of the 2nd Tank Army
Colonel Bazanov

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 307. Оп. 4148. Д. 226. Л. 105.

Report of the Staff of the 1st Belorussian front to the Joint Staff of the Red Army about the losses of the front from 1st to 10th of August 1944.

13th August 1944.

To the Head of the Operational Headquarters of the Red Army Joint Staff.

Reporting the summary of the losses sustained by the 1st Belorussian front from 1st to 10th of August 1944:

• 48th army – personell:
  killed – 737, wounded – 2 352 ;
  horses: killed – 49, wounded – 48 ;
  material: artillery – 3, rifles and machineguns – 137, machineguns – 24, ATR – 1, mortars – 4, cars – 1.
• 65th army. – personell: killed – 842, wounded – 2 487.
• 28th army – personell: killed – 651, wounded – 2 963;
  material: rifles and machineguns – 251.
• 70th army – personell: killed – 158, wounded – 563; material: cars – 2, carriages – 5.
• 47th army – personell: killed – 1045, wounded – 3146;
  horses: killed – 76, wounded – 6.
• 1th Polish army – personell: killed – 290, wounded – 684, missing – 565;
  horses: killed – 55, wounded – 87 ;
  material: rifles and machineguns – 824, machineguns – 87, ATR – 35, mortars – 18, artillery – 76 and 45 mm – 9,
  tanks: burned – 1, knocked out – 6, radios – 1, cars – 2.
• 8th grds. army – personell: killed – 1769, wounded – 7415, missing – 482.
• 69th army – personell: killed – 1418, wounded – 3958;
  material: artillery – 8, mortars – 8, rifles and machineguns – 294, machineguns – 4, ATR – 2, cars – 3, tractors – 1, radios – 3.
• 2th tank army – personell: killed – 409, wounded – 1271, missing – 589;
  material: burned and knocked out tanks – 101, self propelled artillery – 13.
  destroyed: artillery – 28, mortars – 9, machineguns – 84, APC – 2.
• 16th air army – lost to enemy AA artillery and in air fights as well as crashed – 22 aircraft.
• 6th air army – lost to enemy AA artillery and in air fights – 13 and did not return from combat mission – 27 aircraft.

Head of the operative headquarters of the staff of the 1st Belorussian front
General-Major Boikov

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 2307. Д. 12. Л. 307–308.

Report from the Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov and Marshal Rokossovsky to the Supreme Commander about the Warsaw operation plan for the 1st Belorussian front.

Active Army.

8 August 1944

To the Supreme Commander Marshal of the Soviet Union comrade Stalin.

Reporting our views about the following combat activities of the forces of the 1st Belorussian front and about the estimate of the Warsaw operation plan.

1. The front can begin the Warsaw operation after the right wing armies reach the region of river Narev and capture the bridgehead on its Western bank near Pultusk and Serotsk.
   The combat formations of these armies are around 120km away from river Narev and it will take around 10 days to cover that distance. This way the right wing of the front should perform an offensive operation with reaching Narev from 10th to 20.08.1944.
2. Within this time on the left flank of the front the 69th army, 8th grds Army, 7th grds Cavalry Corps and 11th Tank Corps must perform a local operation with objective to enlarge the bridgehead on Vistula river Western bank and to reach the region of Varka, Strometz, Radom, Vezhbitsa.
   To carry out this operation Katukov's 1st Tank Army must be transferred from 1st Ukrainian Front to 1st Belorussian Front and send it from Opatuw through Ostrovetz, Senno with the objective to strike in the Northern direction and reach the front: Zwoleny, Radom; by this supporting the 69th, 8th grds Army, 6th Cav.Corps and 11th Tank Corps in crushing the enemy in front of them.
   Together with this the current delimiting line between the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts must be lifted up to the North until the line: Krasnostav, river Ilzhanka, Opochno, Piotrkuw. This wil tighten the combat formations of the left flank of the 1st Belorussian front and increase the striking force of our forces in the Radom direction.
3. After carrying out these operations and reaching the Narev river by the front's right flank and left flank reaching Varka, Strometz, Radom, Veshbitza, the forces will need at least 5 days to relocate the aviation and for the rear and artillery to catch up as well as to resupply fuel and oils.
4. Taking into account the preparation time needed, then the Warsaw operation may be started on 25.08.1944 using the entire front strength and aiming to reach Cehanuw, Plonysk, Vyshogrud, Sohachew, Skernewitze, Tomashuw and taking Warsaw.
   In this operation to advance to the North of Vistula three armies shall be used, 1st tank corps, 1st cav. crops, as for advancing to the North of Vistula 69th army, 8th grds army, 1st tank army and 2nd tank army, two cav. corps one tank corps and one army from the right wing shall be used.
   1st Polish Army will advance along the Western bank of Vistula river with the objective to take Warsaw in collaboration with the forces of right flank of the Front.
5. Reporting the above, we ask to accept our considerations and time estimates about carrying out the furhter offensive operations with the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Zharov
Rumyantsev

ЦАМО РФ. Ф.233 Оп. 2356. Д. 26. Л. 181-183.

Combat report of the commander of the 2nd Tank Army to the Commander of 1st Belorussian front about the enemy offensive near Radzimyn.

3 August 1944

At 10:00 the enemy has attacked the 3rd grds tank corps with a force of up to 85 tanks supported by infantry, moving towards Voloshyn. Another attack from Zelenka to Ossuw with a force of up to 40 tanks has forced our units to retreat and at 18:00 of 3.08.1944 is fighting along the line of railway near Voloshyn.

8th grds tank corps is repelling attacks from East and West is fighting on its previous position.

Decided to: after the infantry reaches Okunew region, to use the 8th grds tank corps in the overall direction towards Ossuw, Zielenka, Marki to cut the Warsaw highway near Strugi, Marki.

3rd grds corps shall go counteroffensive towards Radzymin.

Asking to urgently replace the 16th tank corps with infantry and to allow it to fall back towards Okunew in order to concentrate the army forces as it is now scattered and difficult to control.

Radzievsky.

[RESOLUTION]

To the commander of th 2nd tank {army}.

If 3rd tank corps is in danger to be thrown away from the main forces, move it back to the main forces with objective in mind to not let the enemy to South and South-East directions.

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 2307. Д. 29. Л. 99а, 996.