Vehicle fleet of the national economy

REPORT OF THE SUPPLY DEPARTMENT OF GAVTU RA

Table 3. Vehicle fleet of the national economy on January 1, 1941 

28.09.1945

Total cars	of them:
	cargo and special	cars
807 thousand pieces	704 thousand pieces	103 thousand pieces

Source

Vehicle fleet of the Red Army at the beginning of the war

REPORT OF THE SUPPLY DEPARTMENT OF GAVTU RA

Table 1. Vehicle fleet of the Red Army at the beginning of the war (in thousand units)

28.09.1945

Total	Freight and special	Including				Cars	Including
		GAS	ZIS	YaG	Other		M-1	ZIS 101	Other
272.6	257.8	151.1	104.2	1.6	0.9	14.8	10.5	0.6	3.7

Source

Report about the delay of Vistula river crossing.

REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OFFICER OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY TO THE DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ON THE REASONS FOR THE DELAY IN THE CROSSING OF VISLA RIVER BY THE TROOPS OF 8TH GUARDS ARMY

August 3, 1944

to Comrade ZHAROV

Troops of the 8th gds Army during August 2, 1944, the armies fought an unsuccessful battle on the western bank of Vistula river and continued to transport infantry, artillery, ammunition and horses.

I consider the reason for the unsuccessful offensive for the expansion of the bridgehead on the western bank of Vistula river to be:

• Indecisive actions of the infantry without appropriate amounts of reinforcing, namely: absence of tanks and an insufficient amount of artillery on the western bank of Vistula river and especially in the morning.
• The increase of the resistance of the enemy, since the latter had planned, according to the testimony of the prisoners, to throw off our units from the occupied bridgehead with the help of aviation. During August 2, 1944, enemy aircraft had disabled a large number of crossing facilities, which slowed down the crossing of troops and equipment.

The absence of a built pontoon bridge and an insufficient number of floating crossing facilities makes it impossible to transfer divisional mechanically tracted artillery, tanks and other equipment to the western coast in a timely manner.

By 20.00 2.8.1944, in two days, the following were transported in total:

• of the 29th gds rifle corps fully: infantry of the 27th and 74th guards rifle division, 82-mm mortar units and 45-mm guns, 2, 76{mm} regiment artillery - 7, 76{mm} divisional artillery - 2.
• of the 28th rifle corps fully: infantry of the 79th, 39th gds rifle division, 76-mm guns of regiment artillery - 20; 76 mm divisional artillery - 33; 45 mm - 26; 82-mm mortars - 83; 120-mm mortars - 12; self-propelled regiment 1061 - 7 guns.
• In the 4th Guards. sk in full: 57th, 35th gds rifle division, all 45-mm and 76-mm horse-drawn regiment artillery, 82-mm mortar units and 28 76-mm divisional artillery guns, self-propelled guns. regiment 1087 - 20 guns.

In addition to infantry and equipment, horses were transported to the western bank of the Vistula - 2 horses for each gun and the necessary amount of ammunition.

An attempt to transport tanks to the western bank of the Vistula river under water did not give any result: the first 2 KV tanks to attempt that remained under water. After this underwater crossing attempts were stopped. For the crossing of heavy equipment (tanks, wheeled artillery), it is necessary to speed up the construction of a heavy pontoon bridge.

General Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Drabkin

Source: Печ. по: ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 178503. Д. 2. Л. 98–99. Подлинник.

About the preparation for winter of the evacuated oblast’ population

Decree of the Bureau of the Stalingrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Stalingrad Regional Executive Committee.

"About the preparation for winter of the evacuated oblast’ population".

Report. Polyakov A.M. and Krutsko.

In cooperation with executive committee of District Council of deputees of working people.

3. October 1942

Task the chairmen of the executive commitees and region councils and secretaries of VKPB to organize a thorough check of the status of preparation of the evacuated population. Adopt measures so that during October dugouts {with roof} (where there is lack of dwelling) are prepared at the expense of kolkhozes and local authorities as well as for funds provided by SovNarKom and District Executive committee. Oblige com. Poshlin to immediately take measures to provide this construction with materials.

Oblige the secretaries of region committees of VKPB and representative of executive committees and regional councils to provide the minimum necessary amount of banyas for the evacuees and also to carry out prevention of epidemic diseases among the population.

Task the district executive committees to provide the further work and flawless functioning of kids dining rooms under all conditions. Also attach the newly arrived kids to schools, provide the functioning of schools. Provide jobs in kolkhozes and industries for newly arrived adult population.

Due to sharp shortages of shoes and clothes among the evacuees, especially for kids, consider it necessary to organize commissions for gathering warm clothes and provide those in need with clothes gathered from the population as well as from the provided funds.

Task the executive commitees and regional councils to adopt measures to prioritize local resources for providing the needs of the evacuated population. Use local sewing workshops to make the necessary amounts of warm clothes and shoes for kids and adults as well as organize laundry-rooms for washing the clothes.

Российский государственный архив социально-политической истории
Ф. 17. Оп. 43. Д. 1773. Л. 78–79.

Order 0391 About the facts of sybstitution of educational work with repressions

Order of people's Deffense Commissar of the USSR

"About the facts of sybstitution of educational work with repressions"

4 December 1941 № 0391

Recently, there have been frequent cases of illegal repressions and gross abuse of power by individual commanders and commissars in relation to their subordinates. Lieutenant of the 288th rifle regiment Komissarov, without any reason, killed a Red Army soldier Kubica with a shot from a revolver.
The former head of the 21st UR, Colonel Sushchenko, shot Jr. Sergeant Pershikov for too slowly getting off the car due to an injured hand.
The commander of a platoon of a motorized rifle company of the 1026th rifle regiment, Lieutenant Mikryukov, shot dead his assistant, junior platoon commander Baburin, allegedly for not following orders.
The military commissar of the 28th Panzer Division, Regimental Commissar Bankvitzer, beat a sergeant for lighting a cigarette at night; he also beat Major Zanozny for an unrestrained conversation with him.
The chief of staff of the 529th Infantry Regiment, Captain Sakur without any reason has hit twice senior lt. Lieutenant Sergeyev with a pistol. Such intolerable facts of the perversion of disciplinary practices in the Red Army, the excess of granted rights and power, lynching and assault are explainable with:

• the method of persuasion was incorrectly relegated to the background, and the method of repression against subordinates moved into first place;
• daily educational work in units is in some cases replaced by swearing, repression and assault;
• the method of explanations and conversations of commanders, commissars, political workers with the Red Army soldiers is abandoned and the clarification of questions that are incomprehensible to the Red Army soldiers is often replaced by shouting, abuse and rudeness;
• individual commanders and political workers in difficult conditions of battle get lost, fall into a panic and cover their own confusion with the use of weapons without any reason;
• the simple truth is forgotten that use of repression is an extreme measure, permissible only in cases of direct disobedience and open resistance in a combat situation or in cases of malicious violation of discipline and order by persons deliberately going to disrupt the orders of the command.

Commanders, commissars, and political workers must remember that without a correct combination of method of persuasion with method of coercion, the imposition of Soviet military discipline and the strengthening of the political and moral state of the troops is unthinkable.
Severe punishment in relation to malicious violators of military discipline, accomplices of the enemy and open enemies should be combined with careful analysis of every case of violation of discipline that require a detailed clarification of the circumstances it has occurred in.
Unjustified repressions, illegal executions, arbitrariness, and assault on the part of commanders and commissars are a manifestation of lack of will and handlessness, often lead to the opposite results, contribute to decline in military discipline and political and moral state of troops, and can push unstable fighters to defect to the side of the enemy.

I order:

1. Restore educational work, widely use the persuasion method, do not replace everyday explanatory work with administration and repressions.
2. To all commanders, political workers and chiefs to talk daily with the Red Army soldiers, explaining to them the necessity for strict military discipline, honest fulfillment of their military duty, the military oath and orders of the commander and chief. In conversations, also explain that a serious threat looms over our Motherland, that the greatest self-sacrifice, unshakable steadfastness in battle, contempt for death and a merciless struggle against cowards, deserters, self-mutilators, provocateurs and traitors to the Motherland are needed to defeat the enemy.
3. Explain to the commanding staff that lynching, assault and public swearing are degrading the rank of a soldier of the Red Army, lead not to strengthening, but to undermining the discipline and authority of the commander and political worker.
4. In the most resolute manner, up to bringing the perpetrators to trial by a military tribunal, to combat all manifestations of illegal repression, assault and lynching.

The order is to be announced to the entire commanding staff of the Army in the field, up to and including the commander and commissar of the regiment.

People's Commissar of Defense I. Stalin
Chief of the General Staff B. Shaposhnikov

ЦАМО РФ Ф. 4. Оп. 11. Д. 66. Л. 149–152.

About the evacuation of the civilian population from Red Army combat regions.

Resolutions of the Bureau of the Stalingrad Regional Committee of the CPSU(b) and the Stalingrad Regional Executive Committee

About the evacuation of the civilian population from Red Army combat regions.

/ In cooperation with city council executive committee /

1. In accordance with resolution of the Military Council of 62nd Army, until this year’s 22nd August evacuate all the civilians from the combat areas from Panshino, Dmitrievka, Marinovka, mid-Tsaritsinskoe, lower-Tsaritsinskoe and bank of Don.
2. Oblige the chairmen of executive committees of district councils and secretaries of regional committees of CPSU(b) of Ilovlinsky, Gorodische, Kalachevskoe regions to evacuate all the civilians, cattle, enterprises, institutions and all the material values from mentioned region to areas which were earlier selected for positioning these evacuees.
3. To provide practical help to local soviet, party organisatoins during the evacuation of the civilian population, send on an official journey to Ilovaysk region com. Mashustin, to Kalachevsky region com. Krakhmalev, to Gorodischensky region com. Dedikov.

16 August 1942

RGASPI (Russian Government Archive of Social-Political history)
Ф. 17. Оп. 43. Д. 1772. Л. 248–249.
Source

About partial unloading of the city of Stalingrad.

Resolutions of the Bureau of the Stalingrad Regional Committee of the CPSU(b) and the Stalingrad Regional Executive Committee

About partial unloading of the city of Stalingrad.

(report by com. Polyakov A.M.)
(In cooperation with city council executive committee)

1. In accordance with com. Schvernik, evacuate 15 thousand non-working women with children out of the city of Stalingrad to Kuibyshev region / Ulyanovsk and Syzransky districts / and 8-10 thousand people to settle them in trans-Volga regions.
2. Including in the mentioned numbers, evacuate from the city of Stalingrad families of Red Army soldier families and commanding staff, families of workers, employees, soviet party workers, those who don’t work at plants or institutions.
3. Oblige head of NVRP com. Kachenin, head of Southern railroads com. Molchanov to provide the appropriate amount of tonnage and railroad cars to evacuate the above mentioned families from Stalingrad city, according to the requests from the Region Administration of employment of the evacuated population - deputy chair of executive committee com. Krutsko, who has to be assigned the management of the task of partial unloading of the Stalingrad city.

15 August 1942

RGASPI (Russian Government Archive of Social-Political history)
Ф. 17. Оп. 43. Д. 1772. Л. 248–249.
Source