24th Army Losses 15-26 September 1942

Information about the losses within the Rifle Divisions of the 24th Army.

For period from 15.09 to 26.09.1942

Division name	Staff				Horses
	KIA	WIA, Shell-shocked, Sick	MIA or Captured	Total
396 Rifle Division	387	1762	34	2177	38
49 Rifle Division	494	2029	185	2708	169
231 Rifle Division	249	1304	29	1582	93
233 Rifle Division	1587	5097	289	6968	194
	2701	10192	532	13435	494

Division name	Equipment
	Guns 152mm	Guns 122mm	Guns 76mm	AT guns	Mortars	Mounted MG	Light MG	PPSh	AT rifles
396 Rifle Division	-	-	-	4	-	5	-	86	2
49 Rifle Division	-	-	2	3	21	30	60	-	19
231 Rifle Division	-	1	1	4	27	10	4	1	1
233 Rifle Division	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	2	4	11	48	45	64	87	22

24th Army, captain Nikitchenko,
2 rank intendant-technician Sholomin

Original scan

ЦАМО, Фонд: 206, Опись: 262, Дело: 107

Meeting of command staff of the 1st guards Army

Meeting

Of division and separate units commanders, commissars,
Artillery leaders and heads of command staff of the 1st guards Army.

29.9.1942
(2km South East from Sovkhoz Kotluban) ravine.

Report of the head of staff of army colonel Ivanov.

Results of combat operations of the 1st guards army from 18.09 to 30.09.1942

1. The objective, set for the 1st guards army to break through the enemy’s defense line and connecting with the Stalingrad defenders was failed. The Soviet reports have specific style of minimizing or ignoring positive things and highlighting bad things, because those need to be addressed.
   This causes the so-called "archive depression" for an unprepared reader when things seem much worse than they actually were.
2. We had enough forces to fulfill the objective. The force balance was on our side, especially in manpower, vehicles and weapons. The enemy had supremacy mostly (1000 planes) in the air. The enemy had 76th infantry division, parts of 60th and 3rd motorised division.
3. the concentration of forces was not properly concealed because:
   • constant enemy air scouting and
   • possible information leak caused by defectors from 173 rifle division on 17.09 (this data requires checking).
4. The main strike was performed by the left flank of the 1st guards army (in the strip of 316 rifle division and 7th tank corps).
5. The execution of the operation.
   The fighting has begun:
   • 18.09. The defense of the enemy was broken in the strip of the 316 rifle division. Hill 154.2 was taken by one regiment of the 316th rd and the advancing units rushed towards farm Borodkin. 4th Tank Corps did not enter the breakthrough in time. Due to absolutely unsatisfactory leadership of the 316rd, they did not gain a foothold on the hill 154.2 and no weapons {like cannons} were brought in, no recon was organized. The enemy could attack (supported by 50 tanks) this hill in the second part of the day and retake it. Commander and commissaar of the 1073 regiment deserted from the battlefield and were sent to court-martial. The commander and commissar of the 316rd have let the command out of their hands. The hill 154.2 has a high importance within the strip of offense of the 1st guards army because it is dominant on the front of offensive operations of our army and possessing it will put our forces in a better position. Further on a fight was ongoing for a few days for possessing that hill. The 260th rifle division and 4th tank corps (7th tank corps went dry) were sent to battle. At this time the Germans were concentrating their forces and intensified the bombing.
   • Due to lack of results of this offensive, future operations were transferred to the right flank . The main strike was performed in the strip of the 273rd, 258th rifle divisions and 16th tank corps. According to the new order of the commander of the army the 273rd rifle division, acting quite energetically has taken hill 130,4. The 16th tank corps entered the battle and did provide help, but the infantry did not gain a foothold (by this time some artillery regiments and mortar regiments were taken away from the army).
6. By this time the situation in the army is as follows. The attacks will be continued in order to tie up enemy forces from the siege of Stalingrad, thus supporting the Stalingrad defenders. For this, units of the rear should be cleared and part of the forces should be sent to the front units to reinforce them.
7. the result of the offensive actions of the army was:
   • partially the forces enemy were taken away from Stalingrad,
   • same for the German aviation
8. Operations of our divisions.
   • 173rd did not accomplish its task. It reported its initial location on hill 108.4 wrongly. This hill was in the hands of the Germans. It moved only for a small distance throughout the entire offensive period.
   • 273rd was taking part in the 2nd period of the offensive in the direction of the main attack and did fulfill its objective. The division has organized a breakthrough in the region of hill 130.4 but did not gain a foothold.
   • 258rd within the first period of the fighting did not take hill 118.1 despite having a lot of supporting weapons.
     Unsatisfactory leadership of the division played a role in that.
   • 292rd for ten days of fighting did not move a bit, but lost a lot of men and only by 29.09 approached the frontal edge of the enemy defense.
   • 260rd is totally disorganized. Absolutely unsatisfactory leadership from the commander and commissar of the division. The staff is not put-together and is poor at controlling the combat. Units of the division took a long time to cross the balkas and were only brought in the proper direction by the staff commanders of the staff of the Army. Did not meet its objective.
   • 221rd has low manpower. Accomplished the objective on a satisfactory level.
   • The artillery was miserable during the offensive. The fire was unaimed (they cannot even concentrate fire). The artillery did not make way for the infantry with its fire, because of this very few enemy fire-positions were suppressed and did not follow up the infantry while in offence. This altogether does not help the overall progress of the attack.
   • Tank actions. Tanks move very slowly during the offensive. Tankers do not trust the artillery men because the latter do not support tank attacks. There were cases of attacks in the wrong directions.
   • Staff work. Account of the losses is very poor. Urgent messages are delivered to staff with huge delays. Leadership is not precise. Frequently the control is lost. Unit work checking is not organized which results in many mistakes and frequent lying.
   • The main drawback in staff and unit work is poor organization of cooperation between infantry, artillery and tanks. More precisely, there is no cooperation at all. That is why units operate without proper cooperation and naturally don’t have success in their offensive.
   • One of big drawbacks in actions is lack of cooperation between the neighboring units. They do not support each other which also does not help the offensive.

Objectives on 30.09

• Eliminate the German bulge in the region of hill 123.6 because it interferes with the future offensive.
• Use existing forces to attack and use rear units to increase the numbers of frontal units.

Instructions of the Army Commander.

• many commanders show signs of lack of belief in victory. (Commanders, 316rd, 260rd), which undoubtedly has a negative effect on the fighting. We must fight these moods. Those who think in such a way should free up their posts and not interfere with fighting.
  We have all the necessary forces and equipment to crush the German fascists.
• By this time, the situation is such that the enemy wants to take Stalingrad despite any losses. Our mission is to help the Stalingrad garrison to repel all the attacks and prevent the enemy from reaching Volga.
• despite us breaking the German defenses twice (316rd, 273rd) we were unable to exploit the success. One of the reasons for this is poor division leadership and also unsatisfactory organization of cooperation.
• 16th tank corps during the offensive lost the attack direction twice and did not fulfill its objective.
• A drawback of our attacks is that the infantry uses little machine guns, submachine guns and rifle fire. Evidence to that is the fact that for ten days of fighting there were no ammo requests from the divisions.
• We observe German submachine gunners operating near our Command posts and Observing posts. We must urgently clear those areas.
• Please keep in mind that German submachine gunners and snipers are hunting primarily lower ranked officers.

Conclusion:

1. immediately address the errors pointed out by me and the head of the staff and by all means resolve them.
2. clarify the international situation {to the subordinates} and address the moods that do not facilitate the fulfillment of our common goals.

Member of the Military Council division commissar Abramov points out:

1. The military Council during the offensive was sending its representatives to 35 battalions and they have presented the material proving the unsatisfactory work performed to organize the offensive. Most of the issues were pointed out buy the army commander and the chief of staff.
   Additionally to that:
2. • not everywhere the commanders are leading the offensive spirit of the soldiers.
   • We see a lot of cases of unskilled use of weapons. During the 10 days of fighting we have spent 10 railroad cars of ammo with absolutely unsatisfactory results.
   • There are many cases of poor responsibility shown by the leadership regarding the implementation of orders.
   • The condition of party and political work is not satisfactory because it does not address the most basic questions regarding the combat support.
   • Active bayoneta saying means a front line soldier with a weapon term is understood incorrectly in the divisions, for instance: a regiment has just over a 1000 of men, but only several active bayonets are accounted for. This is wrong. We must account for all the specialists that have individual and collective weapons as well.
   • Brigade commissar Layok adds about the unsatisfactory work of evacuation services. Treatment of wounded is poorly organized especially if they get to other sanitary battalions which belong to other divisions.

ЦАМО, Фонд: 292, Опись: 6911, Дело: 41

Directive Nr. 220155 of Stavka of the Supreme Commander to the Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front about the usage of the tank armies and cavalry units for capturing bridgeheads on Vistula.

Follow up order of the Ukrainian Front

27 July 1944. 19:20

In connection with front forces capturing Lviv, Peremyshl and Yaroslav, the Stavka of the Supreme Commander orders:
Use the 1st Guards Tank army of Katukov and cavalry units to capture bridgeheads on the Western bank of Vistula in the region between Sandomier and river Visloka. Send there Rybalko’s 3rd Guards tank army following these units.

The directions regarding your plan that was sent on 24.07 will be given on 28.07.1944.

Please report about the issued instructions.

Stavka of the supreme commander
J.Stalin, A.Antonov.

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 166. Л. 417.

Follow up order of the Ukrainian Front

Order of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Commanders of the 13th Army, 3rd Guards Tank Army about the elimination of the Sandomierz enemy group and liberation of city Sandomier.

Based on Stavka directive Nr. 220155

03. August 1944.

In order to eliminate the Sandomierz enemy group as well as to enlarge and reinforce the bridgehead on the Western bank of Vistula river to the North West of Sandomier. As well to support Gordov’s 3rd Army crossing Vistula.

I order to:

1. The commander of the 1st Tank Army to decisively strike at Opatow, Ozharuw directions with the objective to eliminate the Sandomierz enemy group which is operating in front of the 3rd guards Army; by the end of 04.08 capture Ozharuw. To cover the army from the West, capture road links at Ostrovec and Laguv.
2. The commander of the 13th Army by using forces of five rifle divisions to strike from Kopshivnica, Klimontuw region at the direction of Kolechatuw, Sobutka with the objective to eliminate the Sandomierz enemy group in cooperation with the 1st Tank Army and to capture Sandomier by morning of 05.08. The region of Ivaniska, Bogorija, Stashuv shall be occupied by three rifle divisions to support the operation of the army from the West.
3. The commander of the 3rd guards Army must accelerate the crossing of Vistula river and while striking to Ozharuw, Ostrovec together with 13th Army and 1st Tank Army must eliminate the Sandomierz enemy group. By the end of 05.08 the main forces of the army must enter the region of Tarluw, Ozharuw, Opatuw.
4. The delimiting line between the 3rd grds and 13th Armies is the same until Ulyanuw, then the mouth of river San, Laguw, Kelytze - all the points except for Kieltze, inclusive for the 13th army.
5. Report about the given orders and their implementation.

Konev, Kraynyukov, Sokolovsky

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 236. Оп. 17062. Д. 16. Л. 435.

Based on Stavka directive Nr. 220155

Directive of Stavka Nr. 220162 of the Supreme Commander to the commander of the Belorussian front and Stavka representative.

About the offensive to Warsaw and capturing the bridgeheads on Narev and Vizsla.

28. July 1944. 24:00

The Stavka of the Supreme Command orders:

1. After taking Brest and Sedlec region proceed with offensive in general direction to Warsaw with an objective to take Prague not later than on 5 - 8 of August and capture a bridgehead on the Western bank of river Narev in the region of Pultusk, Serock. The left flank of the front must capture the bridgehead on the Western bank of Vizsla river in the region of Demblin, Zvoleny, Soletz. Use the captured bridgeheads to strike to the North-West direction to wrap the enemy’s defense along river Narev and Vizsla thus supporting the crossing the Narev river by the left flank of the 2nd Belorussian front as well as central armies of your own front. Further on, plan to advance in the general direction to Torn and Lodzy.
2. From 24:00 29.07 establish the following delimiting lines:
   • With the 2nd Belorussian front to Rozhany - as before and further to Czekhanuv, Strasburg, outskirts of Warsaw, Gradunetz (all points for the Belorussian front inclusive)
   • With 1st Ukraine front to Konske - as before and further Piotrkow, Ostruw (20km SouthWest from Kalish). Both points for the Belorussian front, inclusive.
3. Responsibility for organizing junctions with other fronts shall remain as before.
4. Report about the given orders.

Stavka of the Supreme Command
J.Stalin, A.Antonov

ЦАМО. Ф. 148а. Оп. 3763. Д. 166. Л. 424. Подлинник.

USSR vs Germany artillery shell usage in 1942

Source: This post was created long ago on VIF2 forum by famous historian V.Isaev and based on his research. However now that link doesn't work anymore. This is a translation of multiple reposts of Isaev's original post, like this one.

USSR		Germany
Gun caliber	Amount	Gun caliber	Amount
Regiment artillery(thousands shells)
107 mm mortar.	293,8	12cm Gr.W.	2,9
120 mm mortar	3 008,2	10cm Nb.W	551,9
76 mm regimental 1927	5 063,1	7.5cm le.I.G.18	6 200,4
76 mm regimental 1943	0	7,5cm LG 40	0
76 mm mountain 1938	654,0	7,5cm Geb.G and К	749,7
		7,62cm IKH 290(r)	0
		10,5cm LG 40 & 42	43,3
		15cm s.I.G.33	1 115,6
Total: 3 302 thousand mines and 5 717thousand shells, weight 84 724 ton		Total: 555 thousand mines and 8 109 thousand shells, weight 88 879 ton
Mid caliber division and corps artillery (thousands shells)
76 mm 02/30-36 year.	10 024,2	7,5cm Pak /KwK/FK	1 581,2
75mm M1 Howitzer	1 162,8	7,62cm Pak 36(r)	162,3
76,2mm Gun	242,1
85 mm cannon	0	8,8cm Pak /KwK /FK	15,7
122 mm howitzer	4 306,2	12,8cm Pak	0
100 mm cannon	0	10cm le.FH 30(t) and 14/19(t)	169,1
		10,5cm Geb.H 40	2,4
107 mm 10/30 year.	322,0	10cm le.FK 18	17 751 ,0
		10cm s.K 18	1 209,8
122 mm cannon 31 year.	599,1	10,5cm s.K 35(t)	39,4
100 and 102mm cannon	21,0	10,5cm K 331(f) and 332(f)	35,8
120mm cannon	9,5	12cm Haubitze 14 & 15/16(t)	0,2
		12,2cm le.FH 388(r) [10/30]	3,2
130 mm cannon	67,2	12,2cm le.FH 396(r) [M-30]	6,1
		12,2cm K 390(r) [A-19]	4,9
Total: 16 754 thousand shells, weight 187 479 ton		Total: 20 981 thousand shells, weight 295 380 ton
Divisional and corps heavy artillery (thousands shells)
		15cm s.FH 18	4 481,9
152 mm howitzer	706,3	15,5cm s.FH 414(f)	175,1
152 mm reg.how. 37 year.	1 508,8	15cm s.FH 25(t) and 37(t)	115,4
		15,2cm s.FH 445(r) [09/30]	0
		15,2cm s.FH 443(r) [M-10]	0
		15,2cm K.H. 433(r) [ML-20]	12 ,3
Total: 2 215 thousand shells, weight 94 742 ton		Total: 4 785 thousand shells, weight 207 983 ton
Heavy guns, caliber 152-203mm
		15cm K	126,6
		15cm K. 15/16(t)	0
		15,5cm K 416(f) and 418(f)	213,6
		17cm K Mrs.Laf.	25,7
203 mm howitzer 31 year.	107,4
		21cm Mrs	341,2
		21cm K 38 & 39/40	3,7
		21cm Kz.Mrs(t)	0,45
		22cm Mrs 531(f)	65,3
Total: 107 thousand shells, weight 10 472 ton		Total: 776,5 thousand shells, weight 62 001 ton
Superheavy guns (single shells)
none
		24cm K 3	1 352
		24cm H 39	3 070
		24cm s.K(t)	470
		28cm Kusten Haubitze	3 600
		30,5cm Mrs(t)	7 350
		35,5cm Haubitze M1	513
		42cm Gamma Mrs.	449
		60cm Karl	197
		Total :17 thousand shells, weight 5 186 tons

Report to the Commander of the forces of the 1st Belorussian front to deputy head of the Joint Staff of the Red Army about the difficulties with fuel supplies.

31 July 1944

Moscow
To: Joint Staff of the Red Army Antonov,
Main Logistics Headquarters of the Red Army Khrulyov

The constant cut offs from supply bases due to slow railroad repairing has caused difficulties in fuel supplies.
To mitigate this and to make it possible to supply fuel across Vizsla river, I ask to order an urgent formation of a battalion to pump the fuel. For this please provide the battalion with an imported gasoline pipeline together with all the needed gear, which is in possession of the Headquarters of the Fuel Supply of the Red Army.
The battalion must be urgently sent to Lyublin by railroad.

Rokossovsky.

ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 2307. Д. 29. Л. 59.