Attitude of Armia Ludowa regarding the capitulation.
The leadership of Armia Ludowa [AL] and other democratic organizations were not informed by the representatives of Armia Krajowa [AK] about the preparations of the capitulation. The leadership of AL were strictly against it and expressed their protests, requesting to continue the resistance.
On 27.09 during a converstation with me, general Skakowsky has said that: “I will act against the capitulation”. Skakowsky has approved the plans of escaping and uniting with the army of Berling. The unit leaders of the AL awere also supporting the continuation of the struggle and for contacting the Red Army.
However the political leadership of AL was hesitating to break up with the AK considering the difficulty of the situation. AL, which was against surrendering, was joined by the democratic elements from AK and also a considerable number of the civilians, who were counting on the Red Army.
Degradation within AK
The leadership and especially middle and lower ranks of the AK organization
were torn apart by big contradictions regarding military and political
questions. The anti Soviet policy of the government in London has suffered a
complete disaster and has discredited itself within the eyes of the
population and ordinary soldiers of AK. London delegates could not hold off
sympathy among the rebels towards the Red Army anymore.
I personally
know several officers who at first were strictly against any union with the
Red Army or Berling, but later claimed that they are ready to join AL.
The terrorist actions of PKB began to cause protests. The leadership of AK began to hesitate to prosecute the Russian prisoners. If earlier, Russians who were in AK captivity did not receive any food, then later the AK leadership was forced to acknowledge their equality. It also allowed major Volkov (from former POWs) to form a unit consisting of Russian POWs.
There were people in the AK who were against surrendering, such as colonel Bogumil the commander of one of the districts. The AK has begun searching for compromise between the policy of government in London and rebel demands to form a stable contact with the Red Army. Willing to reestablish its authority, even such reactionists as Vakhnowsky began talking about the will to find a compromise between Rolya-Zhimersky and London. However at the same time they were preparing the full capitulation.
In the military respect carelessness prevailed among the leadership of AK. Only in the last period trenching was activated. The barricades were not improved. There were drinking and revelry cases among the officers of AK, especially at Mokotuv district.
Within the AK signs of political degradation were evident. It became known that general Sosnowsky was replaced by “Bor”. There were rumors about the forthcoming dismissal of “Bor”. Messages arriving from London testified that there were contradictions within Mikolaichik and the ministers.
In the evening of 29.09 Mikolaichik deputy (allegedly in the rank of colonel) invited general Skakovsky. Two questions were discussed there:
- Skakowsky’s attitude regarding the capitulation. Skakowsky has replied in a sharply negative manner, demanding struggle till the end.
- Skakowsky’s attitude regarding his promotion to replace general “Bor”. Mikolaichik’s deputy has underlined that Skakowsky’s candidacy is supported by the government in London and Lyublin. Skakowsky allegedly didn’t respond positively to this matter.
Surrendering
On 29-30.09 the leadership of AK has finished the preparation to surrender. Money reserve of amount up to 1,5 million zloty was buried and respective organization have prepared themselves to go underground.
According to the agreement with Germans, on 30.09 the first exit of the civil population has begun. The time window was established every day from 5:00 till 19:00, military operations continued outside of these hours. AK soldiers and officers started to panic. They were trying to dress as civilians and leave among them. AL was still objecting the capitulation.
In the evening of 28.09 I visited General “Monter”. Colonel Vakhnowsky was
present during this meeting as well as chief of staff colonel “Hirurg”.
I said to General “Monter”: “As a Soviet Officer I propose to develop
a plan on how to cross Visla. I will coordinate the actions with the Red
Army to provide artillery covering fire and infantry support from the other
bank. We must concentrate all the rebel forces to perform a strike. We have
enough machine guns, ATRs and amoo for them. I ask you to develop a plan and
inform me”.
General “Monter” answered: “I will think about this.
However it is strange that the Red Army doesn’t come to help us”.
Colonel Vakhnowsky said: “This is a good plan, but we have no ammo”.
When I noted that despite the lack of ammo they still managed to hold
on until now, Vakhnowsky answered that the uprising was not planned for such
a long period etc.
In that way I didn’t receive an answer to my
proposal.
During the talk with colonel Slabvor and Bogumil I also expressed this plan to them. They cheerfully approved it, but said that they will obey the leadership of AK and will not go against its orders.
As noted before, the leadership of AL has agreed with my plan.
On
29.09 I requested answer from “Monter” twice in written form and by
telephone, but I received no answer. On this day at “Monter’s” staff they
refused to give me the information about the enemy, motivating it with
absence of new data.
In the evening of 01.10 I was visited by general
“Monter’s” adjutant captain Boguslawsky callsign “Korob” who was very
sympathetic towards me and the Red Army.
Boguslawsky has warned me of the following:
- The leadership of AK has decided to surrender.
- I must leave immediately, because assasination attempt is being prepared against me as a representative of the Red Army.
After assessing the situation, I made a decision to leave about which I reported on the radio. I went down the manhole, went along the pipes following previously scouted path to Visla, swam across the river and went ashore around the bridge of Ponyatowsky. I notified the members of the Lyublin government in Warsaw about this route.
About the actions of captain Kalugin
After arriving to Warsaw I found out that 3-4 days prior to my arrival captain Kalugin has went to the Soviet side. He was at “Monter’s” staff and was considered an official representative of the Soviet command.
The officers of AL said me that Kalugin was exceptionally trusted by
“Monter” and was called “Soviet military attache”. Kalugin has taken part in
all the meetings of AK staff.
Kalugin has issued leaflets addressing
the Russian cossacks, traitors who were on the German side. He called them
to join the Red Army or the rebels. These leaflets were dropped from
airplanes.
Of Kalugin’s personal omens I know only that he lacks 2-3 fingers on his hand. Kalugin was sent by “Monter” on the Eastern bank and allegedly had some important plans with him.
Source: ЦАМО РФ. Ф. 233. Оп. 2380. Д. 22. Л. 238–244.
Source: warsaw75.mil.ru
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